Volume LXV *March 1950* *Number 1*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD AS A TEACHER

IN 1909 when Columbia's veteran college dean, John Howard Van Amringe, was about to retire, the campus paper polled the students on his successor. Charles Beard was the overwhelming preference. He had been teaching hardly more than four years; his own pioneer courses in politics had begun in 1907. Though always accessible, he cared as little as any man about academic management. His easy ways belied how fiercely intent he was on research, writing, and practical service. Yet students, graduate and undergraduate alike, turned to this man as to the light. The warmth about the mouth complementing the glint of the eagle eyes, the spare simplicity, the unstudied attitude of proud and equal deference to all human beings of whatever age and position, all radiated beyond his own classes. As I think back on the magic of it, I recall that when I was a junior I found myself suddenly thinking one day—unbidden by any personal situation—that if I did not have a father and were free to choose one in all the world, he would be Charles Beard. I had not been in his courses, nor indeed did I take work in his department until I was a graduate student and already an instructor, but I had enjoyed something like substitute contacts as a member of debating teams to which he gave much time as an adviser. The impressive thing about the idea I mention is that at the time it seemed to me natural and obvious; I took it for granted that many if not all students felt exactly the same way.

I

Charles Beard's influence as a teacher was not confined to the dozen years he was a professor at Columbia. A country

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journalist even before he entered college, he carried into graduate work and scholarship the communicative zest that made him a builder in the movement for adult education. Though his contribution to the founding of Ruskin College while he was a student at Oxford in 1899 was made in the upswing of labor politics, it was characteristic of Beard to wish to link workers' education to the resources of the great university tradition. Later, even before Beard left Columbia, he was associated with the pioneer training school for the public service established in 1911 under the New York Bureau of Municipal Research and, as head of the Bureau's Training School for Public Service after 1917 and later of the Bureau itself, he gave much of his time to such training. In the same period, too, he lectured at the New School for Social Research and conducted a course for the School of Social Work. While at Columbia, as well as later, he gave sustained series of lectures which were not only the source of published works but also the occasion of close contact with two college communities.[1] In the late thirties, he returned for a semester to the old department at Columbia, which in a very real sense he had never left, so substantial had been the projection of his presence. Beard's unflagging zest as a teacher was likewise shown in a year of full-time residence at Johns Hopkins in 1940-1941. There his crowded seminar overflowed in endless conferences of a singularly vital and warming kind and he became the busy architect of a plan for the study of American cultural history.

Through the long years in which Beard had no permanent connection with any institution, he was in fact an advisory member of countless departments of government and history. His influence was not merely as a writer of texts and treatises. It was not merely as the faithful participant in conventions and other gatherings of teachers in the fields of the social studies. In addition, as V. O. Key said in introducing Beard to the American Political Science Association in 1947, no one will ever know how many individual scholars without shred of institutional claim sought and received help from one who was

[1] At Amherst College in 1916, published as *The Economic Basis of Politics* (1922); at Dartmouth College in 1922, published as *Cross Currents in Europe To-day* (1922).

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ostensibly fully occupied as a professional writer and always acutely aware how scanty are the working hours in the racing years, but who was too instinctively a teacher to disregard requests for counsel. Not least important was the time Beard spared for comment on the basic problems of research and instruction. The Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association in its report in 1937 on *The Unique Function of Education in American Democracy* stated that, "when approaching the problem, the Commission decided to seek assistance from the man best qualified for the task by scholarship, social insight, and devotion to democratic institutions. The Commission thereupon voted without difficulty and with complete unanimity that Dr. Beard was especially fitted for this task." [2] The assignment was not the only call of the sort; undertakings of this kind were especially suited to a man who had exhibited a lifelong brooding concern about what goes on in the discussion of public affairs.

Beard's influence as a teacher, then, was multiple and continuous. The constant factor was a fusion of personality and viewpoints. It is with this complex during the period of his full-time teaching that I am mainly concerned.

II

Many qualities enter in varying combinations to make a good teacher; nor is there one type of great teacher. The strength of one ingredient may offset the absence of others. Two elements, however, are usually present in outstanding teachers; their interaction helps to make the teacher as distinguished from other craftsmen of thought and expression. One element is curiosity about truth amounting to passion. The other is concern for the fulfillment of individuals. The emphasis varies with the type of teacher. Sometimes the latter trait is dominant. In that sense, as George Herbert Palmer put it, the aptitudes of the successful teacher include vicariousness and a readiness to be forgotten.[3] On the other hand, in many great

[2] Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association, *The Unique Function of Education in American Democracy* (Washington, 1937), preface.

[3] George H. Palmer, *The Ideal Teacher* (Boston, 1910), pp. 8 and 25-26.

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teachers—perhaps the greatest—it is love of the subject for the sake of comprehending it that is paramount. The gift of communication there must be, of course; sometimes the special force of effective transmission lies in sheer lucidity, sometimes in the excitement of suffused eloquence. In great teachers, probably, both love of subject and concern for students are aspects of the underlying zest to see things as they are, attended by a thrill of discovery that prevents rest until not only the result but also the method of discovery itself is shared with others.

One gropes vainly for words that explain why and how seekers reach out and share with others. Charles Warren in an essay in 1912 on notable Harvard teachers, commenting on men like Agassiz, Shaler, Norton and Pierce, found it no curious coincidence that all who had been "great not merely because of their learning, but because of the lasting impress they made on their students", should have had in common the characteristic of "human sympathy".[4] The phrase describes rather than explains an Agassiz, for example, chary of abstraction, hot on bringing others into "the light of the world's concrete fullness," as William James said of him.[5] Agassiz's method was the much challenged device of the lecture. Yet Henry Adams recalled that during his own student years at Harvard "the only teaching that appealed to his imagination was a course of lectures by Louis Agassiz on the Glacial Period and Palaeontology which had more influence on his curiosity than the rest of the college instruction together."[6]

Personality cannot be separated from outlook. To seek to promote great teaching by prescribing "great personalities" has well been called a counsel of futility. Consequently, before passing to Charles Beard's characteristics of person and of speech and his methods of instruction, it is appropriate to consider attitudes that were fundamental in his power as a teacher.

[4] Charles Warren, "A Plea for Personality in Professors", *Harvard Graduates Magazine*, XXI (September 1912), 53.

[5] "Address on the Commemoration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Arrival of Louis Agassiz in the United States"; quoted in *Great Teachers*, Houston Peterson, ed. (New Brunswick, 1946), p. 204.

[6] Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* (Boston, 1918), p. 60.

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III

Much of Beard's influence as a teacher was a result of the awareness of time and change that he always conveyed, along with a confidence in the future that flooded upward through even the most astringent mordancy. Speaking as president of the American Political Science Association in 1926 to those who were peculiarly his fellows and successors in classroom instruction, Beard asked: " Can those of us who teach and write to-day honestly avoid the challenging fact that their students must work in the substance of the approaching years, not the ashes of the yesterday? "[7] The title of this presidential address was clue and challenge in itself: " Time, Technology, and the Creative Spirit in Political Science ". In his class lectures as in his writing, references to " becoming reality ", the " becoming future ", and " constantly becoming situations " were as frequent as allusions to " the Socratic elenchus ". Two of his favorite turns of speech were joined in a sentence in a mid-career discussion of the methods of political science that Beard contributed to a symposium on research:

> . . . the Socratic elenchus is the prime instrument for training intelligence; and the only tolerable goal of our labors must be an artistically perfect adjustment of our conduct and ideas to the noblest imagined potentialities of the constantly becoming situations, thus uniting the word and the deed which were not asunder in the beginning and will not be at the end.[8]

In Charles Beard something that was almost ambivalent flowed from the fact that his idea of progress associated vast cumulative forces and a creative morality. Illustrations may fittingly be drawn from the stage of his active teaching. In a published lecture on " Politics " contributed in 1908 to a series by various departmental spokesmen, he declared his faith that " society has come from crude and formless associations beginning in a dim and dateless past and moves outward into an

[7] *American Political Science Review*, XXI (February 1927), 4.

[8] " Political Science ", *Research in the Social Sciences*, Wilson Gee, ed. (New York, 1929), p. 287.

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illimitable future, which many of us believe will not be hideous and mean, but beautiful and magnificent." The sentence that followed hinted at the source of the ambivalence while affirming a larger unity. "In this dynamic society, the citizen becomes co-worker in that great and indivisible natural process which draws down granite hills and upbuilds great nations." [9] An essay in 1910 on the study and teaching of politics was an enthusiastic prospectus of the many opportunities and attractions offered by the new field of study. There was place, he wrote, for the scholar's detachment while serving "the practical interests of humanity in its great struggle to secure the highest economies of collective effort in combination with the largest fruitfulness for the individual life." [10] Possible roots for the ambivalence I have mentioned were evident in another remark in the same paper. "Master publicists", Beard exclaimed, "are made largely by time and circumstance; and it is given to few men to write the moral philosophy for the political passion of a great age, or to clothe a powerful social interest in the form of an inexorable and compelling logic."

I leave it to others to consider Beard's resolution of a universal problem. Any viable philosophy, however open-ended and however normative, must concede that life abounds in determined sequences, if not inevitable choices and fixed ends. Suffice it here to deal with the way in which the problem reacted on Beard's teaching. One effect was an ever-present sense of largeness as well as movement. A further outcome was a rapid and at times unpredictable alternation of Beard's moods of emphasis. Sometimes, with almost acid irony, the stress was upon the mighty processes in which men's efforts contribute to results better than their own motives or are bent to different or even opposite ultimate ends. Then, swiftly as the changing sky, Beard's outlook and manner might become those of the ardent or indignant idealist. Part of the excitement of his teaching lay in this almost gusty shift of viewpoint and change of pace.

[9] "Politics", *Lectures on Science, Philosophy and Art* (*Columbia University Lectures* [New York, 1908]), pp. 9-10.

[10] "The Study and Teaching of Politics", *Columbia University Quarterly*, XII (June 1910), p. 269.

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Nevertheless the decisive quality in Beard's impact as a teacher was consistency rather than alternation. The dominant and lasting chords were always humanity, standards, judgment, responsibility, hope. Perhaps the effect was religious in the sense in which Alfred North Whitehead used the word in saying that the essence of education is the inculcation of duty and reverence—duty arising "from our potential control over the course of events" and reverence from the perception "that the present holds within itself the complete sum of existence, backwards and forwards, that whole amplitude of time, which is eternity."[11] In Beard's case the positive net effect was partly due to sheer vitality. As he himself said in a lecture (if a student's notes reported him rightly), "Pessimism isn't a matter of philosophy but of temperament." The basis lay even more directly, however, in his view of the world.

IV

The outlook that Beard brought to teaching was shown in his first and almost forgotten book, *The Industrial Revolution*, published in England in January 1901 and reprinted nine times. It was written to sell for a shilling. In his preface to the 1902 printing Beard commented on its reissuance without a thorough revision, saying: "I believe it will continue to serve my original purpose, which was to supply a concise and inexpensive outline of the Industrial Revolution as a guide to students seeking for the first time the historical basis of modern social and economic problems." The book was intended primarily for adult education in the labor and coöperative movements. In 1902 Beard himself did not doubt "that the reorganization of industrial society upon a democratic basis will be brought about by a political and social movement depending for its numerical strength upon the working classes." F. York Powell, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, whom Beard and his fellow-American, Walter Vrooman, had secured as presiding officer at the inaugural meeting of Ruskin College on February 22, 1899, contributed an introduction on Beard's request be-

[11] Alfred N. Whitehead, *The Aims of Education and Other Essays* (New York, 1929), p. 23.

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cause, as he wrote to another, "He is an old pupil of mine, and the nicest American I ever knew."[12] Powell's own anxious concern was for the enlightenment of working people on the threshold of great political power. Yet he was downright about the past when he wrote in the introduction to Beard's book: "The English people, never by any plague, or famine, or war, suffered such a deadly blow at its vitality as by the establishment of the factory system without the proper safeguards."

As for Beard, it was full of meaning that the name Ruskin was given to the building founded in 1899 as a residence center for workers within sound of Oxford's bells. And it was to those who appraised the economic order in terms of beauty, kindness, decency, and the high aesthetic of function and style that Beard appealed in his first book. "The Political Economists who regarded society as composed of a group of independent and warring units did not long occupy the fortress of knowledge unassailed", he wrote. "Owen, Carlyle, Maurice, Kingsley, Ruskin—the humanitarians—impeached in eloquent, if not always logical, English the old assumptions."[13] Beard himself had none of the traces of condescension not always absent in the humanitarians, even Ruskin and York Powell. What he shared was their classless sense of usefulness and distributive justice. Before Beard came to Columbia for the completion of his graduate work he had lived and lectured in England's Black Country. He returned to the United States angry at squalor and waste. Essentially, however, the book he had already written was a plea to take advantage of the opportunities opened by the Industrial Revolution. Along with indignation there was confidence in a possible future that would be "beautiful and magnificent."[14]

In Beard's teaching his innate respect for human beings, his sense of movement, and his confidence in the becoming future always triumphed in their combined effect over irony, over sarcasm, over even occasional bitterness and innuendo. I think he

[12] Oliver Elton, *Frederick York Powell: A Life and a Selection from His Letters and Occasional Writings* (Oxford, 1906), I, 314.

[13] *The Industrial Revolution*, p. 81.

[14] *Lectures on Science, Philosophy and Art, loc. cit.*, p. 10.

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was cautious about the rising schools of psychology in the study of politics not so much because they stressed factors that challenged the environmental interpretation of events but more because the new explanations—as Ernest Barker phrased the matter in a notable inaugural address—threatened to deny "the unity secured to the mind by a pervading and freely moving reason."[15] Indeed, Beard's later views on certain foreign policies (with the postulates and conclusions of which I could not agree) showed how little of determinism there was in his thinking. For at the core of his anger then was the belief that opportunities had been missed by wrong decisions.

In Beard's transforming presence as a teacher, students sensed understanding even in condemnation. He practiced what he mentioned in commenting later on a former instructor, the historian George Lincoln Burr.

> I do remember one thing that I heard him say in his seminar during the fall term of 1899, when I was a student at Cornell. . . . The saying was: "It is only through sympathy, never through hatred, that we can understand an age or a people." . . . It struck fire in my mind then, and has burned there for more than forty years.[16]

V

I think my memory does not trick me in recalling an incident that throws light on the attitude and atmosphere that Charles Beard brought to teaching. Promethean may be exactly the word. We were in his office between classes. Did I know what he considered the greatest lines in English poetry? It was more than a guess when I named at once the closing lines of Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*. I was right. At least I was right for that hour, and I was right also, I think, in terms of a deep and durable resilience in the man; whatever he said, his bearing and voice and the spirit behind them implied that love does not repent and that hope can create from its own wrecks

[15] Ernest Barker, *The Study of Political Science and Its Relation to Cognate Studies* (Cambridge, England, 1928), p. 33.

[16] Roland H. Bainton, "'Poppy' Burr", in *Great Teachers*, edited by Houston Peterson, p. 177.

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the thing it contemplates. Even if my memory errs about this incident—an electric moment still in my retrospect—the fact that I could conceive it at all is a commentary on the qualities that Beard communicated to the men about him.

Beard's classroom methods were very uneven, apart from the alternation of viewpoint that I have mentioned earlier. Graduate students, for example, remember marches of logical exposition—sometimes level, oftener mounting—and the timbre of an eloquence that seemed almost imperious. On the other hand, I am interested to note that Irwin Edman, who took politics as a freshman, has written of Beard the teacher as a "lanky figure leaning against the wall, drawling wittily with half-closed eyes. . . ." Edman wrote that, under "his easy, drawling manner, we sensed a passionate concern for an understanding of the realities of government, the economic forces and the interested persons involved in it, and the ideal of government: the liberation of the energies of men." But Edman, when recounting his galaxy of great Columbia teachers, could identify no special technique that accounted for Beard's influence. "He was clear, he was suggestive, he was witty. But none of these things could quite account for the hold he had on the smug and the rebels alike, on both the pre-lawyers and the pre-poets." Edman added his own estimate: "I suspect it was a certain combination of poetry, philosophy, and honesty in the man himself, a sense he communicated that politics mattered far beyond the realm commonly called political, and an insight he conveyed into the life that forms of government furthered or betrayed." [17]

Beard's unevenness of method made him at times seem perfunctory as well as unpremeditating. None the less, even on these occasions, he usually added significance as well as gusto. Thus in 1909, the year of the appearance of his own *Readings* on politics, he wrote in the *History Teacher's Magazine* with almost naïve enthusiasm about the use of source material. "I always take Ash's edition of the charter of New York City—a portly volume of about a thousand pages—into my classroom and perform before the eyes of the students the experiment of running through the chief titles." This remark might be a

[17] Irwin Edman, *Philosopher's Holiday* (New York, 1938), pp. 130-131.

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travesty on descriptive political science in its heyday when facts were free and equal. Under Beard's casual touch, however, the operation would doubtless be an *experiment* in which municipal functions would begin to mean something in their relations and involvements. Another procedure that risked being perfunctory was to summarize some writer—Aristotle, for example—taking his ideas just as they came, chapter by chapter. Here Beard's genius showed itself in the offhand running comments and perhaps a few words at the end.

When one describes Beard's teaching as often casual he remembers as apt what Confucius (in the rendering of Lin Yu-tang) said of the ideal teacher: "His words are concise but expressive, casual but full of hidden meaning, and he is good at drawing ingenious examples to make people understand him." [18] The oblique method is in line with what Sidney Hook has said about how to convey the vision indispensable in great teaching. "Its presence should be inferrible from the spirit with which the instruction is carried on", he has pointed out, adding that "it should operate in such a way as to lift up the students' hearts and minds beyond matters of immediate concern and enable them to see the importance of a point of view." [19]

Still, as I have said, much of Beard's power and impact in graduate teaching was by lectures. Although soliloquy is not always instruction, the method of the lecture, at its best and in many forms, can recapture the condition of nascence, thus approximating a series of mental experiments in which ideas are born or at least lived through again in such a natural order and with such vitality that the hearers seem to be present at the first birth of the ideas themselves. Sometimes this precious quality goes with a tentative, testing, even halting advance from one point to the next. Beard's usual manner was more sweeping and assured but it contrived, aided by the kindling face and the edged voice, to share the sense of discovery. On occasion it was his habit—perhaps encouraged by early training in logical argumentation at DePauw—to direct the march of thought to a con-

[18] "The Ideal Teacher", in *Unseen Harvests: A Treasury of Teaching*, Claude M. Fuess and Emory S. Basford, eds. (New York, 1947), p. 342.

[19] Sidney Hook, *Education for Modern Man* (New York, 1946), p. 192.

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clusion in the manner of *The Federalist* papers. A story was almost always at hand to be told with considerable power of mimicry, which was not less appreciated because in this art Beard was seldom able to get wholly outside his own character. Personal anecdotes were few; there was none of the improvised autobiography that has well been called the nadir of teaching.

The shock method as such was not characteristic of Beard's teaching. It was not that he did not preach the need for the eternally challenging question: is it true; is it true for my age; is it true for me; isn't exactly the opposite true? He consciously practiced simplification and emphasis. "A good teacher must exaggerate", a student's notes report his saying to a class in 1918, and he quoted Ruskin. This quality was personal and an aspect of his art. It has been present in most of his creative writing; its relative absence in his textbooks on politics somewhat dulled their edge while doubtless widening their usefulness as texts. To his own students Beard's presence implied so rich a background of understanding, tolerance, and unspoken qualification that the selectivity and stress of his teaching technique were never dogmatic.

Beard's reading and memory made it easy for him to point his lectures and conversation not only with historical anecdotes but also with exact quotations. Students were especially charmed, I think, by a few that constantly recurred. But the range of allusion was wide and surprising. Still there was in Beard no trace of the code that assimilates scholarship to good manners, making aptness in elegant quotation seem one with knowing the right people and where in Paris to have shirts made. This observation leads me to add that, although Beard never paraded iconoclasm and often spoke of the decent respect that is due to the opinions of mankind, one of the qualities that galvanized students was a vague yet real sense of Beard's indifference to academic punctilio, convention, and prestige. It is more than a play on words to say that Beard was earnest rather than serious; certainly he was not solemn, although it was not in a man with so much feeling to maintain the constantly light touch. Ten years after he left Columbia Beard wrote of university life in general: "Perhaps it needs a little laughter, more

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than it does changes in administration and curriculum." Humor was not the whole of his prescription. Without disparaging the opportunities that universities afford, he found in them "too much routine, not enough peace; too much calm, not enough passion; . . . too many theories, not enough theory; too many books, not enough strife of experience; too many students, not enough seekers." [20]

In his attitude toward the run of students, Beard's humanity dominated his realism. His standards of excellence led him, as a matter of cold insight privately expressed, to see in few students minds and interests that properly warranted much trouble on the college teacher's part. Beard did not dissemble, however, when he utterly failed to show this attitude in class or conference. He treated all with respect and genuine liking. Doubtless this trait was deepened by the perspective, pity, and modesty that edge and underlie irony. Beard never engaged in sarcasm at the expense of his hearers.

Perhaps a combination of tolerance and realism led Beard to be too easy as a critic and guide of students' work. His characteristics in this respect might have been a handicap if he had remained long in graduate instruction. Certainly he could be a ruthless as well as a driving editor as he showed in reviewing papers written at the Bureau and elsewhere. Mainly Beard evoked by warmth and example. The method of leadership natural to him was suggestiveness; he tended to assume that others would be artists too or must find their own level. "I urge you", he said to a class, "to have a dislike for books when they are not inspired; when you read one just wonder how much better you could write it yourself—and try it."

VI

Beard's influence as a teacher included the effect of his personal example and his textbooks in shaping bodies of subject matter for instruction. His own graduate work at Columbia, following a year at Oxford and a half year at Cornell and two more years abroad, involved work in public law under John W.

[20] *Research in the Social Sciences*, edited by Wilson Gee, pp. 289-290.

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Burgess, Frank J. Goodnow, John Bassett Moore, and others. It was the closing period of the golden age of the Columbia Faculty of Political Science, a leader in the still small circle of places in the United States for advanced social studies. Beard began his actual teaching in history and did his first sustained writing in that field, although years before as a young journalist he had dealt with politics firsthand. Soon a deep and inveterate concern with public policy, together with the temper of the time, led him to conceive a program of instruction oriented to active citizenship and trained administration in the modern state. In 1907 Beard launched what was virtually a separate college department of politics, linked to the existing graduate Department of Public Law and Jurisprudence. His new beginning course became the matrix of the textbook on *American Government and Politics* published three years later. This text was almost unique when issued; for a time it dominated a field it helped largely to create. Its omnibus and relatively impersonal character increased while it diluted Beard's consolidating influence upon the subject. The combined effect of man and book helped to standardize the introductory course in American colleges as a careful description of the structure and methods of American government on its several levels. The acceptance of this pattern was reflected in the 1913 report of a committee of the American Political Science Association, which recommended

> the advisability of selecting American government as the basic course because it is convinced that there is an imperative need for a more thorough study of American institutions, because the opportunity for this study is not now afforded in any but a few of the best secondary schools, and because it is exceedingly important that the attention of an undergraduate be directed early in his course to a vital personal interest in his own government, national, state, and local.[21]

In contributing to the trend, Beard's influence was important rather than strictly novel. James Bryce's descriptive volume had been available for nearly two decades. Edmund J. James at Pennsylvania and Albert Bushnell Hart and A. Lawrence

[21] *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association*, X (1914), 258.

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Lowell at Harvard, among others, had been teaching American government fairly realistically. Beard himself, in an ebullient essay on the study and teaching of politics in the year in which his text appeared, observed that "within the last quarter of a century . . . the stress and content in the study of politics and government have been revolutionized. . . ." It was no longer confined, he wrote, to "commentaries on Aristotle, the Constitution, and the waywardness of politicians," although the field should not lose "its charm for the scholar of philosophic bent, occupied with large and important theories as to the origin, tendencies, and destiny of mankind politically organized."[22]

The trend in a sense, and certainly as Beard conceived it, was a return to the study of government from the standpoint of statecraft. Such had been the early ideal of the subject shared by lawyers whose interests were political as well as legal. But the impulse had remained largely unrealized. "On the whole," Luther L. Bernard has pointed out in a survey of the development of social thought and institutions in the United States, "the historical and public law aspects of politics won out in spite of the manifest wishes of Franklin, Washington, Jefferson and Madison, due to the more strategic position and greater influence of history and law in the colleges."[23] Even at Columbia, where the term "political science" has been used in the title of the graduate faculty founded in 1880 to cover history, economics, and later sociology as well as public law, the teaching tradition was heavily historical and legal. The original outgoing purpose of preparation for public affairs, moreover, had tended to turn in upon itself. In the colleges generally at the time when Beard returned from England, the condition described by Henry Seidel Canby was not untypical: "Sociology and economics were under way. Only government lagged, for we Americans still felt that the founding fathers had handed down from Sinai all we need to know about government."[24]

[22] *Columbia University Quarterly, loc. cit.*

[23] "United States", *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1930), I, 330.

[24] Henry S. Canby, *Alma Mater: The Gothic Age of the American College* (New York, 1936), p. 67.

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When the change came, however, it was motivated too often by an uncritical faith that a detailed description of the organs of government would automatically quicken not only intelligence in using them but also and especially the will to do so. The effect for many students was to divert attention from formal political theory and from subjects like administrative law without giving them a new grasp of the ends of man's organized efforts and the dynamics of his political life. Beard himself could take for granted a superb background of reading in political philosophy and public law; not every one who sought to follow in his steps was alert to what this background implied.

From the outset, of course, Beard intended that description should be directed to the moving forces. In his keynote lectures on politics in 1908 he spoke of the quest for responsibility and declared his belief "that the party in general and particular, as a center of power and a working institution, offers the richest field of investigation now open to the student of politics, and the results of really scientific investigation would have the highest theoretical and practical value."[25] Beard also helped to direct the attention of observers of government to what became known as the politics of pressure groups. His interest and influence were signalized by his early and characteristically generous recognition of the significance of Arthur F. Bentley's *The Process of Government* on its appearance in 1908. It was no fault of Beard that as the vogue of this approach spread and monographs on pressure politics multiplied, realism at times seemed to be standing in its own light, obscuring, on the one hand, the diffused sources and accretion of the ideas of a people and, on the other, the distinctive rôle of party.

Soon after he took up the teaching of politics, and for a time with especially direct and informing influence, Beard was a leader and organizer, though not exactly a pathfinder, in the rising branch of study called public administration. He had been a student and colleague of Frank J. Goodnow of whom he wrote much later: ". . . it may be safely said that Mr. Goodnow was the first scholar in the United States to recognize the immense importance of administration in modern society and to

[25] *Lectures on Science, Philosophy and Art, loc. cit.*, p. 24.

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sketch the outlines of the field." [26] Still Beard's concern with social problems and policy led him to react from Goodnow's legal approach to city government; he launched a graduate course on municipal activities and dashed off a textbook on the subject. The Beard of those years had the zeal to compile the reform charters of cities in printed, loose-leaf style. He worked closely with the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, which since 1906 had become a center of influence upon every level of government. The bulletin written by Beard for the Bureau in preparation for the New York state constitutional convention of 1915 is pronounced by Dwight Waldo in his survey of half a century of writing on public administration to be "an important document in the history of American political thought." "For this 'new *Federalist*'", as Waldo calls the bulletin in his estimate, "is a conscious statement of fundamental philosophy and a summary and synthesis of the political thought of the previous decades." Although some of it is outmoded, "for the most part American political science and public administration have been content to work within its framework." [27]

In later years Beard was whimsically skeptical about some of the proverbs of the early public administration movement. None the less, he was long an influential enthusiast and never really an apostate about the existence of "an enormous body of exact and usable knowledge in the domain of administration" and about its teachability. "Anything that is known can be communicated, can be imparted to youth," he said in a reminiscent talk on "the philosophy, science, and art of public administration" before the annual conference of the Governmental Research Association in 1939; "it can be taught, learned, and used." He added: "If universities have a warm and living interest in the future of our government and civilization they will teach it, and public officials and politicians will take note of

[26] *Essays on the Law and Practice of Governmental Administration: A Volume in Honor of Frank Johnson Goodnow*, Charles G. Haines and Marshall E. Dimock, eds. (Baltimore, 1935), Introduction, p. vi.

[27] Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration* (New York, 1948), p. 37.

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it, profit by it, and improve the public services as a result of it." [28]

VII

Beard himself while an active teacher was increasingly intent upon a type of subject matter that had been overlaid by descriptive political science, although in Beard's own case an awareness of it had never been absent in his personal conduct of even the most elementary course. By the time he left Columbia his main teaching interest was a discussion of what he called principles. In speculating one day about the scope of politics, he referred to Aristotle's analysis and read the list of that writer's main headings, exclaiming: "Is not that a magnificent array of topics compared with Beard's 'Government and Politics,' for example, or any other treatise from the United States?" But his approach remained chary of formal categories. He told a class in the principles of politics at the Bureau in 1918:

> I have little patience with attempts to classify forms of government. After all, when you get down to the brass tacks of government, what do you have? You do not have any state at all; there is no such thing. What you have in government is concrete acts of power. . . . The only way we can know the state is through concrete manifestation of power. The only way to find the manifestation is to discover its historical circumstance.

Political science in the United States, Beard believed, had been impoverished and trivialized by denying the structure of society. In seeking to lift and rescue the subject, he remained skeptical of the value of thinking in abstractions apart from content and context. Events are indispensable prompters in framing fundamental issues and seeking relevant answers. "On the whole," ran his double complaint when discussing research in 1929, "our political thinking has not kept up with our factual evolution; it lags behind the march of affairs; it has been concerned with minutiae, not great causes and ideas." [29] The

[28] *Philosophy, Science and Art of Public Administration* (an address published as a pamphlet by the Governmental Research Association at Princeton, 1939), p. 5.

[29] *Research in the Social Sciences*, edited by Wilson Gee, p. 291.

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body of academic theory he sought to encourage was the sort of systematic thinking about ends and means that should be characteristic of constructive statesmen.

* * * * * *

Charles Beard was always much more than a teacher; he never ceased to be one. Doubtless much was gained for the schools as well as the public when he became a member-at-large of all faculties and was spared for thinking and writing. Still something was lost by the circumstances that limited the direct impress of his presence and of the accommodating play of his mind upon several generations of students. How much was lost we shall never know, so mysteriously ramified is the transmission of such a personality. As Henry Adams said, "A parent gives life, but as parent, gives no more. . . . A teacher affects eternity; he can never tell where his influence stops." [30]

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[30] Henry Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

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HIGH TIDE OF APPEASEMENT: THE ROAD TO MUNICH, 1937-38

"COME and tell me," said the wife of the British ambassador, "will you be naughty?" The time was August 1938; the subject under discussion Czechoslovakia; the remark addressed to Germany's ambassador in Moscow. Count Schulenburg did not record his reply to the question, which may, indeed, have embarrassed him. But had his profession permitted him to be frank, he might have answered that Germany truly intended to be naughty and that she would go on being so as long as there was no compelling reason for changing her ways. That there was no such reason in 1937 and 1938 will be clear to anyone who consults the British and German diplomatic papers now available in four bulky volumes.

The German documents now printed [1] are the first fruits of the joint Anglo-French-American project for the publication of selected papers from the captured archives of the German Foreign Office and the Reich Chancellery. The first volume deals primarily with the background and execution of the *Anschluss* in March 1938, although it also contains substantial sections on Germany's relations with the United States, Soviet Russia and the Holy See and on Germany's foreign policy in the Far East in 1937-38. The second volume is devoted entirely to the Czech problem and carries the story as far as the conference at Munich. The British volumes [2] are part of the series which

[1] *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945: From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry.* Series D (1937-1945). Volume I: *From Neurath to Ribbentrop,* cv, 1220 pp., $3.25. Volume II: *Germany and Czechoslovakia, 1937-38,* lxxv, 1070 pp., $3.25. Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949. Hereafter cited as *GD.* The chief American editor for these volumes was Raymond James Sontag who also, with James Stuart Beddie, edited *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941,* issued separately by the Department of State in 1948.

[2] E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (editors), *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939.* Third Series. Volume I: *1938,* lv, 655 pp., 21*s.* Volume II: *1938,* lxxvii, 692 pp., 21*s.* London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1949. Series I, documents for the years beginning 1919, and Series II, for the years beginning 1930, are already in course of publication. The British documents will be cited hereafter as *BD.*

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was projected by the Foreign Office in 1944 and which will eventually give full documentation on the course and execution of British foreign policy from 1919 to 1939. The first volume reviewed here begins with the fall of Austria and covers the period which ended with the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague in July 1938. The second volume covers the months July to September 1938.

Yellow books and other diplomatic collections sponsored by official agencies have not always been received with full confidence by independent scholars. These volumes should satisfy the most suspicious. As far as the German volumes are concerned, there was no reason for the editors to disguise, and no need to attempt to exaggerate, the record of aggression laid bare in the documents. And if anyone feared that the British Foreign Office might suppress material which illustrated the inadequacies of British diplomacy before Munich, he will be reassured by reading the papers selected by Professor Woodward and Mr. Butler. The British record is frank to the point of being embarrassing.

This does not mean that these volumes must not be used with caution. In both England and Germany much went on behind the scenes which is not reflected in the diplomatic correspondence. The British editors point out that it is not their purpose to present " a complete record of the processes of formulation of policy as distinct from execution," since reasons of constitutional propriety forbid the inclusion of " discussion and divergencies of view in the Cabinet and between Departments and individuals." In the German documents, also, the factors that shaped policy are not always clearly delineated, nor can they be. Hitler distrusted many of the career diplomats in his service, and often kept them in ignorance of his intentions. As the editors say: " The attentive reader will frequently see evidence of this situation and will realize that their reports and instructions do not always reflect the actual policy of the Reich."

On the other hand, both sets of documents throw light upon the major differences of opinion which had to be resolved before policy took final form. The British volumes make it clear that there were people in the Foreign Office and the diplomatic serv-

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ice who were not always convinced of the wisdom of Mr. Chamberlain's course; and the German documents reveal that some German diplomats believed honestly in a negotiated settlement of the Sudeten problem and did their best to turn Hitler from his more extreme course. In 1937-38 the caution of the career officials of both countries was overborne by the feckless optimism of the nonprofessional realists; and the material which these volumes present to illustrate this is one of many reasons why they will be indispensable to students of the pre-war period.

The unhappy chain of events which led to the surrender at Munich had its inception in the secret conference of 5 November 1937, when Hitler outlined his policy objectives to his military and diplomatic aides. In this exposition of policy—which, in the event of his death, Hitler desired to have regarded as his "last will and testament"—the Fuehrer announced that "the aim of German policy was to make secure and to preserve the racial community and to enlarge it. It was therefore a question of space," which must be acquired—by force if necessary—*in Europe*. Germany's first objective, Hitler announced, was the overthrow of Austria and Czechoslovakia. "If the Fuehrer was still living it was his unalterable resolve to solve Germany's problem of space at the latest by 1943-1945"; but such solution would come sooner if domestic events in the Western countries or the development of the differences between England, France and Italy presented a suitable opportunity.[3]

Hitler's unwillingness to give a precise date for the beginning of the campaign against Austria and Czechoslovakia is understandable. Since the conclusion of the Austro-German agreement of 11 July 1936, the Germans had used every possible means of softening up the Austrians in preparation for the *Anschluss* that was desired.[4] But there were still factors that counseled caution. The position of Italy was uncertain. In January 1937, Papen felt that Italy was "trying to hinder as much as possible the expected further strengthening of Germany

[3] *GD*, I, 29 *et seq.*

[4] See, for instance, the documents relevant to Guido Schmidt's visit to Berlin at the end of 1936. *GD*, I, 314-349.

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in Central Europe";[5] and Goering's attempt in the same month to win an unequivocal promise of neutrality from Mussolini was not successful.[6] By the end of 1937, it is true that Italy had become so deeply involved in Spain that there was not much she could do if Hitler moved against Austria; but it seemed reasonable to expect opposition from Britain and France, and Russia would doubtless have something to say also. Hitler, then, was still reluctant to signal the beginning of the offensive.

Two weeks after the conference of 5 November, however, Lord Halifax arrived in Berlin for talks; and there can be little doubt that this visit encouraged Hitler and his most intimate advisers to accelerate their plans. For the Halifax mission was the opening gun in Neville Chamberlain's campaign to solve all European problems—as Halifax explained—"on the basis of realism, even if the realities to be dealt with were unpleasant for one party or the other."[7] The Germans were less interested in Halifax' exposition of this philosophy, or in his plea for a comprehensive Anglo-German agreement which might serve as the basis for a general *détente*, than they were in certain remarks which he made, perhaps inadvertently, in his talk with Hitler. A Foreign Office memorandum of 22 November pointed out that

> Halifax admitted of his own accord that certain changes in the European system could probably not be avoided in the long run. The British did not believe that the *status quo* had to be maintained in all circumstances. Among the questions in which changes would probably be made sooner or later were Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia. England was only interested in seeing that such changes were brought about by peaceful development. . . . It is also worthy of note that Halifax even in his introductory remarks described Germany as the bulwark of the West against Bolshevism.[8]

If this was encouraging, there was also heartening news from France. The German ambassador in Paris reported that Delbos, the Foreign Minister, had said that, while France was not dis-

[5] *GD*, I, 371.

[6] *GD*, I, 384 *et seq.*

[7] *GD*, I, 58.

[8] *GD*, I, 69-70.

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interested in changes in Central Europe, "she had no essential objection to a further assimilation of certain of Austria's domestic relations with Germany's."[9] To the Foreign Office, this marked a "significant loosening up . . . in comparison with the rigid 'Geneva framework' of former years"; and when Delbos, in his swing around Eastern Europe in December, failed to visit Moscow, the Germans saw a further weakening of the potential forces of resistance.[10]

It was perhaps in view of these facts that Hitler advanced his timetable. At the beginning of February, in a complete administrative reorganization, he subordinated the *Wehrmacht* to his personal control, dismissed those generals who had been doubtful about the feasibility of his plans[11] and made Ribbentrop Foreign Minister. Almost immediately Schuschnigg was summoned to Berchtesgaden and forced to submit to terms which left Austria little more than the illusion of freedom.[12]

In the same month, the "realists" were taking over in London. Sir Robert Vansittart, an outspoken opponent of Germany, was deprived of much of his influence and kicked upstairs, and shortly thereafter Anthony Eden broke with Chamberlain and was replaced at the Foreign Office by Lord Halifax. We know from a report of Dino Grandi, printed elsewhere,[13] that the immediate cause of Eden's resignation was a sharp difference of opinion with regard to negotiations with Italy. But the German embassy in London was correct in seeing a more fundamental meaning in the incident. Eden had always retained his enthusiasm for the idea of collective security. Chamberlain, on the other hand, took "an absolutely realistic view of the League of Nations and the question of collective security associated with it." He had no faith in the slogans of Geneva and thought almost exclusively in terms of agreement

[9] *GD*, I, 83.

[10] *GD*, I, 122, 150.

[11] The German documents cast no light on this reorganization. See, however, F. Hossbach, *Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler* (Wolfenbüttel, 1949).

[12] *GD*, I, 513 *et seq.*

[13] Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe* (Verona, 1948), pp. 249 *et seq.* See also Ciano, *1937-1938 Diario* (Bologna, 1948), p. 116. "Crisi a Londra per il dissidio Eden-Chamberlain, particolarmente per la politica verso l'Italia."

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between the four Great Powers of Europe, excluding the lesser states and Russia from his calculations.[14] It cannot be said with certainty that Eden's fall influenced Hitler's actions; but certainly it did not discourage him from resolving now to liquidate the Austrian problem. Using as a pretext Schuschnigg's appeal for a plebiscite, the Germans moved into Austria on 12 March.

The story of Austria's last hours is told in infinite detail in the German documents, and in much more restricted scope in the first of the British volumes. What emerges from the two accounts is the fact that the Germans knew exactly what they were doing, whereas the British were torn between irritation over the Nazi action and indignation that the Austrian Chancellor should have precipitated it. Schuschnigg, wrote Nevile Henderson from Berlin, " has let us all down badly." [15] On 10 March, Halifax warned Ribbentrop against adventures which might lead to general war;[16] but the effect of this was probably weakened by a conversation which Erich Kordt had on the same day with Chamberlain's confidant, Sir Horace Wilson. Wilson " hoped very much that we would succeed as much as possible vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia and Austria without the use of force. The prerequisite for this was, of course, that the other side also played ' fair '." Kordt said that, in his opinion, the Austrian plebiscite plan was not " fair " and Wilson " replied that, in his opinion, too, this plan created difficulties." [17] The difficulties were not, however, of great duration. The *Anschluss* was completed two days later.

Between the *Anschluss* and the beginning of the campaign to destroy Czechoslovakia there was no perceptible pause. Indeed, the speed with which Hitler turned to Czechoslovakia alarmed and dismayed his professional diplomats. In the opinion of the German minister in Prague, Czechoslovakia could be brought into the German orbit by diplomacy, by handling " her so considerately that her French alliance gradually loses its intrinsic

[14] *GD*, I, 221-222.

[15] *BD*, I, 25.

[16] *BD*, I, 4-5; *GD*, I, 253 *et seq.*

[17] *GD*, I, 271.

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value." [18] Herr Eisenlohr saw no purpose in creating a dangerous international incident and sought to discourage the provocative tactics which were being adopted by the Sudeten party.[19] His views were shared by the State Secretary, Weizsäcker, and by the ambassadors in London and Paris, who feared that use of force against Czechoslovakia would bring Britain and France into armed conflict with Germany.[20] Throughout the first part of 1938, Weizsäcker urged caution on Ribbentrop and Hitler. "We have no military recipe for defeating France and Britain", he was to write in June. "Even taking into account Italian and Japanese help, we would only be able to inflict injuries upon the limbs of our most dangerous foe, England, not strike her in the heart. The war would therefore end with our exhaustion and defeat." [21] Diplomatic and economic pressure would give Germany everything she needed in Czechoslovakia. Anything like an invasion would lead to war and "this war would sooner or later end in a German capitulation." [22]

The line taken by the professionals merely irritated Hitler and his Foreign Minister. Ribbentrop, as a German diplomat in Moscow told one of his British colleagues, "shared, or affected to share, the Fuehrer's optimism, and the certainty that Great Britain would in no circumstances move and that Germany would be able to invade Czechoslovakia with impunity was reflected with alarming clearness in the despatches and instructions which went out from the Wilhelmstrasse." [23] Weizsäcker's doubts were disregarded and he was eventually warned by Ribbentrop that "it was necessary to believe in . . . [Hitler's] genius" and that "if I had not yet reached the stage of blind belief . . . then he desired of me, in a friendly manner

[18] *GD*, II, 107.

[19] *GD*, II, 123, 155, 163, 169. It was perhaps no accident that when Hitler discussed with General Keitel the various means of precipitating action against Czechoslovakia, he included the possibility of taking advantage of an incident, "for example, the murder of the German Minister (in Prague)." *Ibid.*, p. 239. Herr Eisenlohr, the minister, was not a Nazi.

[20] *GD*, II, 395.

[21] *GD*, II, 420.

[22] *GD*, II, 663; see also 483, 504, 593.

[23] *BD*, II, 141.

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and urgently, too, that I should do so." [24] Meanwhile, as early as March 1938, Eisenlohr's attempt to restrain the Sudeten party had been blocked, and Hitler and Ribbentrop had told the Sudeten leader Henlein to be as provocative as possible.[25] The publication of Henlein's Karlsbad program on 24 April marked the beginning of a campaign which, in Hitler's opinion, would properly end with a German invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Here again, Hitler's faith in the feasibility of such a plan was probably bolstered by British conduct. On 24 March, in the House of Commons, Mr. Chamberlain had made a rambling and wholly sibylline statement, to the effect that, if Czechoslovakia should be invaded and France should in consequence go to her defense, it was " well within the bounds of probability that other countries besides those which were parties to the original dispute " might become involved.[26] The British documents reveal that Lord Halifax felt impelled to caution the French and the Czechs not to " build too much upon this statement ";[27] but it was not likely that the Germans would be worried by it. The British were not enthusiastic about protecting the Czechs. As early as 15 March, Newton, the minister in Prague, had expressed the opinion that " Czechoslovakia's present political position is not permanently tenable " and that it would " be no kindness in the long run to try to maintain her in it." [28] In Berlin, Nevile Henderson—with what L. B. Namier has called " perky resignation " [29]—had come to the conclusion by 24 March that " Central Europe and Eastern Europe will in general have to dance as Hitler pipes." [30] Henderson was already sure that the Sudetenland must pass to Germany, and unfortunately he was not reluctant to express that opinion in Berlin. And certainly the Germans must have derived satisfaction from

[24] *GD*, II, 593.

[25] *GD*, II, 197 *et seq.*, 203 *et seq.*

[26] See Lindsay Rogers' admirable treatment of this declaration. " Notes on the Language of Politics ", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, LXIV, 497 (December 1949).

[27] *BD*, I, 141, 150. [28] *BD*, I, 56.

[29] L. B. Namier in *Times Literary Supplement*, leading article, 26 March 1949.

[30] *BD*, I, 100; see also 621-625.

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Under-Secretary Butler's curious remark to the German chargé d'affaires on 22 April, to the effect that " the circles close to him fully understood that Germany had to pursue her national aims in her own way " and that " England was aware that Germany would attain ' her next goal '." [31]

On 28 April, Eduard Daladier and Georges Bonnet went to London to discuss the Czech problem with the British ministers. The protocols of the meetings are reproduced in full in the first British volume,[32] and they show that Daladier made a valiant attempt to persuade the British that the time had come to present a firm front to Germany and to show that they were prepared to take action to save the independence of Czechoslovakia. Mr. Chamberlain, however, felt that this would be

> what the Americans in their card games called bluff. . . . It made his blood boil to see Germany getting away with it time after time and increasing her domination over free peoples. But such sentimental considerations were dangerous. . . . If Germany did decide to destroy Czechoslovakia, he did not see how this could be prevented.

He himself did not believe that Hitler had any such evil intention, and he refused to provoke the Fuehrer with a declaration promising the Czechs protection, which might, in any case, be illusory. Instead, he proposed that a joint *démarche* be made in Prague to urge the Czechs to make a comprehensive settlement with their German minority and that the British meanwhile inform the Germans of this and solicit their views concerning a just settlement of the Sudeten question. Overborne by the Prime Minister's arguments, Daladier agreed.

Thus, the Western Powers embarked upon the fatal attempt to promote a settlement between the Czechs and the Sudeten party. Theoretically, it was to be a settlement which satisfied the Sudeten Germans, while leaving them within the borders of the Czech state, but it seems clear that from the beginning the British were not confident that this would be enough. On 7 May, Henderson told the political director of the German Foreign Office that " we were urging in general terms a compre-

[31] *GD*, I, 1092-1093. [32] *BD*, I, 198-235.

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hensive settlement such as, speaking quite confidentially, a state of nationalities rather than a national state would imply." [33] On 9 May, the First Secretary of the British embassy went even further and, according to the German report, said that

> if the German Government would advise the British Government confidentially what solution of the Sudeten German question they were striving after, he believed that he could assure us that the British Government would bring such pressure to bear in Prague that the Czechoslovak Government would be compelled to accede to the German wishes.[34]

This was, unfortunately, an all too accurate description of what the final British position on Czechoslovakia was to be, and the documents give a melancholy history of the way in which they moved toward it. Under Anglo-French pressure, President Benes sought a formula which would satisfy the Sudeten party. Since Hitler and Henlein had agreed in March that the party "must always demand so much that we can never be satisfied," [35] it is understandable that he had no success. But precisely because he had none, his character was denigrated in the West; and, especially after the war scare of late May [36]—when the Czechs, because of alleged German troop movements on their borders, ordered partial mobilization—Benes was suspected of being insincere in his efforts and of preferring war to a genuine settlement.

The British were sufficiently alarmed during the May crisis to issue a stern warning to the Germans, but, once the danger had passed, they seemed to regret their own action. Henderson, who had tamely submitted to a tongue-lashing from Ribbentrop while communicating the British warning,[37] now argued that "if the German confidence in British sincerity was to be main-

[33] *BD*, I, 260. On 9 May, Halifax reprimanded Henderson for this statement, saying that it was not advisable that the Germans should be able to use it, "at the present stage at any rate." *Ibid.*, p. 264.

[34] *GD*, II, 265.

[35] *GD*, II, 198.

[36] The German documents throw little new light on this incident and leave open the question of the justifiability of the partial Czech mobilization.

[37] *GD*, II, 315 *et seq.*

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tained it was essential for [the] Czechoslovak Government to give concrete evidence of a change of heart." [38] The Chamberlain government evidently agreed. At the end of May, William Strang was sent to consult the British embassy staffs in Prague and Berlin. Arguing that neither Czechoslovakia nor the Western Powers " were on a good wicket if there was trouble," he discussed the possibility of a plebiscite for the Sudeten Germans.[39] This idea, which would have meant the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, was not at this juncture pursued; but it is clear that Mr. Chamberlain was becoming irritated by the protracted and fruitless Sudeten negotiations. In May and June, Lord Halifax sought to induce the French to warn Benes that, if the negotiations failed through any fault of his, the French would abandon the Czechs to their fate.[40] Despite Bonnet's frequently reiterated assurance that he would adopt any procedure desired by the British, this suggestion met unexpected and firm resistance in Paris; and Daladier, on 13 July, objected that " the pressure which His Majesty's Government and the French Government were keeping up at Prague might be misinterpreted in Germany as a sign of weakness." [41]

Mr. Chamberlain, then, decided to despatch the Runciman mission to Czechoslovakia to mediate in the Sudeten dispute. Henderson, who was by now describing the Czechs as " incorrigibly pigheaded people " [42] and suggesting that " the moment has come for Prague to get a real twist of the screw," [43] immediately suggested that " there is no solution unless Lord Runciman can recommend a plan which approximates to Herr Hitler's present views." These he defined as " autonomy on Swiss lines and the eventual elimination of the Soviet-Czech alliance." [44] This was a touching declaration of faith in Hitler,

[38] *BD*, I, 363. This is reminiscent of a cartoon of 28 January 1938 by David Low, showing a group of international financiers asking a belligerent Teutonic goddess, " But what do we get for our money? " " Why," she answers, " a return of my confidence in you."

[39] *BD*, I, 403 *et seq.*

[40] *BD*, I, 419, 496 *et seq.*, 545-546.

[41] *BD*, I, 554.

[42] *BD*, I, 604.

[43] *BD*, I, 590.

[44] *BD*, II, 85.

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but an inaccurate estimate. The military directive for action against Czechoslovakia had been signed in June.

The Sudeten party was fully prepared for Lord Runciman. One of their leaders wrote:

> His Lordship must take away with him the impression that the situation in this State is so confused and difficult that it cannot be cleared up by negotiation or diplomatic action, that the blame for this lies exclusively with the Czechs, and thus that the Czechs are the real disturbers of peace in Europe.[45]

The British documents make it abundantly clear that Lord Runciman was not immune to this sort of suggestion. By the end of August, his feelings toward Benes were much like those of Henderson;[46] and on 2 September, with the support and approval of the British government, he informed the Czech President that "if it came to choice between acceptance of [the] Karlsbad programme or war he should be under no illusion as to what [the] British choice would be."[47] On 4 September, despite Benes' protest that the Karlsbad program would mean the dissolution of the state, Newton reinforced this warning.[48]

Bowing to the inevitable, the Czechs on 7 September came forward with a new set of proposals which were tantamount to complete acceptance of the Henlein program. The effect of this—as the German documents show—was to cause absolute consternation in the Sudeten party. If the party, wrote one of its leaders, "does not wish to put itself, and thus also the German Reich, in the wrong, the Sudeten German Party must eventually accept such an agreement which, outwardly and in its essential content, covers the most important principles of the Karlsbad demands."[49] To their embarrassment, the Sudeten Germans and their patrons had finally to show their real objectives, and they did so. On 12 September, Hitler made his coarse and violent attack upon the Czechs and offered protection to his long-suffering brethren. On the following day, Henlein demanded complete separation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia and fled across the border.

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[45] *GD*, II, 578.

[46] *BD*, II, 192.

[47] *BD*, II, 221.

[48] *BD*, II, 226.

[49] *GD*, II, 715.

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Theoretically, by destroying the fictions which had up to this time beclouded the real issues, these actions should have made it easier for the Western Powers to take a stand in defense of Czechoslovakia. Their immediate effect, however, was a sudden and deplorable failure of nerve in Paris. Although, as late as 8 September, Daladier had been insisting that a new Anglo-French warning be sent to Berlin,[50] Hitler's menaces seem to have exercised a depressing effect on him. His Foreign Minister, M. Bonnet, was doing his best to weaken the ministry's will to resistance. Bonnet had asked the British ambassador to procure for him a copy of a British despatch of May, in which Halifax had warned that Britain was not automatically obliged to take arms if France resisted German aggression in Czechoslovakia. He received this on 12 September, and on the following day told Sir Eric Phipps that "he had found this useful with certain bellicose French ministers."[51] Meanwhile, in answer to a direct question by Bonnet as to the possibility of joint action in Czechoslovakia, Halifax had written on 12 September: "While His Majesty's Government would never allow the security of France to be threatened, they are unable to make precise statements of the character of their future action, or the time at which it would be taken, in circumstances that they cannot at present foresee." On receiving this, Phipps reported, Bonnet "seemed genuinely pleased at the negative nature of your reply."[52] Apparently it helped him win his battle in the cabinet, for, on 14 September, he informed Phipps that "France would accept any solution of [the] Czechoslovak question to avoid war."[53]

There were still some flickers of French resistance, however. Mr. Chamberlain went to Berchtesgaden on 15 September and promised Hitler that he would attempt to persuade his colleagues, the French and the Czechs, to agree to an outright cession of the Sudetenland to Germany.[54] In the Anglo-French

[50] *BD*, II, 269.

[51] *BD*, II, 311.

[52] *BD*, II, 303.

[53] *BD*, II, 323.

[54] Mr. Chamberlain's own record of the Berchtesgaden talk appears in *BD*, II, 338 *et seq.*, and the German record in *GD*, II, 786 *et seq.* The version of the German record which was, after some delay, sent to London appears in *BD*, II, 342 *et seq.*

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conversations that followed on 18 September, Daladier was decidedly stiffer than his Foreign Minister. But once again he allowed himself to be persuaded by Mr. Chamberlain's arguments concerning the indefensibility of Czechoslovakia, and he glumly admitted that his problem was " to discover some means of preventing France from being forced into war as a result of her obligations and at the same time to preserve Czechoslovakia and save as much of that country as was humanly possible." [55] If it was necessary, however, to force the Czechs to cede the Sudetenland, he insisted that Britain agree to join in a guarantee of the integrity of what was left of the Czech state. With many objections, the British Prime Minister finally agreed to this;[56] and the meetings ended on a note of melancholy resignation to facts.

The details of the Anglo-French plan were communicated to the Czechs on 19 September and received by President Benes with the remark that " after all the efforts which he and his Government had made, they were being abandoned." [57] His attempt to escape, or at least delay, cession by seeking an arbitral reward was, however, firmly smothered by the Western Powers. The irrepressible Henderson told the Czech chargé in Berlin that Benes would receive better terms under the Anglo-French plan than he would " if he preferred in despair to risk involving all Europe in a war which morally could not be justified whatever its hypothetical justification on grounds of future German expansionist aims." [58] Henderson's superiors were of the same opinion. On 21 September, the Czechs were informed by the British and French ministers that refusal to accept the plan would produce " a situation for which we could take no responsibility "; [59] and, on the same day, they capitulated, asking only that the two Powers adhere to their promise of guarantee and protect them against German invasion until new boundaries could be drawn.[60]

To Chamberlain, this meant that the dangerous Sudeten problem was at last solved, and he went off to Godesberg in a state of

[55] *BD*, II, 387.
[56] *BD*, II, 393-397.
[57] *BD*, II, 416.
[58] *BD*, II, 429.
[59] *BD*, II, 438.
[60] *BD*, II, 445.

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high satisfaction. But Hitler had no intention of stopping short of the complete destruction of Czechoslovakia, and the German documents supply some interesting details on his own preparations for his meeting with the Prime Minister. The Fuehrer not only viewed with tolerance Poland's expressed desire to share in the Czech cessions [61] but also urged the Slovak Peoples party to demand autonomy.[62] On 20 September, he reproached the Hungarians for their delay in formulating demands for Czech territory. "In his opinion, the best thing would be to destroy Czechoslovakia. In the long run, it was quite impossible to tolerate the existence of this aircraft carrier in the heart of Europe." He warned Imredy and Kanya that if they did not at once join the offensive against Czechoslovakia, he would not protect their interests.[63] The Hungarians were impressed and filed their claims the following day.

In the course of his talk with the Hungarians, Hitler had said that "he would present the German demands to Chamberlain with brutal frankness . . . with the starkest realism." [64] At Godesberg he did precisely that, and Chamberlain's self-satisfaction oozed away in face of German demands for military occupation of the contested areas and immediate settlement of the claims of all of Czechoslovakia's minorities. The Prime Minister's plea that he had "risked his whole political career" by forcing the Czechs to accept the Anglo-French plan left Hitler unmoved; and, although Chamberlain won some minor concessions, he could not alter the German insistence that—if peace were to be preserved—the bulk of the Sudeten territory must be occupied by 1 October, with its installations intact, and plebiscites held in doubtful areas to determine their future fate.[65]

In an atmosphere of mounting tension, which is perceptibly reflected in the documents, Chamberlain submitted these pro-

[61] *GD*, II, 819, 849.

[62] *GD*, II, 852.

[63] *GD*, II, 863-864.

[64] *GD*, II, 864.

[65] *GD*, II, 870-911; *BD*, II, 463-473, 499-508. When Chamberlain described the German plan as an ultimatum, Hitler remarked blandly that "it bore the word 'Memorandum' on the top." *BD*, II, 504.

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posals to his colleagues and to the French. Once again there were signs of stiffening in the West. Lord Halifax sent a tart reprimand to Sir Eric Phipps in Paris, who was urging that no support be given to " the small, but noisy and corrupt, war group here ";[66] and when Daladier came to London on 25 September, he urged that Hitler be held to the terms of the Anglo-French plan. Despite an extraordinary inquisition at the hands of Chamberlain, Simon and Hoare, who bluntly expressed their doubts as to France's military capabilities, the French Premier insisted that " he would not return to France having agreed to the strangulation of a people." [67]

This brave show was, however, merely the preface to the final cave-in. Although the Anglo-French conversations ended with a British pledge to support France if war came,[68] Mr. Chamberlain and Georges Bonnet were resolved that that contingency must not arise, and Sir Horace Wilson was despatched to Berlin to make a final plea to Hitler. Both sets of documents reveal that Wilson's interviews with Hitler were scenes of humiliation and insult for which it would be difficult to find parallels in the annals of British diplomacy; and the German documents, which are more explicit, indicate that he responded to menaces with flattery and with the promise that " I will still try to make those Czechos sensible." [69]

To accomplish this end, a new British note was sent to the Czechs on 27 September, with a proposal for meeting some of Hitler's Godesberg terms and with a warning that Czech rejection of this would mean " invasion and dismemberment ". This curious document continues: ". . . though that might result in general conflict entailing incalculable loss of life, there is no possibility that at the end of that conflict, whatever the result, Czechoslovakia could be restored to her frontiers of today." [70] Here was a plain intimation that Mr. Chamberlain saw neither

[66] *BD*, II, 510, 535.

[67] *BD*, II, 520-541.

[68] *BD*, II, 537.

[69] *GD*, II, 965; *BD*, II, 554-557, 564-567.

[70] *BD*, II, 571.

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merit nor purpose in resistance to the Godesberg terms.[71] In any event, the fiction that the Czechs would be given a voice in the determination of their own fate now disappeared. On 28 September, the French government, in a *démarche* by M. Francois-Poncet, indicated their willingness to accept substantially all of Hitler's demands.[72] Simultaneously came Mussolini's intervention, so earnestly requested by Chamberlain on the previous night,[73] after the Prime Minister had received an unexpected and surprisingly conciliatory letter from Hitler.[74] The German documents do not reveal what went on in Hitler's mind during these last desperate maneuvers or why, at the last moment, he decided to hold his hand and settle Czechoslovakia's fate by Four Power conference. But certainly he conceded little in doing so, as the records of the Munich meeting show.[75]

In a rather lame conversation with the Soviet ambassador on 29 September, Lord Halifax tried to explain the exclusion of Russia from the Munich conference. "We all had to face facts," he said, "and one of those facts was . . . that the heads of the German Government and of the Italian Government would not be willing in present circumstances to sit in conference with Soviet representatives."[76] Yet, as early as 4 September, Henderson had been advocating a settlement of the Sudeten problem by the Four Powers and Czechoslovakia, pointing out that "the advantage of the proposal would be that it would exclude Russia";[77] and there is more than enough evidence to indicate that Mr. Chamberlain did not object to such exclusion.[78] In the months leading up to Munich, the Russians were

[71] Sir Horace Wilson seems to have told a member of the German embassy in London that the British were ready to accept the Godesberg terms if they could be put into a form which public opinion would accept. *GD*, II, 989.

[72] *GD*, II, 988.

[73] *BD*, II, 561, 588. See also Ciano, *1937-1938 Diario*, pp. 249 *et seq.*

[74] *BD*, II, 576 *et seq.*

[75] *BD*, II, 627-640; *GD*, II, 1000-1017.

[76] *BD*, II, 623-624.

[77] *BD*, II, 239.

[78] On Mr. Chamberlain's attitude to Russia see Keith Feiling, *Life of Neville Chamberlain* (London, 1946), pp. 347, 403; and *GD*, II, 434, 486, 608.

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persistently cold-shouldered in London; they were left inadequately informed concerning Anglo-French deliberations,[79] and they do not seem to have been consulted on their own intentions with regard to Czechoslovakia until the time of Godesberg.[80] M. Litvinov, when approached at Geneva on 23 September, said that " if [the] French came to the assistance of the Czechs [the] Russians would take action " and, although he could give no military details, suggested a meeting of the interested Powers " to show [the] Germans that we mean business." [81] This was perhaps not the most encouraging of answers, but it hardly explains Mr. Chamberlain's remark in the Anglo-French conversations of 25 September, that he " had received very disturbing news about the probable Russian attitude." [82] The Prime Minister's argument concerning Russian weakness and unreliability, which was effective both in April and in September in weakening French resistance, could have been justified only by more direct and continuous consultation with the Russians than the documents reveal.

In the first volume of the German papers, there is an interesting section devoted to relations between Germany and the United States in 1937-38.[83] It is clear from the documents printed here that the Washington embassy staff had little doubt that, if war came in Europe, the United States would join England and France. There is no reason to suppose that Hitler was impressed by this warning. In September 1938, he was well on his way to realizing the program laid down on 5 November 1937; and there seemed to be no possibility after Munich that anyone would object seriously to future depredations.

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[79] See, for instance, *BD*, I, 256; II, 107.

[80] *BD*, II, 480.

[81] *BD*, II, 497-498.

[82] *BD*, II, 532.

[83] *GD*, I, 627-732.

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THE NATURE OF DEMOCRACY

THE question has been frequently put as to whether the Eastern and Western views concerning democracy can be reconciled. Inquiry is made as to whether there is an inevitable contradiction between the "political" democracy of the West and the "social" democracy of the East. Implicit in this is the assumption that the West emphasizes the political forms of democracy, such as civil rights and free elections, while the East places its emphasis on economic equality; but that this may be no more than a mere matter of emphasis.

The difficulty with this assumption is that it touches on only certain mechanisms and slurs over democracy as an ethical end and a problem of human relations. The backgrounds of Western democracy in the Judeo-Christian and Stoic philosophies of equality are ignored. The rich American literature interpreting democratic aims and methods and pushing forward the frontiers of democratic effort tend to be ignored.

In his *Journals,* Emerson wrote:

> The root and seed of democracy is the doctrine, Judge for yourself. Reverence thyself. . . . At the same time it replaces the dead with a living check in a true, delicate reverence for superior, congenial minds. "How is the King greater than I, if he is not more just?" [1]

John Dewey, in *The Public and Its Problems,* discussing "the nature of the democratic idea in its generic social sense", writes:

> From the standpoint of the individual, it consists in having a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing

[1] Vol. III, p. 369 (Boston, 1909-14).

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> the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain. From the standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the interests and goods which are common.[2]

There have been a number of functional definitions of democracy which are pertinent to the inquiry. Thus Harrison Elliott described it in this manner:

> Democracy seems . . . to mean that arrangement of life by which the members of a group, small or large, have opportunity to participate in proportion to their maturity and ability, in deciding, planning, executing and evaluating all matters in which the group is concerned, matters both within the life of the group and also in the group's relationship to other groups and the common life of which the group is a part.[3]

The author has suggested that the democratic principle involves:

> (1) Respect for individuals and the variations among individuals, their needs and their aspirations. (2) Making possible equal opportunity for every individual to obtain satisfaction by realizing and exercising his capacities and pursuing his interests. (3) Equality of treatment of each individual by those with power or authority. (4) The concept that equality does not mean identity, but rather recognition of differences, a recognition of differences not in the form of favoritism, but as an expression of respect for individuality. (5) Collaboration, rather than competition, or paternalism as the more likely method for achieving mutual respect, equality and development.[4]

The differences between democratic and autocratic administration have been well stated by Louis H. Blumenthal as follows:[5]

[2] New York, 1927, p. 147.

[3] New York State Conference on Social Work, October 19, 1938, cited by Blumenthal, *infra.*

[4] *The Freedom to Be Free* (New York, 1943), p. 84.

[5] *Administration of Group Work* (New York, 1948), p. 137.

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The Democratic Administrator	The Autocratic Administrator
Works to release energy in others	Works to watch over others
Looks for "answers" from others	Knows all the "answers"
Gets others to share responsibility	Does it all himself
Wants to build up others	Wants to be looked up to
Welcomes contribution	Is afraid of new ideas from others
Is the partner	Is the boss
Is the leader	Is the driver
Exerts power with people	Exerts power over people

Finally, Jeremy Bentham has pointed out that the difference between free and despotic governments depends

> on the manner in which the whole mass of power, which taken together is supreme, is in a free state distributed among the several ranks of persons that are sharers in it; on the source from whence their titles to it are successively derived; on the frequent and easy changes of condition between governors and governed, whereby the interests of one class are more or less indistinguishably blended with those of the other; on the responsibility of the governors; *on the right which the subject has of having the reasons publicly assigned and canvassed of every act of power that is exerted over him.* (Italics mine)

These quotations indicate that a definition of democracy is possible in terms of human character and relationships. It need not be in terms of instrumentalities, whether political or economic, whether civil rights or the ownership of the means of production. *Democracy can be defined in terms of personality.* In such terms certain instrumentalities tend to develop personalities which are self-respecting, coöperative, capable of moving toward the realization of their capacities, to a great extent free of anxieties and destructive drives. Other instrumentalities

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tend to develop personalities which are dependent, repressed, apathetic, anxious, antagonistic, destructive.

It is necessary to distinguish between a philosophical concept of democracy which is rooted in human relationships and directed toward ethical ends, and the forms of democracy, the instrumentalities of society. The latter may, in one situation, contribute to what Emerson called " the spirit of life for the general good " and, in another, stimulate greed, hatred and lust for power. The same institutions may lead to freedom or subservience, depending upon the attitudes which at a given time and place may be acceptable to society. Thus courts of law may be instruments for judging impartially conflicts between individuals and between individuals and the state; or they may be instruments to enforce subservience to the state.

It would seem that *one cannot understand the forms of democracy, or of any other social philosophy, without reducing them into their elements of power. And one cannot understand power without reducing it to human relationships, to impulses, drives, beliefs, tensions and the like.* Voting, civil rights, forms of control over goods and the means of production provide answers to needs. They afford satisfactions or they cause deprivations. In this they are likewise elements in power struggles.

We continually try to find satisfaction and avoid pain. In these enterprises of living we seek food, clothing, housing. We use our minds, our reason, to discover what will bring satisfaction and what pain, and we form systems of belief which reduce our anxieties concerning the unknown things of the universe and the half-known things of the world which we find ourselves powerless to control. We have impulses to exercise our capacities, especially those which we discover to be socially acceptable within the pattern of our particular culture. Above all, we want love, and this at once makes social beings of us. It causes us to search for satisfying relationships with others and to modify those relationships where they no longer yield satisfaction.

Unsure of what love is, we seek its symbols too. As symbols of love we seek not only sexual response but also status, a recog-

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nition of the worth of our capacities, an acknowledgement of the values we place upon ourselves. These symbols, these rewards, may be in terms of many things, such as a pat on the back, a prize, a title, a sum of money, an invitation. How pathetically we seek such symbols is illustrated by Mussolini's statement that he " was never the King's guest at his country estate " and only once in Rome, to see a moving picture after dinner. Moreover he said that " all his life he never had any friends." [6]

In this search we frequently become frustrated. To gain one value or satisfaction we must deny ourselves another. We want love or honor or the opportunity to accumulate or the chance to become a judge or play on a great football team. We may overestimate our own capacities; or the chance may not present itself; or we may not recognize our opportunities. Moreover, someone with power over a means of satisfaction may refuse it to us; or someone on whom we are dependent for food or love or recognition or assurance of future security may reject our advances, repress our attempts to satisfy our impulses.

These frustrations result in pain and may lead to aggressive destructive responses. We may seek to destroy or injure the person who has denied us satisfaction or his possessions or beliefs or the institutions of which he is a symbol.

To the extent that society finds means of diverting or harnessing these aggressions, they do not become harmful. When directed against objects rather than persons, they may even be the dynamic power of social development and improvement. " The instinct of destruction, when tempered and harnessed (as it were, inhibited in its aim) and directed towards objects, is compelled to provide the ego with satisfaction of its needs and with power over nature." [7]

But to the degree that society provides no such outlets, tensions result and destructive forces may be set free. Thus John Dewey has said: " Just because the cause of democratic freedom is the cause of the fullest possible realization of human

[6] *The Fall of Mussolini*, ed. by Max Ascoli (New York, 1948), pp. 52, 156.

[7] Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (London, 1930), p. 101.

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potentialities, the latter when they are suppressed and oppressed will in time rebel and demand an opportunity for manifestation." [8]

Such rebellions and demands are a threat to power. Consequently those who have exercised power in such a way as to suppress and oppress the realization of human potentialities become caught in the quagmire of their own power. In their struggle to keep on top they sink deeper and deeper.

Out of the search for satisfactions and the aggressions incident to the frustration of this search, the power struggle arises. Singly or in association, people attempt to escape the pain of frustration by attempting to gain power over the causes of their frustration. The political process is the dialectic of power.[9]

Economic forces can no more be isolated from the political process than can they be made the sole or even the principal motivating force of human action. If there is any principal motivating force, it is the impulse to find satisfaction and avoid pain. This impulse involves the universal search for love expressed in terms of affection, regard, sex, parenthood, approval, recognition, acceptance, or something else deemed to be rewarding. The absence of such satisfactions gives rise to anxiety and fear. The impulse to destructive aggression bred by deprivation arouses not only anxiety and fear but also guilt, which tends to reinforce the aggressive impulse.

Economic force is a power weapon. That is, it can be used to obtain or retain power over others. When exercised as a weapon of power, bread and gold and the means of production impede democracy; they impede democracy just as much as the use of physical force can impede it. For to exercise power of any nature *over* people is to that extent to deny them or relieve them of responsibility. This limits their personalities, their opportunities for growth. It represses them. It binds them to dependency.

This is the case whether economic power or physical force be exercised by the state or by untrammeled private enterprise.

[8] *Freedom and Culture* (New York, 1939), p. 129.

[9] *Swords and Symbols*, by the author (New York, 1939), p. 103.

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State capitalism or private enterprise can each impose a sense of dependence upon those over whom the economic power is exercised. This will be less complete where democratic political mechanisms are available, as, for example, where those who are subject to power, who are oppressed or persecuted, can meet together in protest, can strike, can present their cause in the public press, or by the ballot can throw the oppressive rascals or their agents out of office.

Thus political forms which we call democratic, such as the right to vote and civil liberties, afford people power avenues for the release of their aggressions through political competition. Economic conflicts and free expression and debate give the people involved opportunities for the release of their aggressions in the form of economic and intellectual competition. These releases afford satisfactions. Where they exist they are socially acceptable substitutes for destructive aggression; they are outlets for aggression which may be at once constructive and satisfying.

Where the power which controls the economy also controls the weapons of force, that is, the armed services, the police, the courts—which themselves rely in the last analysis on the police power—there is no way out of submission to economic power on the part of those dependent on it. This has been as true in small isolated communities dominated by one industry or one mining company as it is true in great nations in which political life and economic life are controlled by the government. The evil effects of a substantial monopoly of power weapons can be discerned under state capitalism or private capitalism. In the latter case, however, such concentrations have never been as complete.

Such submission to economic power is not true in England or the United States today, although there are danger signals. Can the habits of centuries which have planted the traditional British liberties in the hearts of every Englishman withstand the new combination of power weapons in the hands of the British government? Will the stubborn bulwark of the Britisher's belief that his home is his castle be able to resist the encroaching nature of this reinforced governmental power? Will his growing dependence on increasingly centralized authority rob him of

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the strength to wield his constitutional rights as he has done ever since Coke hurled his misinterpretations of the nature of Magna Carta at the tyrannies of the Stuart kings?

Some of the same questions can well be asked as to the forms of political democracy in the United States. Almost a century and a quarter ago Tocqueville warned:

> In democratic communities nothing but the central power has any stability in its position or any permanence in its undertakings. All the citizens are in ceaseless stir and transformation. Now, it is in the nature of all governments to seek constantly to enlarge their sphere of action; hence it is almost impossible that such a government should not ultimately succeed, because it acts with a fixed principle and a constant will upon men whose position, ideas, and desires are constantly changing. . . .
>
> Thus a democratic government increases its power simply by the fact of its permanence. Time is on its side; every incident befriends it; the passions of individuals unconsciously promote it; and it may be asserted that the older a democratic community is, the more centralized will its government become.[10]

We see these tendencies accelerated in the United States today under the social service state. Will the people of the United States become so dependent on their government that they too will forfeit the instrumentalities of political democracy? Are they unwittingly building a new paternalism under the illusion that they are free and democratic so long as they can " shake off their state of dependence just long enough to select their master and then relapse into it again "? There are hopeful signs in the United States in the richness of local institutions and also in the numerous " pressure groups ", those private voluntary organizations which enable the individual to express his individuality and his views in a growingly complex world.

The saving point in British socialism may lie in the fact that the men of the Labor party are also men of the trade unions. Trade unions are more than the holders of economic weapons. They are also associations of individuals who have gained integrity, respect and fellowship through common effort. Unions

[10] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York, 1945), vol. II, p. 294 fn.

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have given John Doe, the working man, a name and a face. They therefore afford a strong psychological weapon to protect the historic democratic forms from becoming submerged by the new power weapons mobilized in the state.

In terms of power the danger remains that the state, holding the bulk of the weapons of economic and political force, will control the third weapon of sovereignty, that is, psychological power. To retain control those in power tend to regulate freedom of expression, the press, the schools. Where this exists there can be no effective right of the subject "of having the reasons publicly assigned and canvassed of every act of power that is exercised over him."

As distinguished from the autocratic view, the democratic view of the relationship of government to *censorship* turns censorship upside down. This was expressed by Jefferson in his letter to Washington of September 9, 1792:

> No government ought to be without censors; and where the press is free, no one ever will. If virtuous, it need not fear the fair operation of attack and defense. Nature has given to man no other means of sifting out the truth, either in religion, law or politics. I think it as honorable to the government neither to know, nor notice, its sycophants or censors, as it would be undignified and criminal to pamper the former and persecute the latter.

The use of slogans as promises of rewards and stimulants to anxiety is the most common use of psychological power. Thus we find such terms as "communism", "Fascism", "nationalization", "Five Year Plan", "New Deal", "the withering state", "popular sovereignty", and many other symbols of reassurance and fear utilized as weapons in the political process.

Today there is psychological value in affixing the label "democracy" to institutions and "democratic" to men, just as a century and a half ago the labels "inalienable rights" and "natural rights" called forth the enthusiastic response of men throughout the Western World.

That the term democratic is applied as propaganda is evident from its different uses. The Cominform countries refer to

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themselves as democratic, and civil liberties as incidences of the capitalist, bourgeois states. American Communists demand that they be permitted to carry on their fight for communism in the name of their " democratic rights " of free speech, fair trial, suffrage and assembly. Capitalism and private enterprise have been associated with democracy by captains of industry and in the fulminations of Hitler as well as by Lenin in his *State and Revolution*.[11]

We cannot ignore the implications of the power struggle in the use of the words " democracy " or " democratic ". Such usages amount to little more than the emotional load they carry. It is only as the paint of propaganda is removed that we can bring to light the solid substance of the group relationships in a society and the personality structures of the group members. Then we can discover whether the prevailing social pattern is autocratic or whether it more nearly fits the definitions of democracy in the socially dynamic terms of Emerson, Dewey and the others already quoted.

Certainly to distinguish between democracy as " the rule of the majority " on the one hand and " in the interests of the majority " on the other, as was done by Bertrand Russell,[12] is a failure to analyze the dynamics of democracy and to fall into the trap of power politics. What is more social democracy than that of Emerson and Dewey? How can there be democracy for the people—that is, in the interests of the majority—without there being also democracy of and by the people? The use of the words *of, by* and *for* in Lincoln's famous Gettysburg Address was not coincidental. Without benefit of modern psychology he understood the importance of popular participation if government was to be *for* the people.

Moreover, majorities are not the only groups to be considered. Minority opinion today may become the majority opinion tomorrow if left free to express itself. Such freedom is the very essence of personal integrity. It is the kernel of Emerson's " Judge for yourself."

[11] *Essentials of Leninism* (London, 1947), vol. II, p. 200.

[12] *What Is Democracy?* (London, 1946), p. 14.

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This interchangeability, this fluidity, between majority and minority not only offers hope to those whose needs are left unsatisfied. It also offers them the means to work for the satisfaction of their needs. Such a relationship between majorities and minorities means that people need not passively await some power to do something "*for* the people". It means that the power is "*of* the people" to do something "*by* the people". In such circumstances there can be no fixity of status as in feudalism or under autocracy; for in feudalism and autocracy, authority cannot risk the use of the powers *of* the people *by* the people. It must use the power *for* the people; it must keep them dependent. Unfortunately, when power is used by others *for* the people it generally entails a strong element of aggression. This tends to turn the power against the people in satisfaction of the power needs of those who exercise it.

Psychological methods are the most potent forces which people have to modify or change power balances. They are the most effective means by which people with power may avoid the wastes incident to the use of economic and physical force. This is so because psychological weapons reach the minds and emotions of people. Therefore they touch belief systems, cultural values, anxieties, moral needs, guilt feelings, hope and reason. Character and personality are molded and modified through the approaches to the mind and the emotions. Force and bread, politics and economics, make their deeper and more lasting impacts on reason and feeling, not on bodies. That is why the weight of authority can be so great.

Authority can be varied. It can include many things, from social conscience imposed by ancestral ghosts to the centralized state. In a political sense, authority means the authorities, those who have substantial power weapons at their control, whether those weapons be force, economic power or psychological. "In psychological terms authority means control over rewards and punishments."[13] In an autocratic society, the authorities distribute rewards and punishments. It is this that tends to create dependence. In democratic societies, rewards and punishments

[13] Mark A. May, *A Social Psychology of War and Peace* (New Haven, 1943), p. 175.

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are to a great extent in the hands of individuals and their voluntary organizations. This results in greater independence or interdependence.

Group control of rewards and punishments, where each member of the group has an equal "opportunity to participate in proportion to . . . [his] maturity and ability, in deciding, planning, executing and evaluating all matters in which the group is concerned" is fundamental to democratic relationships. For it is only in this way that one can have "a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain."

The measure of a people's democracy is the extent of its freedom from dependence. For a people, as for an individual, this freedom is a sign of maturity. Individuals and nations in times of stress tend to retreat to patterns of dependency which they had seemingly outgrown. They will pay the price of more or less submission to authority. In return for the rewards of relief from stress, or for the mere promise of such rewards, they will surrender power here and there and the ability to act for themselves without asking somebody's permission.

Dependence—with its corollaries of submissiveness and apathy—is not democratic. How can dependent, submissive or apathetic people—or for that matter antagonistic people—judge for themselves or reverence themselves? Freedom from such dependence is the very basis of democracy. It is necessary if men are to develop and utilize their capacities, if society is to be a balance of their individualities and not a structure of status. Freedom from dependence is requisite to maturity. For the satisfaction achieved through dependence is an uneasy peace in the shadow of some power in which one has little share. By paying the price of dependence one places a cheap value on one's self.

Dependence may perhaps purchase a measure of food, housing, clothing, social service and protection by the armed services. It is in fact a form of prostitution. Guilt and anxiety, apathy and impotence, resentment and bigotry, are its undertones. From them arise aggressive and destructive impulses which can

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be channeled or repressed by authority. If they are not channeled to ends of self-realization and free expression, these impulses strain for release in war and revolution.

Whatever may have been the condition of the "happy savage" or of some primitive societies, we must accept the fact that some degree of dependence exists in the cultural pattern of every nation today. As infant mortality decreases and more children are reared, as the demand for increased education postpones the productive period of life, as science has lengthened the span of life and thus increased the ratio of elderly people in the community, the demands upon the family as an economic and cultural unit have grown far beyond its capacity to satisfy them. Increasingly, therefore, men have asked for assistance in meeting their burdens—to give adequate care to their dependents. To shift the responsibility of their dependents, the producing members of society have become in turn dependents of the state. The state has not been the only institution to meet these needs but it has been the principal one.

This in itself might not be so great a threat to man's integrity and inner strength if at the same time the family as a more or less independent producer had not been abolished. Industrialization gave the world more clothing, more food, better housing, more entertainment, greater spice in greater variety in life. But it has also tended to diminish the great satisfactions derived from family interdependence and self-reliance. The family no longer depends upon its members to perform the services of weaving, sewing, raising food, building its houses, providing its light. Domestic education and the intimate revelries of family life have also given way to mass entertainment and education. For all these goods men have come to depend more and more not upon themselves and the family group but upon industry and the state, the economic and national groups in which their individual wills are limited and their individual voices are whispers. Thus they tend to be frustrated and dependent.

The more the power weapons are concentrated, the greater that frustration and dependence tend to become. *Those political, economic and social forms, those philosophies and ideologies which tend to reduce dependence and thus to minimize its in-*

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cidences, are democratic. Those which tend to increase dependence are autocratic.

It does not follow that the only alternative to dependence is independence, what in American social thinking has sometimes been called " rugged individualism ". For that is a fantasy of the frontier. There is another alternative in the recognition of interdependence, of coöperative effort. Through common endeavor, love satisfactions are alone made possible. Men acting with their peers for common purposes can participate " in deciding, planning, executing and evaluating all matters." They do not have to weigh their acts or their beliefs, nor need they judge what is good or bad for them and theirs against the shadow of the smile or frown of authority.

Thus in the field of economic power the democratic answer is not necessarily private or state capitalism, private enterprise or socialism. It may lie in the middle ground of the coöperative, the functioning of which involves participation by equals in planning and sharing, in responsibility and rewards. Here power is not centered but diffused.

Voluntary organizations, from local committees to church conferences and international labor organizations, serve the same purpose. They are outlets for tensions, and group expressions which relieve frustration and minimize dependence. These organizations also tend to diffuse power.

We can see then that words like " democracy " and " autocracy " describe far more than political and economic mechanisms. They are descriptive, among other things, of group relationships. As such they are frequently used as slogans and symbols, that is, as psychological weapons of power or as shorthand expressions of moral and philosophical ends.

The important thing to keep in mind is that the terms " democracy " and " autocracy ", being descriptive of group relationships, deal with dynamic, living, changing social interactions. It is to be expected that these dynamic group relationships must affect the personality patterns of the members of the group. Where power is highly concentrated, dependence and submissiveness play a great part in personality structure. Where power is diffused, there is generally a broader opportunity for

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self-realization and a greater variety of possible interrelationships.

Where people are dependent on authority, they have less opportunity to release the energies impounded in them by repression than have those who possess enough power to cause authority to listen to their claims and account to them for its behavior. Under authority the impulse is to look to others—that is, to those with power, to those in authority—to find satisfactions rather than for people to seek satisfactions for themselves.

Neither the concentration nor the diffusion of power will of itself free people of anxieties. Highly dependent people, it is true, may in apathy withdraw from all concern with anxiety-breeding conflicts. On the other hand, throwing people long habituated to dependence into a situation requiring responsibility may well increase their anxieties. It may well happen that in such circumstances, freed from the impositions of authority, "The aggressiveness of conscience carries on the aggressiveness of authority." [14]

The aggressive power of the authorities may have been lost, but its effectiveness may linger as a definition of right and wrong, of what is permissible and what forbidden. We see this in adults who accept through life the moral patterns imposed upon them in infancy; and we see it in the cultural patterns of nations which have long since changed their institutional forms.

Nothing is truer, however, than the psychological principle that you cannot free people of one form of satisfying experience, however anxiety-laden the satisfactions may be, without substituting other satisfactions. "It does not matter how many tension points are raised in the development of the individual, provided proper outlets are permitted." [15]

Where power is more diffused, people will have a greater opportunity of finding for themselves outlets for their tensions, substitute situations, which will more nearly meet their needs. *Find for themselves*—this is important—for it implies emergence from dependence, a growth of personality out of child-

[14] Freud, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[15] Abram Kardiner, *Psychological Frontiers of Society* (New York, 1945), p. 420.

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hood and adolescence into maturity. In psychological terms this is just what democracy makes possible and autocracy represses. The autocratic school, the autocratic church, the autocratic labor union, the autocratic employer and the autocratic state depress subordinates and deny them the chance of growth, the chance to realize their capacities, just as in the autocratic home the parents attempt to hold the children in a state of involuntary dependence.

As we have already stated, it is our desire to be loved that makes social beings of us. The society that is derived from the hope of love of equals, in weakness and strength, will be a different society than one based on the hope of love of subordinates by their superiors and of superiors by their subordinates. Quite different group relationships must follow; quite different personalities must be developed.

Being dynamic, dealing with living, changing human relations as it does, democracy cannot be expected to measure up to the aims of its advocates. Democratic nations miss their democratic objectives time and again. But, as has been well said, the best can be the enemy of the good.

True enough, the archetype of a democratic society has not been realized. This does not justify cynicism or doubt. Pragmatically, a democracy works where it tends to develop men and women as mature people, prepared to coöperate as equals, free of a large measure of dependence and aggression. And as democratic principle involves the concept of self-realization and the coöperative improvement of society, the validity of a democratic pattern of society cannot be denied because the ideal has yet to be achieved. *The test is the measure of freedom from dependence on authority.* That is why freedom and democracy, and voluntary effort and democracy, have been so closely associated.

Certain group relationships and their incidental personality patterns we call autocratic; others may be called democratic. One of the most important aspects of such relationships is to be found in the distribution of power. Such distribution weighs heavily in determining the relative amounts of dependence and self-realization, of unchanneled destructive aggression and of

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creativity, of subservience and voluntary coöperation, of animosity and love in group and personality patterns.

Political and economic mechanisms contribute to or limit the facility with which power can be used. They provide the large spoons of authority, or the smaller spoons of voluntary groups and individuals, for ladling out rewards and punishments. But to define democracy—or autocracy—in terms of political or economic mechanisms is to ignore social dynamics.

If one adopts this psycho-social approach, two results follow: first, democracy becomes a comparative rather than a normative —that is, a definitive—cultural relationship; and, secondly, democracy is a way of life, a complex of human relationships and not a selection of politico-economic forms, however much those forms may reflect and deflect ways of life.

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WHITHER THE TECHNOLOGICAL STATE?

I

THE rapidity with which, in recent decades, American technology has evolved has mirrored itself in correspondingly rapid changes in the American pattern of living. And these two changes—one affecting what we might call the materials of living and one its practices—have been accompanied by equally striking changes in American political philosophy as expressed at the polls, in legislative halls, and in the courts. This latter development, exalting the state in domestic affairs, has found its counterpart in a world-wide movement, more drastic in some countries than in others. In a word, a pronounced spirit of collectivism—to many observers the advance agent of dictatorship—is now pandemic. Whether, like an infection, it will run its course and then subside or, like a tidal wave gathering impetus and volume as it travels, it will submerge the world's few remaining strongholds of individual liberty, bringing much-altered political doctrines and observances, is perhaps the paramount riddle of our time.

The causal connection between changes in physical standards of living and in political standards of action is manifestly two-way, so that while political concepts and practices influence the rate of change of industrial techniques, these latter in turn react upon the political situation. Irrespective of whether this relationship may have grown in intimacy in recent decades, its present power must be taken as cause for considerable concern. If it were true that the rapid changes of present-day technology were accompanied only by slow and deliberate alterations in political concept and practice, there would be little to remark. But evidence is piling up that in many unsuspected ways technology must henceforth be regarded as a dominant influence in shaping man's relations to his fellowmen.

Though technology and politics have each given rise to a veritable deluge of discussion, the former has almost nowhere

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been portrayed as the coming artificer of the latter, molding forms of government much as it does the materials and mechanisms of trade. So vaguely is technology recognized as an agency that might react detrimentally upon political liberty that we have, for example, the belief currently popular in the United States that a high standard of living is the best bulwark against communism and other totalitarian philosophies. Yet this proposition is certainly not one of unrestricted validity. Though situations may now and again arise in which such a relationship exists, reasons will here be advanced for viewing it as of quite limited applicability.

Our question may be phrased as follows: why should political doctrines consistently repudiated by liberty-loving peoples throughout the centuries now be a widespread intuitional answer to the world's unfinished business? Why should there now arise a well-nigh universal faith in the guiding and ameliorative powers of the state? Why, in our own midst and in all categories of society—even among entrepreneurial groups who should be the staunchest devotees of free institutions—is there growing regard for the state as the coming Messianic planner and the redeemer of minority causes?

The thought that will occur at once to many is that this state of mind reflects the impact of two world wars and an intervening world depression of record severity. It is true, to be sure, that these have uprooted many staunch convictions as well as altered many political régimes. But as technology has had much to do with each of these events, and especially with the destructiveness of wars, it cannot thus escape being identified as an important factor underlying the political changes in question. More direct and yet unidentified relationships explain, however, why the present far-reaching program directed toward the mechanistic elaboration of living has come to be invested with special political significance.

II

Let us first note a very general relationship. Among the older and more enduring philosophical concepts is one that relates goodness to order, and evil to disorder. Things in disorder

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are hurtful or repulsive or unsatisfying; the same things when in order are helpful or attractive or satisfying. A stomach or mind disordered is one diseased. Were a business, a community or a government to disclose symptoms of marked disorder, we would recognize it as needing aid or reconstruction.

Order is the chief goal of organization. Systems of transportation and communication function only as their behavior is ordered and orderly. If a bank were not orderly in its accounting, it would soon have to close its doors. Speech and music are ordered sound; painting is ordered form and color. Thought is the ordering of ideas, and science the ordering of observations. Even life itself, from the simplest cell to man, is based upon order. Contrariwise, into any living organism introduce a sufficient degree of disorder, and death ensues.

Yet quite obviously order is not in all cases the equivalent of what is good or desirable, nor is disorder the only enemy of order. In particular, one set of ordered phenomena can overcome and destroy another set. The might of armies and the destructive power of the atomic bomb are, in their way, as well ordered as the industrious housekeeping of the bee or the unfolding of the butterfly's wings from the cleft walls of its chrysalis.

All this is so well known that it is mentioned only because it sheds considerable light upon the present discussion. From man's continuous struggle for order comes much of the strife and confusion of the present day. In countless instances one order is incompatible with another, though each by itself is highly esteemed. Cultural conflicts in general have this origin.

In terms of order, one can readily appreciate why the liberal way of life with its comprehensive grant of rights to the individual is now giving way before newer and more exacting orders. Especially is this the case in so highly industrialized a nation as the United States. For, in spite of the fact that the political liberty of the individual specifies a certain social order, it is in effect a very loose one. Essentially, it is a random order connoting the privilege of arranging one's life largely in accordance with personal wishes, and only incidentally in conformity with the dictates of an external agent, be it job or labor

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union or state, or any combination of them. Although traditional respect for the loose order of liberalism is high, so that it is still very generally held as a cherished ideal, the order itself is not well fortified against encroachment by other orders, especially any that are more exacting and carry the pragmatic sanction of the day.

It is such an order that current technology provides to a nicety. The advancing precision that derives from the progressive subdivision of labor, so conspicuous a characteristic of modern life, is increasingly antithetical to personal liberty and randomness of conduct. And as national prosperity becomes more closely interwoven with the operations of commerce and industry, and the smooth flow of trade becomes more vital to daily existence, there is a natural tendency to seek tighter controls of a political nature, that will express society's increasing concern lest failure in some small link or cog seriously cripple large sections of the economic machine. Having in this sense become production-minded, and with good intentions having adopted the concept of efficiency as its touchstone, a technological society is inclined to view machinelike precision and close dovetailing of effort as its natural lot. The loose order of individualism is accordingly, by degrees, being shoved aside.

Naturally one hopes that this new order will never succeed in displacing personal independence or even in lowering its high standing in our scale of values. However, this conflict between the orders of technology and personal independence marks but one of several ways in which our traditional freedom from political constraint is in jeopardy.

III

By virtue of its technological advances the United States has over the years gradually ceased to be a land of one- and two-man businesses, becoming largely a nation of employees. This shift embodies a political ferment that may be great beyond our present power to gauge it. The individual who would quickly resent state interference in the affairs of his own business seems generally to take a different stand when he becomes an employee. Then he rather welcomes the intermediation of a higher paternalistic authority and frequently derives, it would seem,

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some considerable degree of vicarious satisfaction from any mild harassing that it brings upon his management, or upon management in general.

Moreover, such governmental intermediation (to say nothing of outright government ownership) is interpreted by the worker as promising him a greater voice in setting the standards of his job. It suggests perhaps a minor partnership in the business and a fractional participation in the owner's rights of decision, even in the owner's financial reward. In election day he sees his opportunity to determine who his top management shall be and the basic policies which it shall follow. As for the consequences that might weigh more directly against him, the increasing tax burden he meets for the most part only indirectly as a gradual rise in the cost of living. His freedom of speech and assembly seems in no immediate danger. Aside from the draft for military service, he sees no forced labor in the offing. If advancements by merit under private management are largely replaced, under state direction, by a rule of seniority, the resulting inefficiencies of production are likely to creep on so gradually as to leave him largely unimpressed. Taught to fear industrial monopoly, he as yet feels little concern about the hugest of all monopolies formed as the state extends its control, as well as its actual ownership, of business. So, as he weighs the pros and cons of swelling governmental authority, the balance he strikes favors continuing its increase.

In consequence, the initiative and the talent for independent action which have made free enterprise spectacularly successful during a century and more of rapid growth now lie dormant, except among a decreasing fraction of the population. Public respect for privately owned and managed business is materially less than it was not so long ago. To many politicians this is, of course, a welcome portent. It supports them in their instinctive desire to bring as much as possible of the nation's affairs within their ambit, even raising no inconvenient scruples when an increasing portion of the tax drain upon private resources is for enterprises chiefly of an industrial character, as indeed they are.

Thus, selecting at random from the present list of federal proposals, one notes the St. Lawrence shipway, the plan to make

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the nation independent of foreign sources of oil by a forced-draft development of vast synthetic plants, the program to build several more TVA's, the reconstruction and expansion of highways, the purportedly heavier needs of the Army and Navy, the proposal to set up large stand-by aviation resources, the tremendous undertaking (at least temporarily assumed) to help Western Europe in its reconstruction; the schemes of increased state protection ranging all the way from socialized medicine to guaranteed incomes for farmers; and perhaps least—though by no means *last*—there is the scheme to expand the nation's program of scientific research and development by subventions from the federal treasury.

Turning to the military program, these proposals, all of which are put forward as essential to either improving or safeguarding political liberty, have been topped by the Compton Committee with "A Program for National Security". While this report may, within limits, offer a formula for the military defense of the territory of the United States in the atomic age, it proposes expenditures and procedures so drastic as virtually to entail the bankruptcy of taxpayers and the regimentation of industry. The costs of its heavy concrete and lead shelters for essential services, of its program of duplication of many industrial plants —these costs when lumped together would load the national economy with debt, and thereby undermine—not fortify—our liberal way of life.

But mention of the Compton report in such a light is not intended to suggest that military expenditures are necessarily more conducive to totalitarian repercussions than are those incurred by government for general civilian purposes. The essence of the matter is that the advancing technological society sees its appetite grow with what it feeds on, until its lively aspirations concerning the more abundant life culminate in a demand for an equally lively rate of realization. Children are no more enthralled by the glitter of a toy shop than is such a society by visions of a socialistic acceleration of technology. But, unhappily, its dreams of wealth and military protection seem quite matched by a general vagueness as to why and how they serve to incubate financial and political regimentation.

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IV

Turning for the moment from the domestic to the foreign scene, we behold a picture in which the blacks and whites are even more vividly arrayed. East and West, the thirst of nations for technological development, and their resultant demands for capital are much intensified by the debt and destruction of the war. The world round, technological experts and capital are popularly esteemed to be paramount national needs. Irrespective of local party doctrines and official propaganda, a large portion of the world—destitute as it is in each of these respects—has no practicable alternative but, by resort to one or another species of state control and centralized planning, to effect a regimentation of workers and credits alike in the hope of hastening the processes of recovery and industrialization. How very tangible this motive is can be gauged by supposing for the moment that, like many other nations, the United States were now to lack adequate basic industries, yet felt within its grasp relatively complete knowledge as to how to set them up and operate them. Our national policy would then give but little heed to venture capital and free enterprise. With already assured markets and a public clamoring impatiently that its demands be met, the problem would be to train the many engineers and technicians, and accumulate by employment of public credit or the regimentation of labor the vast resources needed to create the coveted services and manufacturing facilities without incurring unpopular delay.

With this in mind, let us consider China's present predicament. In the period prior to Chiang's " abdication ", American advocates of large-scale aid to China argued about the adequacy of this or that amount. Some said $2 billions, some said $5 billions, and some suggested that only military supplies be sent. But none gave heed to the fact that whatever they recommended would, at best, have served only to scratch the surface of China's needs for industrial development. Nor would their suggested aid have added perceptibly to her supply of technically trained and professional manpower. Once her civil strife is over, to do the things the Chinese people are likely to want so eagerly that their demands will irresistibly shape national policy, the gov-

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ernment (or perhaps regional governments)—and whether "Nationalist" or "Communist"—will have little option but to institute regimentation as the expedient answer to China's needs.

China has been cited just by way of illustration and not because her present predicament is unique. Similar unbalances exist in nation after nation, so that, were other powerful collectivist influences lacking—which, unhappily, they are not—the wide margin by which national desire for technological wealth outdistances industrial achievement would, almost of itself, support the conclusion that the future must be pictured in terms of a largely regimented world. Whereas authoritarian doctrines, by whomsoever preached, bear a natural affinity to programs of rapid industrialization, the liberal faith must increasingly contend against social and economic forces so powerful that the billions of wealth now being extended to hold them in check are likely to leave as little trace as snow upon the sands of the desert.

V

Returning to the United States, whether we see our country moving with the world tide or independently of it, our technology has yet other holds upon us.

As Emerson observed, "to be great is to be misunderstood"; and technology is no exception. For each individual who is conversant with its methods, there are perhaps a hundred to whom it suggests man's closest approach to mastery of his fate. Impressed with the seeming straightforwardness of the engineer's craft, the layman is led to believe that somewhat the same efficiency could mark progress in the political and economic fields. To him the record of success in technology contrasts startlingly with the record in practically all other fields of primary public interest. And this attitude of mind, widespread as it is, has direct political significance. Why, when the key to success in any engineering undertaking is centralized planning and scheduling, should not national issues be dealt with likewise? Why fail to apply to larger affairs the methods which are conspicuously successful in lesser affairs? Why not centralize planning and the major economic controls, subordinating the random profit motives of self-centered individuals to the proper

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interests of the whole economy? Since the fountainhead of all technological advances is science, why not launch a broad unified program of scientific research, having a nationwide concept, to replace the present somewhat random assemblage of little projects? [1]

Again, to the lay public, science and technology connote swiftness and deftness of acomplishment. Little does the public see of the unremitting effort that goes on behind the scenes, and so has little reason to know that painstaking search and careful deliberation are the *sine qua non* of success in engineering undertakings and scientific research alike. A truer picture would show the public how unlike one another are the problems of technology and those of politics and economics; and how misleading it is to hold similar criteria for progress in such disparate fields. To the very limited extent that the methods and achievements of technology suggest procedures in politics and economics, they actually counsel patience combined with a willingness to understand and weigh all factors and to explore all interrelationships.

Unfortunately, however, the basis for patience is lacking, the individual being more disposed to measure technology's benefits to him in terms of the often slight improvements it brings him year by year than in terms of his conveniences as contrasted with those of his father or grandfather. Moreover, technology has set up many differential stresses throughout society. The

[1] As regards centralized planning (a more disarming expression than regimentation) of scientific research, the following quotations are worthy of note. They come from one of the most amazingly socialist documents that an American administration has ever turned out, *Science and Public Policy*, a report of Mr. Truman's Scientific Research Board:

> "Most of the funds in support of basic research should be expended through a National Science Foundation, responsible to the President."
>
> "The Federal Government's share in the total national science program makes it imperative that the Government scientific agencies be represented in planning the basic research program."
>
> "There must be a single point close to the President at which the most significant problems created in the research and development program of the Nation as a whole can be brought into top policy discussions."

Any of the bills to create a National Science Foundation would, if passed, provide the mechanism whereby a President could quite effectively control the nation's scientific research, should he so desire.

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relatively fixed and ordered social classes of earlier generations have largely vanished. Change and unrest seem all about, yet somehow the gains fail to meet expectations. A sure way to discredit a mechanism or an institution is to create the widespread impression that it has virtually no overload point. The system of free enterprise has, in this respect, suffered from unfair judgments in contrast to yet untried authoritarian schemes; and its best friends, indulging in sweeping claims as to its accomplishments, have been an invaluable foil to those who preferred to promulgate the notion that the flow of material wealth might truly have satisfied all classes of society, save that the profit motive and the uncoördinated efforts of free industry caused the cornucopia of science to clog.

VI

As mentioned in an earlier paragraph, the United States, being no longer a land chiefly of tiny businesses, has lost an important stabilizing attribute. Because the man who ceases to be his own proprietor, and instead becomes an employee, is likely to make a significant change in his views concerning the relationship between business and government—and this transformation today marks, not thousands, but many millions of persons—it does much to explain the ease with which state officialism is now " metastasizing " through so many of the vital organs and tissues of society.

To be sure, bureaucratic growth has thus far been restricted chiefly to the field of corporate activity, keeping clear of the individual's civil rights and liberties, except as it manifests itself in perilously high taxes. But until we have assurance that such immunity will continue, the question remains timely as to whether government controls must not soon break into the domain of the individual's prerogatives—whether the tightening social order that is springing up in response to our technological conditioning is not destined to replace the present loose order of political liberty based upon individualism. For example, can an economic society remain half slave and half free, its corporate half being effectively in a condition of serfdom under the state? Is the resulting Big Government less to be feared than the proverbial Big Business, that is nowhere near so powerful?

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We can reach the answers to these questions by formulating what, in an industrial society, liberty depends upon. It quite obviously involves a broader base than the traditional freedom of speech, assembly and worship, though these are not to be overlooked. In an industrial society regimentation could readily invade the more intimate conditions of working and living. And because many of what might be termed the metabolic processes of an industrial society are economic in character, not political, what it brings to the individual in satisfaction of his consumer wants depends upon attributes that cannot be legislated. There is little that democratic decisions arrived at at the polls could do to improve technological processes and the general levels of production efficiency. Paraphrasing the familiar doggerel about the centipede that lay distracted in a ditch, when asked which leg came after which, its confusion would be as nothing to that of a nation's enterprises of production, were the state (even through the instrumentality of popular elections) to undertake to instruct its thousand-legged industrial order in how to run. Nevertheless, this is the goal toward which state planning is making.

Already the industrialized state begins to mirror the factory. Already somewhat the same multifarious balances are essential to the operation of one as to the other. Yet there is this fundamental difference: factory teamwork is achieved by a recognized community of interest, a common objective, and a supervision such that—through properly maintained communication and a system of incentives and rewards—the needed balance and rhythm of effort are assured. On the other hand, teamwork is not a natural mode of the state. The state can claim no single objective (save in the unhappy circumstance of war) and it has no material incentives and rewards (save political power) to offer. The living standards it provides are fixed by a complex interplay of human skills and temperaments. Could a society be so organized that every member were doing what he could do most effectively, then its productivity would presumably attain its highest level. Regimentation not only upsets any natural balance but, in so doing, reduces the efforts of the talented without raising the output of routine workers. It restricts the opportunity for ingenuity, worthy ambition and pride of

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achievement. While the stimulus of competitive effort vanishes, the machine becomes more ponderous. There remains no way in which the man who can build a better mousetrap can do so, or even prove the superiority of his idea.

Moreover, as government control and ownership of industrial facilities continue to expand, the danger grows that the agency to which both the worker and employer have a right to look for an impartial tribunal, and whose obligations and responsibilities should impart no bias to it, will be so large an employer as to dominate the employment market. Government, that should be the servant, becomes the master; to the duty of operating the traffic lights for business, it will have added the privileges of the driver's seat as well. Then the private citizen may expect to encounter (as business has increasingly) the rigidity of legislative concrete and the superciliousness of the bureaucrat who feels safely sheltered behind its walls. How simple and almost inevitable this transformation is, a glance at England currently reveals. Summarizing a few short years of socialist government, the British journal *Nature* recently remarked editorially:

> It is a disturbing reflexion that, in one sphere after another, even in democratic Britain, controls have been imposed and administered in ways likely to impair respect for human personality and to arouse the opposition rather than to secure the consent of the governed. In its handling of the fuel crisis, the petrol situation, the new health service and the question of a wages policy, the Government has used too often the methods of the totalitarian State rather than those of a democracy; and under the forms of parliamentary government has shown a spirit of intransigence fundamentally opposed to the spirit and temper of accommodation which is the touchstone of democracy.

VII

By way of conclusion, let us glance at what may still remain of opportunities to escape from this collectivist current that moves at such a formidable pace. By the record, only once have a people undertaken to free themselves when so impelled and imperiled, and they were well known for inverting the accepted orders of things. The decree of the Erewhonians was to banish all mechanical devices that lacked suitable antiquity, a solution

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that manifestly will make no present-day appeal. Be the odds what they may, present-day nations as we know them will continue to entertain a greater love together with a lesser love and struggle to keep the two on terms friendly and compatible with each other. Mankind is thus prepared to add another stubbornly equivocal situation to life's already ample store! The chances seem vanishingly small, however, that anything save bitter disappointment lies in the collectivist port for which all are now unintentionally making.

Yet for the United States, for example, to alter its own course while continuing with an energetic program of technological expansion will call for a large measure of popular understanding of what otherwise impends. No burst of enlightenment in Washington will suffice, nor indeed need we anticipate its appearance. Nothing short of a real "mandate" from the electorate will be effective, and it must reverse in many respects what, in recent years and in certain party circles, have been hailed as mandates.

Narrow though the margin for hope is, the nation has not gone so far toward bureaucracy but that between technological change and resulting political change there is still, in certain instances, the intermediate linkage of the public mind. Whatever the nature of the former change, changes of the latter sort ensue only as the public either tolerates or wills agencies of government making them. The collectivist currents and encroachments cited above—irrespective of how we "rationalize" them in our day-to-day life—clearly reflect doubts upon much of the more recent tolerating and willing of the American public. A good workman knows his tools—and, as a tool, technology has vast powers to shape political institutions as well as the material world. To lose political liberty were bad enough—a forfeit from which material standards of living would surely suffer—but to lose it, as now threatens, through heedless and uncritical judgments respecting the best way to achieve more ambitious technological heights would constitute a major tragedy in the checkered history of human freedom.

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CIVIL LIBERTIES IN GERMANY

THE United States has worked hard to promote civil liberties in Germany. The struggle has been a difficult one. An authoritarian tradition going back hundreds of years and affecting almost every phase of German life has stifled the development of individual freedoms. The hesitating advances made during the period of the Empire and later under the Weimar Republic were swept completely away by Hitler, leaving the German people with an inadequate foundation upon which to build.

The new constitutions of Bavaria, Hesse and Wuerttemberg-Baden, promulgated in 1946, dealt extensively with civil rights. But in 1948, when this study was made, there was little disposition on the part of either the legislatures or the administrative officials to give the civil rights clauses real meaning.[1] Instead, they were looked upon mainly as grand expressions, impossible of early achievement. Indeed, the fact that many of the so-called rights could not be attained was frequently cited by officials as an argument for ignoring all others. A second reason for not taking positive steps to realize the constitutional guarantees was based on the argument that civil liberties could have no significance so long as the people were confronted with an occupying Power. A third line of reasoning, of less validity in 1948 than in the immediate post-war period, was that individual freedoms meant nothing to people who were in misery for want of adequate food and housing.

An examination of what might have at first appeared to be excuses rather than valid reasons for a disinterest in the subject of civil liberties revealed the complexity of the German problem. In some fields, there was little that could be classified as

[1] *Constitutions of the German Laender*, prepared by Civil Administration Division, Office of Military Government (U. S.) [OMGUS], 1947. See Robert G. Neumann, "New Constitutions in Germany", *The American Political Science Review*, vol. XLII (June 1948), pp. 448-468.

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deliberate discrimination. In other areas, neither the legislatures nor the administrative officials were especially interested in establishing effective curbs to eliminate discrimination. There was a third category in which "circumstances beyond their control" acted to nullify any desire German officialdom might have had to make effective the civil rights sections of the new constitutions.

The Expellee Problem

Illustrative of this third category was the expellee problem. Article 8 of the Constitution of Hesse contains four words, "the dwelling is inviolable". The constitutions of the other *Laender* contain similar provisions. It was the daily violation of this clause which was cited by almost every German official as evidence that civil liberties were of little importance.

The violations were by the Germans themselves. Yet the decision which made the violations necessary had been set down at Potsdam in 1945 when the United States, Great Britain and Russia agreed to the deportation to Germany of minority elements in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.[2] As a result of this agreement, in 1946 over one and one-half million people from Czechoslovakia and Hungary were transferred on an organized basis to the United States Zone. In addition to this number, the Office of Military Government estimated that 450,000 persons came into the Zone illegally from those same areas. Another million persons who formerly had lived in Eastern Germany, now a part of Poland, were also living in the United States Zone together with 275,000 former residents of the Soviet Zone. Thus at least three million people were added in the United States Zone alone to a population which in 1939 numbered slightly over fourteen million. This represented an increase of over 20 per cent in an area where many thousands of homes had been destroyed in the war. The problem was complicated still further by the illegal entry into the United States

[2] Article XIII. "The three governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German population, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner."

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Zone of an estimated 400-600 persons every day. They came from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, and from the other zones in Germany.[3]

Under normal conditions, the assimilation of such a large number of people would be difficult. Under post-war conditions the task was virtually impossible. During the period of the organized movement, in 1946, the new arrivals were distributed as equitably as could be on the basis of the housing that was available. In one *kreis* in Wuerttemberg-Baden, for example, 40,000 of the 105,000 inhabitants were expellees, chiefly from Czechoslovakia. This higher than average proportion was due to the fact that the *kreis* had suffered little war damage.

The expellees were sent to private homes, assigned there by local housing officials. They were moved in so rapidly that almost no attention was paid to the skills of the individuals. A mechanic or an attorney or a doctor might find himself assigned to a farm in some rural area where he would be of little value to the owner of the land and in no position to practice his own profession.

For the most part the old residents were not interested in trying to assimilate the expellees, notwithstanding the fact that during the war these same people had been looked upon practically as blood brothers. Now they were viewed as complete foreigners whose sole aim was to wrest the lands and property from the rightful owners. Many of the expellees had ties with Germany only through their great-grandparents. Some did not even speak the German language.

Not all of the expellees were anxious to be assimilated. Many of them looked forward to returning home. This desire was less important than formerly, due to the falling of the Iron Curtain over Czechoslovakia. Few expellees had any desire to live in Russian-dominated territory. Instead of planning their return home, the expellees were primarily concerned with the *Lasten-*

[3] *The Civil Administration of U. S. Zone Germany*, prepared by the Civil Administration Division, OMGUS, 1948. See also Jane Perry Clark Carey and Margaret Hine, "Present Population of Germany", *Foreign Policy Reports*, vol. XXIV, No. 20, March 1, 1948, p. 248; Julius Isaac, "Germany's Refugees", *Information Bulletin*, magazine of U. S. Military Government in Germany, No. 169, September 6, 1949, p. 7.

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ausgleich or " equalization of burdens ". This program, which was supposed to operate simultaneously with the currency reform, was understood by the expellees to contemplate various forms of aid including money, household effects and lands. They expected to obtain a substantial portion of the property of those Germans who had come through the war undamaged. Although the Bizonal Economic Administration approved a limited equalization program, it was improbable that the amounts turned over to the expellees would result in any feeling other than one of disillusionment.

It was difficult to develop a feeling for civil liberties in such an atmosphere. The homeowner had little respect for a constitutional guarantee of the inviolability of the home after he had been ordered to share a portion of his house with a foreign family. The expellee had nothing but resentment for a system of assignment which designated a place of residence but did not follow up to determine how often each week he was allowed to prepare a hot meal in the kitchen.

The newcomers in some parts of Wuerttemberg-Baden were so numerous and so well organized that, after establishing residence qualifications for voting under the new constitution, they took over some of the offices in the towns. In most communities, however, the expellee was the victim of discrimination wherever he turned. He had difficulty, for example, in finding employment. His children did not have the same opportunities for schooling.

In some places a real effort was being made to provide work and proper food and shelter for the expellees. In other places the German officials demonstrated their dislike for the newcomers by doing almost nothing. In Bavaria, considerable numbers of expellees were in camps. In the summer of 1948 students at the University of Munich—and most of them were German students—visited one of the camps operated by the Bavarian government. They were so indignant at the failure of the German officials to provide decent accommodations that they staged an effective protest meeting and exacted a promise of reform.

What the ultimate solution to the expellee and refugee prob-

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lem will be is not yet clear.[4] Some may be able to emigrate to other lands. Some may be aided by new construction or by the equalization program and may eventually become assimilated into the German economic and social life. But so long as the expellee is unwanted, just so long is one important phase of civil liberties little more than a mockery.[5]

Freedom of the Person

Fundamentally, freedom of the person means freedom from arbitrary arrest, search and seizure. The task of assuring that freedom rests primarily upon the German authorities, yet the occupying Power also plays an important rôle.

There seems to be little question that in the early days of the occupation, arrests were made by Military Government on a wholesale basis and persons were placed in jail without proper charges having been made against them. Because of the turnover of American personnel, there was often no one with any knowledge of a particular case. If held in a German prison, the Germans in charge had no authority to effect the release of those jailed by American personnel. As a consequence, persons were held illegally for long periods.

Happily this situation has been corrected. In March 1948, a directive was issued which set forth in considerable detail the procedures to be followed in connection with (a) the issue of a warrant, (b) arrest without warrant, (c) action following arrest, and (d) confinement.[6] Detailed procedures for the review of charges against persons arrested were set forth in Military Government Court Letters. These letters were designed to carry out the basic policy directive of 15 July 1947 to the Commanding General, United States Forces of Occupation:

> As a basic objective of the occupation in the reestablishment of the rule of law in Germany, you will require all agencies under your control to refrain from arbitrary and oppressive measures.

[4] It was recently listed by President Theodore Heuss of the West German Federal Republic as the most important problem facing Germany in 1950. *New York Times*, January 3, 1950, p. 12.

[5] See dispatch of Drew Middleton to the *New York Times*, April 7, 1949, p. 12.

[6] *Arrest, Search and Seizure*, Standard Operating Procedure, No. 96 (revised), Headquarters European Command, 16 March 1948.

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> . . . You will protect the civil rights of persons detained under charges assuring them a fair trial and ample opportunity to prepare their defense.[7]

Germans spoke well of Military Government efforts to eliminate abuses in these fields. When questioned specifically about the workings of the new directive, the Deputy Minister of Interior and the leading police officials of Hesse voiced not a single complaint. The Hessian Minister of Justice, Mr. Georg August Zinn, said that Military Government's greatest violation of civil rights had been in connection with arrests. He added, however, that by mid-1948 there were no longer any grounds for criticism. Interestingly enough, the secretary of the Communist party in Wuerttemberg-Baden observed, with reference to action by American personnel against Germans, " there is freedom of the person." [8]

The primary question concerning freedom of the person involved the relationship of the individual German to the German police. There was no easy method of obtaining accurate information concerning the frequency of arbitrary action by law enforcement agents. The people had been so thoroughly intimidated by the police under Hitler that it was doubtful whether, even under favorable conditions, they would report abuses.

The new constitutions, in addition to guaranteeing the inviolability of the home, prohibit searches unless upon the order of a judge. But the constitutions contain also a qualifying clause which permits search in cases of " imminent danger " as set forth in the criminal code. An evidence of the disregard by the authorities of the constitutional prohibition was reported in Wuerttemberg-Baden. In late 1948, of 10,651 house searches, 81 were supported by warrants. The explanation for this condition lay partly in the failure to revise the criminal code which insufficiently defines " imminent danger ". Nor did it provide redress for the offended citizen or punishment for the official whose action was unjustified.[9]

[7] For complete text see *New York Times*, July 16, 1947, p. 8.

[8] Personal interviews.

[9] *Information Bulletin*, No. 153, January 25, 1949, p. 20.

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The Office of Military Government in Bavaria took to task the Bavarian Minister President because of the disregard by both the German police and a German court of the constitutional provisions concerning freedom of the person. A seventeen-year-old was arrested for illegal border crossing and held for a week without being questioned. Another week elapsed before an arrest order was issued by the local court. The youth was acquitted of the charge after spending almost a month in jail. This action, or lack of it, was taken, the Military Government pointed out, notwithstanding a clause in the Bavarian Constitution requiring an arrested person to be brought before the court no later than twenty-four hours after the arrest and to be informed of the charges against him.[10] In this case the Military Government requested that the Germans themselves investigate the case and take disciplinary action.[11] The fact that the Military Government took up one specific violation with the Minister President was evidence of strong feeling that the practice was widespread, since the American authorities were demonstrating an ever-increasing reluctance to interfere with German administration except in clear-cut and rather extreme cases of violation of existing law.

Additional factors complicated acceptance of the concept of freedom of the person. One was the practice of administrative officials in sentencing persons to jail without benefit of court procedure. The Military Government in Bavaria released prisoners and abrogated ordinances, passed after the occupation, which authorized mayors and chiefs of police to imprison individuals. There was also the practice of holding people after their jail terms were completed. This was done on the basis of The Workhouse Law passed in the early part of the Hitler régime and never abrogated. Another phase of the problem concerned the discrimination against imprisoned non-Germans by German prison officers.

As one means of controlling violations of Military Government's rules governing prison administration, a new Prisons

[10] Article 102.

[11] *Information Bulletin*, No. 146, October 19, 1948, p. 10.

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Report system was put into effect.[12] Each *Land* was required to submit a single report covering all penal institutions. The report provided details on the status of prisoners, covering such matters as pre-trial detention, authority for holding, and length of sentence.

In the other areas related to personal freedom, the problem of determining the number and seriousness of violations of civil liberties was exceptionally difficult. The limited staff of the Military Government could do little more than to exhort German officialdom to observe a principle which, although at one time reasonably well established, has been completely foreign to the state for a decade and a half.

Freedom of the Press

Under Military Government, the German people did not consider their press free. How can there be freedom, they argued, so long as a licensing system imposed by an occupying Power prevails? Party leaders, desirous of a party press, were especially vociferous in denouncing the means of controlling the number of papers. One element of freedom of the press, they contended, is the individual's right to choose his newspaper. In all but the largest towns this was impossible since only one paper had been licensed. Thus one segment of the population had a virtual monopoly and was able to conduct a profitable publications business while others who wished to express themselves were denied facilities, paper, and, above all, a license.

The licensing system was introduced in July 1945 as the most practicable means of keeping Nazi sympathizers out of the publishing business. Printing plants were seized by the Military Government and turned over to licensees on a rental basis. Providing the owner of the plant and the new publisher could agree on the terms of a lease, Military Government relinquished control of the seized plant. Former publishers in some instances balked at this procedure as they were hopeful of reëntering the publishing business after clearance under the denazification laws. In December 1948, all but 10 of the 56 licensed newspapers in

12 "Legal and Judicial Affairs", *Report of the Military Governor*, No. 35, March-May 1948, p. 7.

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the United States Zone were operating under voluntary leases. The Military Government planned to impose mandatory contracts upon the remainder.[13]

A second factor necessitating the establishment of licensing controls was the acute shortage of newsprint. This had an immediate effect not only upon the number and frequency of editions but upon their make-up and circulation. The rationing of newsprint ended in the fall of 1948.

The goal of the Military Government was to establish a democratic press which would be strong enough to continue on its own after all controls were eliminated. Prospective licensees were screened to eliminate special-interest groups from gaining control. To obtain politically clean local talent proved especially difficult. In Hesse, for example, in no single instance was a newspaperman, recommended by the parties, found to have a clear record. As a consequence, the Military Government went into England, Norway and Sweden—anywhere that exiled Germans could be rounded up who knew the job. This accounted, incidentally, for one of the criticisms most widely leveled at the press, that it was not representative of the people. Party leaders made the point that the press was "left" of the people, especially in the rural areas.

Two newspaper editors who were interviewed challenged the assertion that the press was not representative and was not free. "We do not speak for a particular political party", one said. "Therefore in the minds of the leaders of that party we are not representing the people. Furthermore, anyone in this area who tries to look ahead is considered a leftist and is immediately accused of being unrepresentative." "Actually," said the other, "the German press is more free today than at any time in its history. I write anything I please. All that the Military Government asks is that malicious criticism be eliminated."

The Military Government exercised post-publication scrutiny rather than pre-publication censorship. The German editor was solely responsible for the contents of his paper. That the Military Government came in for at least its share of criticism

[13] "Germany's New Press", *Information Bulletin*, No. 154, February 8, 1949, pp. 19-21. See also *The German Press in the US Occupied Area*, Special Report of the Military Governor, OMGUS, November 1948.

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was evidenced by a statement of the Director of Information Services to a meeting of publishers in December 1948: "I suggest that in the editorial evaluation of news, the mere fact of the occupation in this specific zone should not be counted as a factor which will give the occupier less consideration than is given to others." [14]

Whether objective, outspoken editors would be able to continue once controls were relaxed was an open question. The Military Government was concerned lest discriminatory practices ruin the publishers. One problem concerned the supply of newsprint. If party papers were established, there was a distinct possibility that party influence in governmental and business circles would be sufficient to hold up the delivery of adequate supplies and thus freeze out present licensees. Another problem concerned the attitude of German governmental agencies. They had been reluctant to supply the papers with information and, in some instances, had set up their own press censorship by insisting that all governmental news be channeled through governmental press bureaus. The German official resented criticism from the press.

The Military Government asked the states to protect by adequate legislation the independence of the press. Indeed, the Military Government offered to abandon licensing when this was done.[15]

Perhaps the most significant feature of the German press was its independence. Within the frame of reference established by the Military Government, the 56 licensed newspapers operated as they pleased. Political and economic control was at a minimum. As the editor of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* ex-

[14] "Germany's New Press", *Information Bulletin*, No. 154, p. 19.

[15] The elements of an adequate press law, according to the Military Government, are as follows: (1) no special licenses to be required; (2) freedom from domination by the government; (3) elimination of restrictions on the activities of reporters; (4) protection from arbitrary interference by police or other administrative agency; (3) exclusion of the revival of forms of press control such as the honor courts; (6) prohibition of censorship. "Basis for Press Laws", *Information Bulletin*, No. 152, January 11, 1949, pp. 22, 26. Individual publishing licenses have been discontinued. German press laws are now in effect in all of the United States Zone. *Ibid.*, November 1949, p. 12. For a report on the press in Bavaria, see Drew Middleton, *New York Times*, December 1, 1949, p. 20.

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pressed it, " strange though this may sound, it took an occupation to set us free." [16]

Freedom of Speech and Communication

For the first time in many years the Germans had a high degree of freedom of speech. Although some will argue that freedom of speech under an occupation is impossible, nevertheless most Germans had little to fear from the Military Government.

In its program to stimulate the individual citizen to participate in government and to hold public officials responsible for their actions, the Military Government initiated town meetings. These took different forms, from small community gatherings at which the local Military Government liaison officer, the *Buergermeister* and the *Landrat* would answer questions to public forums of 1,800 where a panel of fifteen top Military Government and German officials would explain governmental policy and answer the criticisms of the inhabitants. German administrators were at first extremely reluctant to submit themselves to public questioning but refusal to do so aroused the ire of the citizenry.[17]

One limitation on freedom of speech was self imposed. The German people were not sure what Power would ultimately control them. So long as there was a possibility that the Russians might take over, some erstwhile leaders considered it inadvisable to speak their minds.

Freedom of communication had to be considered from two points of view, that of the occupying Power as well as that of local police practice. By mid-1948, wire tapping, for example, had been eliminated by the Military Government. German officials no longer included it in their long list of complaints. Nor was there any charge of censorship of the mails.

The new constitutions of the *Laender* are specific with reference to freedom of communication. All have clauses similar to that of Wuerttemberg-Baden, " the secrecy of letters, the mails,

[16] Interview.

[17] " Bavarian Public Forum ", *Information Bulletin*, No. 147, November 2, 1948, p. 9. See also " Open Forum Survey ", *ibid.*, No. 154, February 8, 1949, p. 13; Harold J. Clem, " MGO Teaches Democracy ", *ibid.*, No. 159, April 19, 1949, p. 13.

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telegraph and telephone communications is inviolable." [18] A constitutional prohibition of interference with means of communication is, in itself, of little significance. The real test is in the attitude and daily practice of administrative officials. In the past there had been little disposition to bother about the niceties of constitutional observance. This lack of consideration for the fundamental law had been changed to some degree by American insistence on its observance. However, the policy of the Military Government in withdrawing gradually from all operating responsibilities to a position of observing and reporting made difficult any exact appraisal of German regard for these freedoms.

Freedom of Religion

Officially, there is religious freedom in Germany. The new constitutions guarantee every individual the right to worship as his conscience dictates.[19]

The Military Government gave clergymen complete freedom to speak as they wished. This policy was deliberate. Full restoration of religious worship was made a primary goal of the Military Government.[20] At times American officials were irked considerably by severe criticism emanating from the clergy in the form of pastoral letters. But adherence to the basic policy was maintained, that is, allowing the churches to express themselves on moral issues, as defined and interpreted by the churches.[21]

Discriminations based upon religious differences and directed toward individuals and church groups by the Germans themselves did occur. They were apt to be of a subtle character and

[18] Article 7.

[19] For example, "freedom of religious faith and conscience is guaranteed." Article 107, par. 1, Constitution of the Free State of Bavaria.

[20] OMGUS, *Education and Cultural Relations*, Report of the Military Governor, No. 34, May 1947-April 1948, p. 77.

[21] The clergy was treated leniently in the Military Government phase of denazification. Few direct removals were made but, instead, an effort was made to induce the ecclesiastical authorities themselves to take appropriate action. This approach proved only partially successful. When the denazification machinery was turned over to the Germans, the Military Government requested that priority be given to cases involving the clergy. As a result of the *Spruchkammer* (denazification court) hearings, 73 clergymen were removed. *Education and Religion*, Report of the Military Governor, No. 22, 1 May 1946–30 April 1947, p. 44.

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hard to pin down. In Bavaria, for example, court clerks continued the Hitler practice of placing the word "Jew" before the name of any member of the Jewish race who appeared in court for any reason. The Military Government ordered this practice stopped. Also in Bavaria, the Methodists of Nuremberg complained to the Military Government that they were unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain cement to rebuild their church. The German office in charge of allocating the supply delayed making any allocation for two years on the ground that no cement was available. Finally, the Military Government ordered the German office to make the cement available to the Methodists.

The Military Government intervened on other occasions to obtain equal treatment for the threescore minor denominations. An agreement was reached so that broadcasting time on Radio Munich was divided equally between the two major denominations—Roman Catholic and Evangelical-Lutheran—while the smaller denominations were cared for on an alternating basis. Supplies of sacramental wine, printing paper, and building materials had at various times been the subject of special agreements in order to secure equal opportunity for the smaller denominations.[22]

Equal Rights for Women

From the standpoint of numbers, German women are now in a position to improve their status and to assign to oblivion the long-standing cultural pattern which has confined them to *Kinder-Kirche-Kueche* (children, church and kitchen). In all of Germany, the women now outnumber the men by 6,000,000.[23] In the American Zone alone, according to a census made in 1946, there were approximately 9,400,000 women to 7,800,000 men. The ratio in the age group 20-25, according to a sampling census in Bavaria, was 172 women for every 100 men.[24] This proportion meant that a great part of the economic

[22] OMGUS, *Education and Cultural Relations*, Report of the Military Governor, No. 34, p. 86.

[23] Edward H. Litchfield, "Seeing for Themselves", *Information Bulletin*, No. 154, February 8, 1949, p. 4.

[24] OMGUS, *The Population of Germany*, November 1947, pp. 8-9.

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burden had to be borne by women forced to support themselves and their families. Assumption of a large share of the economic burden tended to stimulate the elimination of discriminatory laws and practices. It had already effected a change in the social status of thousands of women in Western Germany where 6,003,000 women were included in the total of 17,443,000 persons gainfully employed.[25]

The new constitutions guarantee women equal rights,[26] but there has been little demand by women for legislation which will implement the new constitutional provisions. Furthermore, the traditional superiority of the man makes for discriminatory practices which legislation cannot reach.[27]

The suppression of women's organizations under National Socialism had a long aftereffect. Women were not interested in banding together for any common endeavor.[28] Distrust and defeatism were the rule. Only an infinitesimally small percentage joined the political parties or ran for public office.

There has been a considerable revival of interest in organizations concerned with relief.[29] Another area of feminine activity has been in the trade unions. In May 1948, 108 women delegates from trade unions in Wuerttemberg-Baden met in Stuttgart to make plans for improving the lot of their sex in industry. They urged legislation designed to achieve economic equality, the expansion of occupational opportunities, collective agreements providing equal pay for equal work, and a monthly, paid, free day for household duties.[30]

25 OMGUS, *Economic Developments since Currency Reform*, Special Report of the Military Governor, November 1948, p. 21.

26 For example, "All persons, irrespective of sex and birth, are free and equal before the law." Article 2, Constitution for Wuerttemberg-Baden.

27 For example, in job placement. See Elise F. Hawtin, "Home Economics for Farm Women", *Information Bulletin*, No. 153, January 25, 1949, p. 8.

28 See David Rodnick, *Postwar Germans* (New Haven, 1948), chap. ix.

29 Mrs. Chase Going Woodhouse, "Today's Women of Germany", *Information Bulletin*, No. 145, October 5, 1948, p. 4.

30 OMGUS, *Manpower, Trade Unions and Working Conditions*, Report of the Military Governor, No. 35, March-May 1948, p. 9. For the percentage of women in various trade unions see Matthew A. Kelly, "The Reconstitution of the German Trade Union Movement", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. LXIV, March 1949, p. 42.

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That women were interested and wanted to know about present-day problems such as currency reform, coal allocation, and educational reform was demonstrated by the large attendance of women at the town meetings sponsored by the Military Government in Wuerttemberg-Baden. Another indication was the large number of farm women who participated with increasing enthusiasm in the special demonstration courses and lectures in home economics.[31] In an effort to stimulate " political action for democracy ", the Military Government sent selected women leaders to the United States for a period of three months. Their host group was the Carrie Chapman Catt Memorial Fund, an affiliate of the League of Women Voters.[32]

In general, the cry of equal rights for women is a still small cry. The heavy hand of tradition is hard to lift. Nevertheless, recognition of the goal of equal treatment contained in the new constitutions is a step which, combined with the practical economic realities and a slowly growing awareness of their political importance, may achieve for women a status ultimately approaching equality.[33]

Equality of Opportunity

The doctrine of equality of opportunity as a key concept in the field of civil liberties is almost unknown in Germany. The class stratification in practically every phase of life has existed for so long that it is accepted by a large proportion of the populace as normal and correct.

Educational reform designed to secure equal educational opportunity for all was a major goal of the Military Government.[34] After the Bavarian *Landtag* had used every delaying tactic imaginable, the Military Government ordered that free tuition and free textbooks be supplied pupils of compulsory school age.[35] Revision of the elementary system to provide a six-year

[31] Hawtin, *loc. cit.*, p. 9.

[32] Litchfield, *loc. cit.*, p. 25.

[33] Elizabeth G. Holt, " New Status for Women ", *Information Bulletin*, No. 160, May 3, 1949, p. 3.

[34] *Education and Religion*, Report of the Military Governor, No. 22, p. 4.

[35] *Information Bulletin*, No. 142, August 24, 1948, p. 17.

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rather than a four-year basic course met with vehement opposition. The importance of this reform can hardly be overestimated in view of the fact that 90 per cent of all students (in Bavaria) are at age ten guided away from practically all opportunity to obtain a university education. The program for revision of training techniques, designed to obtain better-trained teachers and to lessen their authoritarian rôle, has made slow progress.[36]

Job opportunities were circumscribed to some degree by restrictions on freedom of movement. These restrictions were due in part to lack of housing and in part to fear of competition. Although an individual was free to travel from one community to another, provided he had proper identification, taking up residence in a new community was a totally different matter. The Bavarian *Landtag*, for example, passed a law in May 1948 limiting the number of settlement licenses and restricting the areas in which licensed physicians, dentists and veterinarians could practice. As a consequence, 4,000 physicians in Bavaria, who had state licenses to practice, were unable to obtain a settlement license from the Minister of Interior.[37] This law was modified in December 1948 to provide free settlement for certain categories of physicians.[38]

Opportunity to move about was further restricted by government controls on quitting a job or taking a job. In addition to government controls were the requirements instituted by nongovernmental associations representing the various trades and professions. These nongovernmental associations often had a decisive voice in determining who should operate new businesses. The Military Government in Bavaria asked the Minister President to review the Bavarian licensing law and to recommend legislation limiting discriminations in this field.[39]

The caste system in the public service constitutes one of the

[36] For the advances in Hesse see James R. Newman, "School Reform in Hesse", *Information Bulletin*, No. 163, June 14, 1949, p. 3; also see "Education in Bavaria", *ibid.*, No. 170, September 20, 1949, p. 2.

[37] OMGUS, *Monthly Report of the Military Governor*, No. 38, August 1948, p. 7.

[38] *Ibid.*, No. 42, December 1948, pp. 24-25.

[39] *Information Bulletin*, No. 148, November 16, 1948, p. 30.

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greatest barriers to the democratization of Germany. Legislation designed to open the public service to all persons who were qualified and to make appointments and promotions on the basis of merit has been passed in all of the *Laender*. But the administration of the law has been in the hands of the old officialdom who resents any interference with the traditional pattern by which a few specially selected and highly trained individuals receive positions of preferment. These officials look upon themselves as " arms " of the state rather than as servants of the people.[40] Nor have the German people been taught to expect any accounting from public employees. Correction of personnel practices to eliminate the preferment accorded certain groups had been so long delayed that the Military Government enacted a law designed to eliminate class distinctions.[41]

Conclusion

The United States has a varied program in operation designed to democratize Germany.[42] Experts in various fields and from many lands are being brought into contact with German groups and individuals; German officials are being sent to this country to observe American practices; thousands of volumes designed to stimulate thinking along democratic lines are being distributed through German agencies; all this, and more, is being done in the hope that democratic ideas and practices may be transplanted to the German scene. Each element of the pro-

[40] *Information Bulletin*, No. 156, March 8, 1949, p. 22; see also " The Civil Servant Holds Privileged Status in Germany ", *ibid.*, No. 171, October 4, 1949, p. 19.

[41] " There is something wrong when a man goes to the housing office to get himself a residence permit and finds himself shunted from office to office, delayed for days by the lack of this or that stamp. Usually he is treated with the cordiality that a king would have for a charwoman." Address of Murray D. Van Wagoner, Director, Office of Military Government for Bavaria, *Information Bulletin*, No. 155, February 22, 1949, p. 11, reprinted in *The Department of State Bulletin*, March 20, 1949, p. 350. For the provisions of the new law see *Information Bulletin*, No. 156, March 8, 1949, p. 8.

[42] For a summary of specific projects see the excerpt from the annual report of the Secretary of the Army, " Report on Germany, Part 2, Political and Social Development ", *Information Bulletin*, No. 159, April 19, 1949, pp. 19-20. The government plans to expand this program. See Henry Byroade, " Our German Problem Today ", *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. XXI, No. 540, November 7, 1949, p. 705.

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gram helps, in large or small degree, to introduce the concepts of civil liberties.

Though there has been some acceptance of the need for strengthening civil liberties, as yet the great mass of the population is being stirred but faintly. The promotion and development of civil liberties to the point where they have deep and lasting meaning for the majority of Germans will require a broad and continuous effort over a long period. That effort must be shared. The Germans have made considerable progress under the occupation, but they have not advanced sufficiently to be left to their own devices.

The tapering off of occupation controls threatens the development of civil liberties, for it makes more difficult the supervision of basic reforms. The hard-fought battle to eliminate the caste system in the schools, for example, is a paper victory only.[43] Years of supervision will be required before the change is accepted as an integral part of the educational system. Yet the Occupation Statute omits education as one of the fields specifically reserved to the Western Powers.

Action by the High Commission to promote the development of civil liberties presumably can be taken under the reserved power entitled "respect for the basic law and the land (state) constitutions."[44] The Occupation Statute authorizes action also "to preserve democratic government in Germany." However, the natural tendency will be further to relax controls. This tendency may be accentuated by a desire to give the newly established Federal Republic as much freedom as possible. Yet to relax in the field of civil liberties is to endanger the progress that has been made. The effort to change the traditional practices of a people has just begun. The process is bound to be long and costly. Failure may be infinitely more costly.

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[43] See dispatch of Drew Middleton to the *New York Times*, December 2, 1949, p. 22.

[44] For the complete text see the *New York Times*, April 11, 1949, p. 9.

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THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AS AN AFTERMATH OF THE GREAT WAR FOR THE EMPIRE, 1754–1763

GREAT wars in modern times have too frequently been the breeders of revolution. The exhausting armed struggles in which France became engaged in the latter half of the eighteenth century led as directly to the French Revolution as did the First World War to the Russian Revolution; it may be said as truly that the American Revolution was an aftermath of the Anglo-French conflict in the New World carried on between 1754 and 1763. This is by no means to deny that other factors were involved in the launching of these revolutionary movements. Before proceeding with an analysis of the theme of this paper, however, it would be well to consider the wording of the title given to it.*

Words may be used either to disguise or to distort facts as well as to clarify them, but the chief task of the historian is to illuminate the past. He is faced, therefore, with the responsibility of using only such words as will achieve this broad objective of his calling and to reject those that obscure or defeat it. For this reason "the French and Indian War", as a term descriptive of the conflict to which we have just referred, has been avoided in this essay as well as in the writer's series on the *British Empire before the American Revolution*. This has been done in spite of the fact that it has been employed by most Americans ever since the early days of our Republic and therefore has the sanction of long usage as well as the sanction of American national tradition assigning, as does the latter, to the Revolutionary War a position of such commanding importance as to make all other events in American history, preceding as well as following it, quite subordinate to it. In contrast to this traditional interpretation of our history one may affirm that the Anglo-French conflict settled nothing less than the incom-

* This paper was read before the colonial history section of the American Historical Association in December 1948 at the Annual Meeting held in Washington.

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parably vital question as to what civilization—what complex cultural patterns, what political institutions—would arise in the great Mississippi basin and the valleys of the rivers draining it, a civilization, whatever it might be, surely destined to expand to the Pacific seaboard and finally to dominate the North American continent. The determination of this crucial issue is perhaps the most momentous event in the life of the English-speaking people in the New World and quite overshadows in importance both the Revolutionary War and the later Civil War, events which, it is quite clear, were each contingent upon the outcome of the earlier crisis.

A struggle of such proportions, involving tremendous stakes, deserves a name accurately descriptive of its place in the history of the English-speaking people, and the title "the French and Indian War", as suggested, in no way fulfills this need. For the war was not, as the name would seem to imply, a conflict largely between English and French New World colonials and their Indian allies, nor was it localized in North America to the extent that the name would appear to indicate. In contrast, it was waged both before and after an open declaration of war by the British and French nations with all their resources for nine years on three oceans, and much of the land washed by the waters of them, and it ultimately brought in both Spain, allied to France, and Portugal, allied to Great Britain. While it involved, it is true, as the name would connote, wilderness fighting, yet of equal, if not of greater, importance in assessing its final outcome was the pouring forth of Britain's financial resources in a vast program of shipbuilding, in the equipment and support of the British and colonial armies and the royal navy, and in the subsidization both of allies on the European continent and of the colonies in America. If it also involved the reduction of the fortress of Louisbourg, Fort Niagara, Fort Duquesne, Quebec and Montreal in North America, each in turn to fall to British regulars aided by American provincial troops, these successes, of great significance, were, in fact, really contingent upon the resounding British naval victories in the Mediterranean, off the Strait of Gibraltar, in the Bay of Biscay, and elsewhere, that brought about the virtual extinction of the French navy and merchant marine and thereby presented to

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France—seeking to supply her forces in Canada and elsewhere with adequate reinforcements and matériel—a logistical problem so insoluble as to spell the doom of her North American empire and of her possessions in India and elsewhere.

If the term "the French and Indian War" meets none of the requirements of accurate historical nomenclature, neither does the term "the Seven Years' War"—a name appropriately enough employed by historians to designate the mighty conflict that raged for seven years in Germany before its conclusion in the Treaty of Hubertusburg in 1763. The principals in this war were Prussia, allied with Great Britain, Hanover, Brunswick and Hesse, facing Austria, most of the Holy Roman Empire, Russia and Sweden, all allied with France and receiving subsidies from her. Although George II, as King of Great Britain and Elector of Hanover, in the treaty of 1758 with Frederick of Prussia, promised not to conclude peace without mutual agreement with the latter, and although large subsidies were annually paid to Prussia as well as to the other continental allies out of the British treasury and troops were also sent to Germany, it must be emphasized that these aids were designed primarily for the protection of the King's German Electorate. In other words, the British alliance in no way supported the objectives of the Prussian King, when he suddenly began the German war in 1756 by invading Saxony—two years after the beginning of the Anglo-French war. In this connection it should be borne in mind that throughout the Seven Years' War in Germany Great Britain remained at peace with both Russia and Sweden and refused therefore to send a fleet into the Baltic in spite of the demands of Frederick that this be done; nor were British land troops permitted to assist him against Austria, but only to help form a protective shield for Hanover against the thrusts of the French armies. For the latter were determined not only to overrun the Electorate—something that they succeeded in doing—but to hold it as a bargaining point to be used at the conclusion of hostilities with Great Britain, a feat, however, beyond their power of accomplishment. Closely related and intertwined as were the two wars, they were, nevertheless, distinct in their beginning and distinct in their termination.

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Indeed, while British historians at length were led to adopt the nomenclature applied by German and other continental historians to all hostilities that took place between 1754 and 1763 in both the Old and New Worlds, American historians, by and large in the past, have rejected, and rightly so, it seems, the name "the Seven Years' War" to designate specifically the struggle during these years in North America with the fate of that continent at stake; so likewise many of them have rejected, as equally inadmissible, the name "the French and Indian War". Instead, the late Professor Osgood employed the title "the Fourth Intercolonial War", surely not a good one; George Bancroft called the war "the American Revolution: First Phase", still more inaccurate in some respects than the names he sought to avoid; Francis Parkman, with the flare of a romanticist, was at first inclined to call it "the Old French War" but finally, under the influence of the great-man-in-history thesis, gave to his two remarkable volumes concerned with it the totally misleading name, *Montcalm and Wolfe;* finally, John Fiske, the philosopher-historian, as luminous in his views as he was apt to be careless in the details of historical scholarship, happily fastened upon the name "the Great War". In the series on the *British Empire before the American Revolution* the writer has built upon Fiske's title and has called it "the Great War for the Empire" in order to emphasize not only the fact that the war was a very great conflict both in its scope and in its lasting effects, as Fiske saw it with clearness, but also, as a war entered into specifically for the defense of the British Empire, that it was by far the most important ever waged by Great Britain to this end.

It may be pointed out that later charges, especially by American writers, that the war was begun by Great Britain with less worthy motives in mind, are not supported by the great mass of state papers and the private correspondence of British statesmen responsible for making the weighty decisions at the time—materials now available to the student which the writer has attempted to analyze in detail in the two volumes of his series that appeared under the title of *Zones of International Friction, 1748–1754.* In other words, the idea that the war was started

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as the result of European balance-of-power politics or by British mercantilists for the purpose of destroying a commercial rival and for conquering Canada and the French West Indies, and for expelling the French from India, rather than for the much more limited and legitimate objective of affording the colonies and particularly the new province of Nova Scotia and the Old Dominion of Virginia protection against the aggressive aims of France, must be dismissed by students brought face to face with impressive evidence to the contrary.

The development of the war into one for the military mastery of the North American continent came with the growing conviction on the part of the British ministers that nothing short of this drastic step would realize the primary aims of the government in arriving at the determination, as the result of appeals from the colonies for assistance, to challenge the right of French troops to be planted well within the borders of the Nova Scotia peninsula and at the forks of the Ohio. One may go as far as to state that the acquisition of Canada—as an objective sought by mercantilists to contribute to the wealth of Great Britain—would have seemed fantastic to any contemporary who had the slightest knowledge of the tremendous financial drain that that great possession had been on the treasury of the French King for over a century before 1754. Moreover, the motives that ultimately led, after much searching of heart, to its retention after its conquest by Great Britain were not commercial but strategic and had primarily in view the security and welfare generally of the older American colonies.

In view of these facts, not to be confused with surmises, the name " the Great War for the Empire " seems to the writer not only not inappropriate but among all the names heretofore applied to the war in question by far the most suitable that can be used by one concerned with the history of the old British Empire, who seeks earnestly to maintain that standard of exactness in terminology, as well as in other respects, which the public has a right to demand of him.

The description just given of the motives that led to the Great War for the Empire, nevertheless, runs counter, as suggested, to American national tradition and most history that has

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been written by American historians in harmony with it. This tradition had a curious beginning. It arose partly out of Pitt's zealous efforts to energize the colonies to prosecute the war most actively; but there also was another potent factor involved in its creation. Before the conclusion of hostilities in 1763 certain powerful commercial interests—centered particularly at Newport, Rhode Island, Boston, New York City, and to a less extent in Philadelphia—in a desire to continue an enormously lucrative trade with the French West Indies, and therefore with the enemy, all in the face of Pitt's determination to keep supplies from the French armed forces operating in the New World, began to express themselves in terms that implied that the war was peculiarly Great Britain's war and only incidentally one that concerned her colonies and that the French, really friendly to the aspirations of British colonials, were opposed only to the mercantilistic ambitions of the mother country. By 1766—just twelve years after the beginning of the war and three years after its termination—this extraordinary tradition had become so well established that Benjamin Franklin, astonishingly enough, could actually assert in his examination before a committee of the House of Commons:

> I know the last war is commonly spoke of here as entered into for the defence, or for the sake of the people of America; I think it is quite misunderstood. It began about the limits between Canada and Nova Scotia, about territories to which the crown indeed laid claim, but were not claimed by any British colony . . . . We had therefore no particular concern or interest in that dispute. As to the Ohio, the contest there began about your right of trading in the Indian country, a right you had by the Treaty of Utrecht, which the French infringed . . . they took a fort which a company of your merchants, and their factors and correspondents, had erected there to secure that trade. Braddock was sent with an army to retake that fort . . . and to protect your trade. It was not until after his defeat that the colonies were attacked. They were before in perfect peace with both French and Indians. . . .

By the beginning of 1768 the tradition had been so extended that John Dickinson—voicing the popular American view in

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his highly important *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania*, No. VIII—felt that he not only could affirm, as did Franklin, that the war was strictly Britain's war and fought for selfish purposes, but could even insist that the acquisition of territory in North America as the result of it "is greatly injurious to these colonies" and that they therefore were not under the slightest obligation to the mother country.

But to return to the last phases of the Great War for the Empire. The British customs officials—spurred into unusual activity in the face of Pitt's demand for the strict enforcement of the Trade and Navigation Acts in order to break up the pernicious practice of bringing aid and comfort to the enemy—were led to employ writs of assistance for the purpose of laying their hands upon goods landed in American ports and secured in exchange for American provisions sent for the most part either directly or indirectly to the French West Indies. Although in the midst of hostilities, most of the merchants in Boston showed bitter opposition to the writs and equally ardent support of James Otis' declaration made in open court in 1761 that Parliament, acting within the limits of the constitution, was powerless to extend the use of these writs to America, whatever its authority might be in Great Britain. The importance of this declaration lies not so much in its immediate effect but rather in the fact that it was indicative of the line of attack that not only Otis would subsequently follow but also the Adamses, Hawley, Hancock, and other popular leaders in the Bay colony during the developing crisis, in the laying down of constitutional restrictions upon the power of Parliament to legislate for America. Further, it is clear that, even before the Great War for the Empire had been terminated, there were those in the province who had begun to view Great Britain as the real enemy rather than France.

Just as definitely as was the issue over writs of assistance related to the war under consideration was that growing out of the twopenny acts of the Virginia Assembly. In search of funds for maintaining the frontier defensive forces under the command of Colonel George Washington, the Assembly was led to pass in 1755 and 1758 those highly questionable laws as favor-

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able to the tobacco planters as they were indefensively unjust to the clergy. Even assuming the fact that these laws were war measures, and therefore in a sense emergency measures, it was inconceivable that the Privy Council would permit so palpable a violation of contractual relations as they involved. The royal disallowance of the laws in question opened the way for Patrick Henry, the year that hostilities were terminated by the Peace of Paris, not only to challenge in the Louisa County courthouse the right of the King in Council to refuse to approve any law that a colony might pass that in its judgment was a good law, but to affirm that such refusal was nothing less than an act of tyranny on the part of the King. It was thus resentment at the overturning of Virginia war legislation that led to this attack upon the judicial authority of review by the Crown—an authority exercised previously without serious protest for over a century. It should also be noted that the Henry thesis helped to lay the foundation for the theory of the equality of colonial laws with those passed by Parliament, a theory of the constitution of the empire that most American leaders in 1774 had come to accept in arguing that if the King could no longer exercise a veto over the acts of the legislature of Great Britain, it was unjust that he should do so over those of the colonial assemblies.

But the most fateful aftermath of the Great War for the Empire, with respect to the maintenance of the historic connection between the mother country and the colonies, grew out of the problem of the control and support not only of the vast trans-Appalachian interior, the right to which was now confirmed by treaty to Great Britain, but of the new acquisitions in North America secured from France and Spain. Under the terms of the royal Proclamation of 1763, French Canada to the east of the Great Lakes was organized as the Province of Quebec; most of old Spanish Florida became the Province of East Florida; and those areas, previously held by Spain as well as by France to the west of the Apalachicola and to the east of New Orleans and its immediate environs, became the Province of West Florida. The Proclamation indicated that proper inducements would be offered British and other Protestants to establish themselves in these new provinces. With respect to the

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trans-Appalachian region, however, it created there a temporary but vast Indian reserve by laying down as a barrier the crest of the mountains beyond which there should be no white settlement except by specific permission of the Crown.

The Proclamation has been represented not only as a blunder, the result largely of carelessness and ignorance on the part of those responsible for it, but also as a cynical attempt by the British ministry to embody mercantilistic principles in an American land policy that in itself ran counter to the charter limits of many of the colonies and the interests in general of the colonials. Nevertheless, this view of the Proclamation fails to take into account the fact that it was the offspring of the war and that the trans-Appalachian aspects of it were an almost inevitable result of promises made during the progress of hostilities. For both in the Treaty of Easton in 1758 with the Ohio Valley Indians, a treaty ratified by the Crown, and in the asseverations of such military leaders as Colonel Bouquet, these Indians were assured that they would be secure in their trans-Appalachian lands as a reward for deserting their allies, the French. As a sign of good faith, the lands lying within the bounds of Pennsylvania to the west of the mountains, purchased by the Proprietors from the Six Nations in 1754, were solemnly released. Thus committed in honor in the course of the war, what could the Cabinet Council at its termination do other than it finally did in the Proclamation of 1763? But this step not only was in opposition to the interests of such groups of land speculators as, for example, the Patrick Henry group in Virginia and the Richard Henderson group in North Carolina, both of whom boldly ignored the Proclamation in negotiating with the Cherokee Indians for land grants, but also led to open defiance of this imperial regulation by frontiersmen who, moving beyond the mountains by the thousands, proceeded to settle within the Indian reserve—some on lands previously occupied before the beginning of the late war or before the great Indian revolt in 1763, and others on new lands.

The Proclamation line of 1763 might have become an issue, indeed a most formidable one, between the government of Great Britain and the colonials, had not the former acquiesced in the

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inevitable and confirmed certain Indian treaties that provided for the transfer of much of the land which had been the particular object of quest on the part of speculators and of those moving westward from the settled areas to establish new homes. Such were the treaties of Hard Labor, Fort Stanwix, Lochaber, and the modification of the last-named by the Donelson agreement with the Cherokees in 1771. Nor did the regulation of the trans-Appalachian Indian trade create serious colonial irritation, especially in view of the failure of the government to implement the elaborate Board of Trade plan drawn up in 1764. The same, however, cannot be said of the program put forward by the ministry and accepted by Parliament for securing the means to maintain order and provide protection for this vast area and the new acquisitions to the north and south of it.

Theoretically, it would have been possible for the government of Great Britain to have dropped onto the lap of the old continental colonies the entire responsibility for maintaining garrisons at various strategic points in North America—in Canada, about the Great Lakes, in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys, and in East and West Florida. In spite, however, of assertions made by some prominent colonials, such as Franklin, in 1765 and 1766, that the colonies would be able and were willing to take up the burden of providing for the defense of America, this, under the circumstances, was utterly chimerical, involving, as it would have, not only a vast expenditure of funds but highly complicated inter-colonial arrangements, even in the face of the most serious inter-colonial rivalry such as that between Pennsylvania and Virginia respecting the control of the upper Ohio Valley. The very proportions of the task were an insuperable obstacle to leaving it to the colonies; and the colonies, moreover, would have been faced by another impediment almost as difficult to surmount—the utter aversion of Americans of the eighteenth century, by and large, to the dull routine of garrison duty. This was emphasized by the Massachusetts Bay Assembly in 1755 in its appeal to the government of Great Britain after Braddock's defeat to send regulars to man the frontier forts of that province; the dispatches of Colonel George Washington in 1756 and in 1757 respecting the shameful desertion of militia-

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men, ordered to hold the chain of posts on the western frontier of Virginia in order to check the frightful French and Indian raids, support this position, as does the testimony in 1757 of Governor Lyttelton of South Carolina, who made clear that the inhabitants of that colony were not at all adapted to this type of work. The post-war task of garrison duty was clearly one to be assumed by regulars held to their duty under firm discipline and capable of being shifted from one strategic point to another as circumstances might require. Further, to be effective, any plan for the defense of the new possessions and the trans-Appalachian region demanded unity of command, something the colonies could not provide. Manifestly this could be done only through the instrumentalities of the mother country.

The British ministry, thus confronted with the problem of guaranteeing the necessary security for the extended empire in North America, which it was estimated would involve the annual expenditure of from three to four hundred thousand pounds for the maintenance of ten thousand troops—according to various estimates made by General Amherst and others in 1764 and to be found among the Shelburne Papers—was impelled to raise the question: Should not the colonials be expected to assume some definite part of the cost of this? In view of the fact that it was felt not only that they were in a position to do so but that the stability of these outlying possessions was a matter of greater concern and importance generally to them, by reason of their proximity, than to the people of the mother country three thousand miles away, the answer was in the affirmative. The reason for this is not hard to fathom. The nine years of war had involved Britons in tremendous expenditures. In spite of very heavy taxation during these years, the people were left saddled at the termination of hostilities with a national debt of unprecedented proportions for that day and age of over one hundred and forty million pounds. It was necessary not only to service and to retire this debt, in so far as was possible, but also to meet the ordinary demands of the civil government and to maintain the navy at a point of strength that would offer some assurance that France and Spain would have no desire in the future to plan a war to recover their territorial losses. In

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addition to all this, there was now the problem of meeting the charges necessary for keeping the new possessions in North America under firm military control for their internal good order and for protection from outside interference.

It may be noted that before the war the British budget had called for average annual expenditures of six and a half million pounds; between the years 1756 and 1766 these expenditures mounted to fourteen and a half million pounds a year on the average and from the latter date to 1775 ranged close to ten million pounds. As a result, the annual per capita tax in Great Britain, from 1763 to 1775, without considering local rates, was many times the average annual per capita tax in even those American colonies that made the greatest contribution to the Great War for the Empire, such as Massachusetts Bay and Connecticut—without reference to those colonies that had done little or nothing in this conflict, and therefore had accumulated little in the way of a war debt, such as Maryland and Georgia. The student of the history of the old British Empire, in fact, should accept with great reserve statements to the contrary—some of them quite irresponsible in nature—made by Americans during the heat of the controversy, with respect to the nature of the public burdens they were obliged to carry in the years preceding the outbreak of the Revolutionary War. In this connection a study of parliamentary reimbursement of colonial war expenses from 1756 to 1763 in its relation to public debts in America between the years 1763 and 1775 is most revealing. As to American public finance, all that space will here permit is to state that there is abundant evidence to indicate that, during the five-year period preceding the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, had the inhabitants of any of the thirteen colonies, which therefore included those of Massachusetts Bay and Virginia, been taxed in one of these years at the average high per capita rate that the British people were taxed from 1760 to 1775, the proceeds of that one year's tax not only would have taken care of the ordinary expenditures of the colony in question for that year but also would have quite liquidated its war debt, so little of which remained in any of the colonies by 1770. Well may John Adams have admitted in 1780 what was equally true

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in 1770: "America is not used to great taxes, and the people there are not yet disciplined to such enormous taxation as in England."

Assuming, as did the Grenville ministry in 1764, the justice of expecting the Americans to share in the cost of policing the new possessions in North America, the simplest and most obvious way, it might appear, to secure this contribution to a common end so important to both Americans and Britons was to request the colonial governments to make definite grants of funds. This was the requisition or quota system that had been employed in the course of the recent war. But the most obvious objections to it were voiced that same year by Benjamin Franklin, who, incidentally, was to reverse himself the following year in conferring with Grenville as the Pennsylvania London agent. In expressing confidentially his personal, rather than any official, views to his friend Richard Jackson on June 25, 1764 he declared: "Quota's would be difficult to settle at first with Equality, and would, if they could be made equal at first, soon become unequal, and never would be satisfactory." Indeed, experience with this system in practice, as a settled method of guaranteeing even the minimum essential resources for the end in view, had shown its weakness and utter unfairness. If it could not work equitably even in war time, could it be expected to work in peace? It is, therefore, not surprising that this method of securing even a portion of the funds required for North American security should have been rejected in favor of some plan that presented better prospects of a definite American revenue.

The plan of last resort to the ministry was therefore to ask Parliament to act. That Grenville, however, was aware that serious objections might be raised against any direct taxation of the colonials by the government of Great Britain is indicated by the caution with which he approached the solution of the problem of securing from America about a third of the total cost of its defense. The so-called Sugar Act first of all was passed at his request. This provided for import duties on certain West Indian and other products. Colonial import duties imposed by Parliament, at least since 1733, were no innovation.

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But the anticipated yield of these duties fell far short of the desired one hundred thousand pounds. He therefore, in introducing the bill for the above Act, raised the question of a stamp duty but requested postponement of parliamentary action until the colonial governments had been consulted. The latter were thereupon requested to make any suggestions for ways of raising an American fund that might seem more proper to the people than such a tax. Further, it would appear—at least, according to various London advices published in Franklin and Hall's *Pennsylvania Gazette*—that proposals were seriously considered by the Cabinet Council during the fall of 1764 for extending to the colonies representation in Parliament through the election of members to the House of Commons by various colonial assemblies. However, it is quite clear that by the beginning of 1765 any such proposals, as seem to have been under deliberation by the ministry, had been put aside when Grenville at length had become convinced that representation in Parliament was neither actively sought nor even desired by Americans. For the South Carolina Commons House of Assembly went strongly on record against this idea in September 1764 and was followed by the Virginia House of Burgesses in December. In fact, when in the presence of the London colonial agents the minister had outlined the objections raised by Americans to the idea of such representation, no one of them, including Franklin, was prepared to deny the validity of these objections. That he was not mistaken in the opposition of Americans at large to sending members to Parliament, in spite of the advocacy of this by James Otis, is clear in the resolutions passed both by other colonial assemblies than the ones to which reference has been made and by the Stamp Act Congress in 1765. Indeed, in 1768 the House of Representatives of Massachusetts Bay went so far in its famous Circular Letter framed in opposition to the Townshend duties as to make clear that the people of that colony actually preferred taxation by Parliament without representation to such taxation with representation.

When—in view of the failure of the colonial governments to suggest any practicable, alternate plan for making some contribution to the post-war defensive program in North America—

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Grenville finally urged in Parliament the passage of an American stamp bill, he acted on an unwarranted assumption. This assumption was—in paraphrasing the minister's remarks to the colonial agents in 1765—that opposition to stamp taxes, for the specific purpose in mind, would disappear in America both in light of the benefits such provision would bring to colonials in general and by reason of the plain justice of the measure itself; and that, in place of opposition, an atmosphere of mutual goodwill would be generated by a growing recognition on the part of Americans that they could trust the benevolence of the mother country to act with fairness to all within the empire. Instead, with the news of the passage of the act, cries of British tyranny and impending slavery soon resounded throughout the entire eastern Atlantic American seaboard. What would have been the fate of the empire had Grenville remained in office to attempt to enforce the act, no one can say. But as members of the opposition to the Rockingham ministry, he and his brother, Earl Temple, raised their voices—one as a commoner, the other as a peer—in warning that the American colonies would inevitably be lost to the empire should Parliament be led to repeal the act in the face of colonial resistance and the pressure of British merchants. Had Parliament determined, in spite of violence and threats of violence, to enforce the act, it might have meant open rebellion and civil war, ten years before it actually occurred. Instead, this body decided to yield and, in spite of the passing of the so-called Declaratory Act setting forth its fundamental powers to legislate on all matters relating to the empire, suffered a loss of prestige in the New World that was never to be regained.

But the Stamp Act was not the sole object of attack by colonials. To many of them not only the Sugar Act of 1764 but the whole English pre-war trade and navigation system was equally, if not actually more, obnoxious. Indeed, the unusual energy displayed by the navy and the customs officials, spurred into action by Pitt during the latter years of the war—bringing with it the condemnation in courts of vice-admiralty of many American vessels whose owners were guilty of serious trade violations, if not greater crimes—generated a degree of antagonism against the whole body of late seventeenth- and early

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eighteenth-century restrictions on commercial intercourse such as never had previously existed. It is not without significance that the greatest acts of terrorism and destruction during the great riot of August 1765 in Boston were directed not against the Massachusetts Bay stamp distributor but against those officials responsible for encouraging and supporting the enforcement, during the late war, of the various trade acts passed long before its beginning in 1754. The hatred also of the Rhode Island merchants, as a group, against the restrictions of the navigation system as well as against the Sugar Act of 1764, remained constant. Moreover, in December 1766 most of the New York merchants, over two hundred in number, showed their repugnance to the way that this system was functioning by a strongly worded petition to the House of Commons in which they enumerated an impressive list of grievances that they asked to be redressed. Even Chatham, the great friend of America, regarded their petition "highly improper: in point of time most absurd, in the extent of their pretensions, most excessive; and in the reasoning, most grossly fallacious and offensive." In fact, all the leading men in Great Britain supported the system of trade restrictions.

Nevertheless, the determination of the government—in view especially of the great financial burdens that the late war had placed upon the mother country—to enforce it now much more effectively than had been done before 1754, and to that end in 1767 to pass appropriate legislation in order to secure funds from the colonies by way of import duties so that public officials in America might be held to greater accountability when paid their salaries by the Crown, could have only one result: the combined resistance of those, on the one hand, opposed to any type of taxation that Parliament might apply to America and of those, on the other, desiring to free the colonies of hampering trade restrictions.

The suggestion on the part of the Continental Congress in 1774 that Americans would uphold the British navigation system, if exempted from parliamentary taxation, while a shrewd gesture to win support in England, had really, it would seem, no other significance. For it is utterly inconceivable that the Congress itself, or the individual colonial governments, could have

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set up machinery capable of preventing violations of the system at will on the part of those whose financial interests were adversely affected by its operation. Moreover, it is obvious that, by the time the news had reached America that Lord North's ministry had secured the passage of the coercive acts—for the most part directed against Massachusetts Bay for the defiant destruction of the East India Company's tea—leading colonials, among them Franklin, had arrived at the conclusion that Parliament possessed powers so very limited with respect to the empire that without the consent of the local assemblies it could pass neither constitutional nor fiscal legislation that affected Americans and the framework of their governments. It is equally obvious that this represented a most revolutionary position when contrasted with that held by Franklin and the other delegates to the Albany Congress twenty years earlier. For it was in 1754 that the famous Plan of Union was drawn up there and approved by the Congress—a plan based upon the view that Parliament, and not the Crown, had supreme authority within the empire, an authority that alone was adequate in view of framers of the Plan to bring about fundamental changes in the constitutions of the colonies in order legally to clothe the proposed union government with adequate fiscal as well as other powers.

In accounting for the radical change in attitude of many leading colonials between the years 1754 and 1774 respecting the nature of the constitution of the empire, surely among the factors that must be weighed was the truly overwhelming victory achieved in the Great War for the Empire. This victory not only freed colonials for the first time in the history of the English-speaking people in the New World from dread of the French, their Indian allies, and the Spaniards, but, what is of equal significance, opened up to them the prospect, if given freedom of action, of a vast growth of power and wealth with an amazing westward expansion. Indeed, it is abundantly clear that a continued subordination of the colonies to the government of Great Britain was no longer considered an asset in the eyes of many Americans by 1774, as it had been so judged by them to be in 1754, but rather an onerous liability. What, pray tell, had the debt-ridden mother country to offer in 1774 to the now geographically secure, politically mature, prosperous,

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dynamic, and self-reliant offspring along the Atlantic seaboard, except the dubious opportunity of accepting new, as well as retaining old, burdens? And these burdens would have to be borne in order to lighten somewhat the great financial load that the taxpayers of Great Britain were forced to carry by reason of obligations the nation had assumed both in the course of the late war and at its termination. If many Americans thought they had a perfect right to profit personally by trading with the enemy in time of war, how much more deeply must they have resented in time of peace the serious efforts made by the home government to enforce the elaborate restrictions on commercial intercourse? Again, if, even after the defeat of Colonel Washington at Great Meadows in 1754, colonials such as Franklin were opposed to paying any tax levied by Parliament for establishing a fund for the defense of North America, how much more must they have been inclined to oppose such taxation to that end with the passing in 1763 of the great international crisis?

At this point the question must be frankly faced: If France had won the war decisively and thereby consolidated her position and perfected her claims in Nova Scotia, as well as to the southward of the St. Lawrence, in the Great Lakes region, and in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys, is it at all likely that colonials would have made so fundamental a constitutional issue of the extension to them of the principle of the British stamp tax? Would they have resisted such a tax had Parliament imposed it in order to provide on an equitable basis the maximum resources for guaranteeing their safety, at a time when they were faced on their highly restricted borders by a militant, victorious enemy having at its command thousands of ferocious redskins? Again, accepting the fact of Britain's victory, is it not reasonable to believe that, had Great Britain at the close of the triumphant war left Canada to France and carefully limited her territorial demands in North America to those comparatively modest objectives that she had in mind at its beginning, there would have been no very powerful movement within the foreseeable future toward complete colonial autonomy—not to mention American independence? Would not Americans have continued to feel the need as in the past to rely for their safety

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and welfare upon British sea power and British land power, as well as upon British resources generally? In other words, was Governor Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts Bay far mistaken when, in analyzing the American situation late in 1773, he affirmed in writing to the Earl of Dartmouth:

> Before the peace [of 1763] I thought nothing so much to be desired as the cession of Canada. I am now convinced that if it had remained to the French none of the spirit of opposition to the Mother Country would have yet appeared & I think the effects of it [that is, the cession of Canada] worse than all we had to fear from the French or Indians.

In conclusion, it may be said that it would be idle to deny that most colonials in the eighteenth century at one time or another felt strongly the desire for freedom of action in a wider variety of ways than was legally permitted before 1754. Indeed, one can readily uncover these strong impulses even in the early part of the seventeenth century. Yet Americans were, by and large, realists, as were the British, and under the functioning of the imperial system from, let us say, 1650 to 1750 great mutual advantages were enjoyed, with a fair division, taking everything into consideration, of the financial burdens necessary to support the system. However, the mounting Anglo-French rivalry in North America from 1750 onward, the outbreak of hostilities in 1754, and the subsequent nine years of fighting destroyed the old equilibrium, leaving the colonials after 1760 in a highly favored position in comparison with the taxpayers of Great Britain. Attempts on the part of the Crown and Parliament to restore by statute the old balance led directly to the American constitutional crisis, out of which came the Revolutionary War and the establishment of American independence. Such, ironically, was the aftermath of the Great War for the Empire, a war that Britons believed, as the Earl of Shelburne affirmed in 1762 in Parliament, was begun for the "security of the British colonies in N. America. . . ."

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ELY MOORE: THE CASE HISTORY OF A JACKSONIAN LABOR LEADER

THE thesis that the Eastern laboring class formed one of the major components of Jacksonian Democracy and furnished many local leaders of that movement has been accepted by so many historians that it has become almost axiomatic.[1] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., gives the clearest statement of this interpretation in recent years,[2] but its genesis can be found in the pioneer studies of American labor history by John R. Commons and his associates more than forty years ago.[3] Without detracting from the permanent contributions to historical knowledge which resulted from their research, it must be realized that in seeking the origins of the American trade-union movement the Commons school often took at face value both the assertions and the terminology employed in the journalistic

[1] Vernon L. Parrington and the Beards may be cited as examples. The former referred to "the will to destroy the aristocratic principle in government" which united the "city proletariat" and the "coonskin voter" behind Andrew Jackson; *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York, 1927), II, 145-146. The Beards labeled the Democracy of this period "a triumphant farmer-labor party", and interpreted the fight against the Bank of the United States as a manifestation of the struggle between "farmers, mechanics, and laborers in general" and "lawyers, merchants, manufacturers, businessmen of the higher ranges, and college professors." Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, *Rise of American Civilization* (New York, 1934), I, 542, 573, 580. See also Edward C. Kirkland, *History of American Economic Life* (New York, 1939), p. 352.

[2] *The Age of Jackson* (Boston, 1945), pp. 143, 205-209, 306-307, 344. Since, Schlesinger asserts, Jacksonian Democracy was an "American phase of that enduring struggle between the business community and the rest of society," and since "the best way of elevating labor was to enact the economic program of the radical Democracy," during Jackson's administrations "laboring men began slowly to turn to Jackson as their leader, and his party as their party."

[3] John R. Commons *et al.*, *History of Labour in the United States* (New York, 1918), I, 180-181, 459-462. Commons referred to the political struggle of this period as the assertion of "the rights of persons against the rights of property." *Ibid.*, p. 12.

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invective of the Jacksonian period. An example of this is the identification of the words "mechanic" and "workingman" with "wage earner" or "laborer",[4] a practice which has been carried to even greater lengths by other writers. As Joseph Dorfman has recently emphasized, these terms had a much broader meaning: "only your political opponents and the terrible aristocrats and the lazy idlers were clearly not honest 'workingmen.'" [5]

Although these historians have referred to the political activities of "workingmen" in all the important urban centers of the East, their major attention has been devoted to New York City where the Workingmen's party and later the Locofocos have been cited as examples of anticapitalist labor movements on the radical fringe of Jacksonian Democracy.[6] It has been offered as further evidence of labor's influence in the party of Jackson and Van Buren that some labor leaders were associated directly with that party, and the career of Ely Moore, "labor's first Congressman", has been taken as perhaps the signal illustration of that influence. His election to Congress on the Democratic ticket in 1834, shortly after his elevation to the presidency of the National Trades' Union, was adduced by Commons as proof both that "Tammany catered to the workingmen" and that "the workingmen of New York supported the Bank policy of Jackson's administration." [7]

[4] The Commons school, however, did recognize one fact which has been frequently overlooked by some more recent writers; that is, that master mechanics and small tradesmen often allied themselves with journeymen on many issues. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18, 459.

[5] Joseph Dorfman, "The Jackson Wage-Earner Thesis", *American Historical Review*, LIV (January 1949), 305.

[6] Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 177, 209, 306-308; Parrington, *op. cit.*, II, 244, saw the Locofoco movement as "one of the first native attempts at conscious class alignment between capital and labor." William Trimble interpreted the movement as a "nascent proletarian party": "Diverging Tendencies in the New York Democracy in the Period of the Loco Focos", *American Historical Review*, XXIV (April 1919), 401, 416-421; and "The Social Philosophy of the Loco-Foco Democracy", *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVI (May 1921), 705-715.

[7] John R. Commons *et al.* (eds.), *Documentary History of American Industrial Society* (Cleveland, 1910), V, 204-205.

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The former assertion can be easily demonstrated; in fact, attempts to capture the "labor vote" were continually made by all political parties. But the unswerving allegiance of labor to the Democracy during the Jacksonian period is less certain. Recent studies of Philadelphia and Boston have shown, for example, that Jackson and the Democrats did not receive consistent support from working-class wards.[8] While no attempt will be made here to evaluate fully the Commons thesis, the career of Ely Moore seems to demonstrate that the conception of the labor movement as the mainspring of Jacksonian Democracy ignores the predominantly middle-class basis of that political and economic revolution. As Bray Hammond has emphasized, the permanent contribution of the Jacksonians was the "democratization of business".[9] Moore's success story tells, not of a worker's rise to a position of leadership through trade-union activity, but rather of an ambitious middle-class politician who, by capitalizing upon a brief early history as a journeyman printer, endeavored to advance his own and his party's political fortunes.

I

Like other urban leaders of the early nineteenth century, Ely Moore came from a rural environment, for he was born July 4, 1798, on a farm near the village of Belvidere in western New Jersey. He left the farm at the age of fourteen, shortly after the death of his father, when he was apprenticed to a printer in the near-by town of Newton, and after earning his journeyman's papers he went to New York to practice his trade.[10] For a period of approximately five years after his arrival no informa-

[8] William A. Sullivan, "Did Labor Support Andrew Jackson?", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, LXII (December 1947), 569-580; and Edward Pessen, "Did Labor Support Jackson?: The Boston Story", *ibid.*, LXIV (June 1949), 262-274.

[9] Bray Hammond, "Public Policy and National Banks", *Journal of Economic History*, VI (May 1946), 82.

[10] James W. Moore, *Rev. John Moore of Newtown, L. I., and Some of His Descendants* (Easton, 1903), pp. 316-317; Moore's obituary in *Kansas National Democrat* (Lecompton, Kan.), February 2, 1860. All newspapers hereinafter cited were published in New York City, unless otherwise indicated.

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tion as to his activities has been discovered. With his marriage to a daughter of Gilbert Coutant, a well-to-do grocer and lumber merchant, however, his career becomes less obscure.[11] This alliance opened up more exciting opportunities to the young journeyman than the print shop could promise him. Coutant had been speculating in Manhattan real estate for several years, and, of greater significance for Moore's future career, he had also been active in Tammany politics since 1806, his services being rewarded in 1828 by his selection as a Jacksonian elector.[12]

Moore took advantage of this fortunate connection, and abandoned his original vocation for the more promising spheres of speculation and politics. In fact, no evidence has been found that he practiced the printing trade at any time after his marriage until 1850, when he purchased a New Jersey newspaper. Throughout the course of his active life his interests centered in oratory and politics. This was true even in the brief period of his association with the labor movement, for his principal activity in that domain seems to have consisted of passively presiding over union meetings or delivering stirring addresses at union celebrations. As far as can be determined, he neither led nor participated in a strike, nor made a speech to a group of strikers. Furthermore, he was not instrumental in organizing a single union, although he defended with vehemence, both in New York and Washington, the right of journeymen to combine

[11] The date of Moore's marriage was not given in Moore, *op. cit.*, nor could it be found in the marriage announcements in the *Evening Post;* but his first child was born in New York in 1825, according to Ely Moore, Jr., "The Lecompton Party Which Located Denver", Kansas State Historical Society, *Collections*, VII (1901-2), 446 note. For Coutant's occupation see *Longworth's Directory of New York City*, 1827-28.

[12] Coutant's landholdings and speculative activities are detailed in *Minutes of the Common Council of the City of New York, 1784-1831* (New York, 1930), XI, 559, 614; *Conveyances Recorded in the Office of the Register of the City and County of New York*, Libers 67-466 (1804-44), *passim*, filed and indexed in the Hall of Records, New York City. His nomination as presidential elector is described in the *Morning Courier*, November 3, 1828; he was elected alderman in 1806, and in the ensuing two decades he received numerous appointments as fireman, street assessor, election inspector, tax inspector, and almshouse commissioner. *Minutes of the Common Council, passim* (see the excellent index for specific references).

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in order to protect themselves against their employers. Yet after the disappearance of the labor movement in the economic debacle of 1837, he made no effort to associate himself with any of the attempted revivals of that movement in the forties.[13]

One probable reason for the abandonment of his trade has already been suggested in the fact that other pursuits were potentially more lucrative and gave freer rein to his oratorical proclivities. This was undoubtedly important also in explaining his relationship to the trade-union movement, for he could not expect an adequate income from a career as a labor leader. This list of deficiencies in Moore's leadership is in many ways as significant in describing the labor movement of the period as in delineating his rôle in association with it. Furthermore, it serves to give some credence to his inclusion by Commons among the American labor "intellectuals", a list which also includes Ira Steward and Henry George. Like them, he was striving to "direct the manual workers away from the strict and narrow interests of wage-earners as a class, and to lead them towards affiliations with other classes." [14]

Moore's early venture into land speculation, which may have been financed by his father-in-law, was of brief duration, but none the less significant. In 1827 he purchased a large tract in upper Manhattan for eighteen thousand dollars and one month later sold it in parcels for a total of thirty thousand dollars.[15] A political career, however, seemed to be more to his liking, and he made his debut a few years later through the influence of his father-in-law. Coutant had been elected county register in 1830 to serve for three years, and Moore was appointed to assist him, thus giving him an opportunity to become increasingly

[13] George A. Stevens, *New York Typographical Union No. 6: A Study of a Modern Trade Union and Its Predecessors* (Albany, 1913), pp. 195-206, 567-577, 592.

[14] Commons *et al.*, *History of Labour*, I, 19.

[15] *Conveyances Recorded in the Office of the Register*, Liber 231, p. 476 and *passim;* while the sales were all transacted in 1827, many of them were not recorded for several years, so reference can be made to the *Index of Conveyances: Grantors* (New York, 1858), vol. VI. Moore's speculation was referred to in the *Daily Whig*, June 7, 1839.

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active in political affairs.[16] While holding this position, he delivered his first important address early in 1832 before a meeting which put forward the name of Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky for the Democratic vice-presidential nomination in opposition to Martin Van Buren, the choice of the Democratic party press. By October, however, Moore had returned to the Tammany fold, demonstrating his fidelity by speaking at a nomination meeting called to endorse the regular slate of candidates.[17] Throughout the following year he took a leading part in the agitation against the recently chartered New-York & Harlem Railroad and its supporters on the Common Council, presenting a report to a mass meeting opposing the extension of the road into the city below Twenty-third Street, because it would offer unfair competition to the owners of carts and omnibuses and create widespread unemployment. Moore also was one of the leaders of a faction in the Fifteenth Ward that successfully opposed the reëlection of an alderman who, among his alleged faults, was a stockholder in the company.[18]

During the remaining months of 1835 Moore began to concern himself less with politics than with the trade-union movement. At this time there were two organizations of printers in the city. The New York Typographical Society, founded in 1809 as both a protective and benevolent society of journeymen, was the older of the two. After an early period of militancy it lost its trade-union attributes and became merely a mutual benefit association, its members by the thirties including both

[16] For Coutant's election, see *Standard*, November 9, 1830. It cannot be established whether Moore was appointed when Coutant first took office or at some subsequent time; *Longworth's Directory* does not list him as assistant register until 1833, continuing the citation in the 1834-35 edition, when Moore and Coutant were out of office. A letter from a Whig "mechanic" referred to Moore's position, adding that he had intended to succeed his father-in-law at the next election; *Evening Star*, November 1, 1838.

[17] *Working Man's Advocate*, March 17, 1832; Moore's speech was printed in William Emmons, *Authentic Biography of Col. Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky* (New York, 1833), pp. 61-65. For his return to party orthodoxy, see *Evening Post*, October 30, 1832.

[18] Ely Moore, *Reply to a Pamphlet Entitled "A Statement of Facts in Relation to the Origin, Progress and Prospects of the New-York & Harlem Rail Road Company"* (New York, 1833), pp. 6-9. *Evening Post*, March 15, 18, 1833.

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master mechanics and journeyman printers. Many of the latter had become convinced, however, that a protective union must be established in order to maintain an adequate scale of wages. This sentiment culminated in 1831 with the formation of the Typographical Association of New York by a group of journeymen, many of whom continued to maintain membership in the older organization.[19] Moore never joined the Typographical Society,[20] and, although he was one of the guest speakers at the first anniversary celebration of the Typographical Association, no evidence has been found that he was officially associated with it during its first two years of existence.[21]

In the spring of 1833 the journeyman carpenters struck for higher wages, and the support of other trades enabled them to win their demands after a month's turnout. This success encouraged discussion of making the alliance permanent, and a circular was issued by the Typographical Association calling for a convention of trades, which resulted in the establishment of the General Trades' Union of New York. It was at this time that Moore's name first appears as a trade-union member, for two days before the meeting was to take place he was named as a delegate from the Association to this preliminary convention, and was subsequently elected first president of the General Trades' Union. These circumstances seem to validate later charges that he " was smuggled into the Trades' Union as one of the Delegates from a trade at which he had entirely ceased to work many years before," and that " numerous meetings were held, and several societies had agreed to organize themselves into a General Society, before Ely Moore made his appearance among them." [22]

19 Ethelbert Stewart, *Documentary History of the Early Organizations of Printers* (Indianapolis, 1907), pp. 42-48; Stevens, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-80, 105-113.

20 *Constitution and By-Laws of the New-York Typographical Society, With a List of Members* (New York, 1848).

21 *Working Man's Advocate*, June 30, 1832, June 29, 1833.

22 The organization of the General Trades' Union is described in Commons *et al.*, *Documentary History*, V, 203, 208-218. For Moore's appointment as delegate, see Stevens, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-165; while this author had access to the minutes of the Typographical Association, which have since disappeared, he shed no further light on Moore's relations with that group. The charges against Moore are taken from the *Daily Whig*, June 7, 1839, and *Evening Star*, October 31, 1838.

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According to its constitution, the Union was established " to maintain the present scale of prices [that is, wages] . . . and to alleviate the distresses of those suffering from want of employment." A spirit of moderation was enunciated by the provision that " no Trade or Art shall strike for higher wages . . . without the sanction of the Convention." [23] This same spirit was emphasized in an address by its president later in the year, after a public procession of some four thousand members of the twenty-one trades affiliated with the new organization. Moore declared that the Union, instead of encouraging strikes, would try to " allay the jealousies and abate the asperities which now unhappily exist between employers and employed," and he cautioned his audience that " their claims must be founded in justice, and all their measures be so taken as not to invade the rights, or sacrifice the welfare of employers." But he defended the right of journeymen to form combinations to enable " the producer to enjoy the full benefit of his productions," affirming that they have " the same right to ask their own price for their own property or services that . . . merchants, physicians, and lawyers have." [24] This view was at variance with a doctrine often promulgated in editorial columns of the time which maintained that all such combinations to regulate prices, whether formed by journeymen, merchants or professional men, were " at war with the order of things which the Creator has established for the general good, and therefore wicked." [25]

II

Moore, meanwhile, had become more active in political affairs during the months when Tammany, led by many officers of chartered banks, vigorously supported Jackson's war against the

[23] The constitution was published in the *National Trades' Union*, August 9, 1834, quoted in Commons *et al.*, *Documentary History*, V, 215-218.

[24] Ely Moore, *Address Delivered Before the General Trades' Union of the City of New-York, December 2, 1833* (New York, 1833), pp. 11-13; this address has been reprinted recently in slightly abridged form in Joseph L. Blau (ed.), *Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy* (New York, 1947), pp. 289-300.

[25] *Journal of Commerce*, June 1, 1833.

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Bank of the United States.[26] This became the chief issue in the campaign preceding the spring elections of mayor and aldermen, the first time that the former was to be elected popularly. While " workingmen " affiliated with both the Democratic and the newly christened Whig parties held rallies and passed resolutions on the Bank question, the closely fought and often violent election saw the triumph of the Democratic candidate. At the same time a Democratic Workingmen's Committee was organized with the announced objective of convincing Tammany " to nominate only anti-bank men ", opposed to " *all* banking monopolies ", and Moore became a member of this group.[27]

During the spring campaign Moore associated himself with another popular issue, opposition to the contract-labor system in the state prisons, which had long been an object of attack by " honest mechanics ", both masters and journeymen. Meetings of the aggrieved mechanics were held and a memorial was submitted to the legislature calling for the abolition of the system. Moore, who had taken no part in the earlier agitation, now went to Albany to lobby for a bill which had been introduced calling for the appointment of three commissioners to investigate prison conditions. After the passage of the bill Moore was appointed to this commission by Governor Marcy.[28] But this appointment met with opposition from some of the mechanics who felt that the bill had been weakened through Moore's connivance with a Democratic machine hesitant to change a system in which it had a vested interest.[29]

[26] Moore served as chairman of an anti-Bank of the United States meeting in the Fifteenth Ward and was appointed to a delegation sent by Tammany to Washington to assure the President of its wholehearted support. *Evening Star*, February 5, 1834; *Evening Post*, February 3, 4, 1834.

[27] *Man*, April 4, May 17, 22, 1834; *Evening Star*, March 29, April 10, 12, 1834.

[28] A good description of the prison-labor system and the nature of the complaints against it is contained in the " Report of the Commissioners appointed under the 'act concerning State Prisons' to the legislature of the State of New York, January 29, 1835 ", *New York Assembly Documents*, 58th Session (1835), No. 135, pp. 1-18. *Man*, May 27, 31, 1834.

[29] The New York " mechanics' committee " which had recommended Moore's appointment attempted to withdraw the recommendation when it was learned that an article allowing the governor to prohibit any convict labor found to be in " in-

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Although hearings were conducted by the commissioners throughout most of the summer, Moore found time to head the New York delegation to the convention which organized the National Trades' Union, a federation of the city central unions of Boston, Philadelphia, Newark and New York.[30] His election as head of this national organization and his subsequent reëlection as president of the New York Trades' Union for another year were evidences that he had maintained his prestige among the organized workers despite the opposition to him over the prison-labor question. But as the November election approached it was inevitable that differences of opinion should appear within the Union, for several officers and prominent members had already aligned themselves with the Whig party.[31] That internal friction in this organization arose from criticism of Moore for using his position as a means to political advancement is evident from his speech at the first anniversary celebration in September. His address the year before, in fact, had

jurious competition" with any trade had been deleted from the bill on the floor at Moore's suggestion. Moore's defense was that Marcy's unwillingness to take such a responsibility, especially since the prison-labor system had been established by the Democrats, would endanger the passage of the entire bill, but the "mechanics" maintained that the revised bill would accomplish nothing "but the appointing and paying of three Commissioners." Letter from a "Mechanic" in the *Evening Star*, November 2, 1838.

[30] The proceedings of this convention were published in the *Man*, August 23 to September 6, 1834; see also Commons *et al.*, *Documentary History*, VI, 190-192.

[31] Moore's reëlection as president of the General Trades' Union was described in the *National Trades' Union*, August 30, 1834, quoted in Commons *et al.*, *Documentary History*, V, 219. This newspaper, on October 11, 1834, indicated that "candidates from the Union will probably be on both tickets at the coming election"; see typewritten extracts from the *National Trades' Union* by John R. Commons *et al.*, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, or microfilm at Columbia University. Among the trade-union leaders who supported the Whigs was Isaac Odell, a carpenter, who had been chairman of the preliminary convention of the Union, and who was the Whig candidate for county coroner in 1834. Robert Townsend, another delegate of the Journeyman Carpenters, had been active in the Anti-Masonic party before joining the Whigs. David Scott, a tailor and vice president of the Union, and James Anderson, a printer and corresponding secretary, also took part in meetings of Whig mechanics during the campaign. *Daily Whig*, July 3, 1832; *Mercantile Advertiser and New-York Advocate*, September 20, October 15, 31, 1834. After the Democratic victory in November, Odell and Townsend resigned as delegates to the Union. *National Trades' Union*, November 8, 1834, January 17, 1835, quoted in Commons *et al.*, *Documentary History*, V, 220, 225.

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contained a brief warning against the " wiles and perfidy " of men who " attempt to excite your jealousy against certain individuals, who, peradventure, may stand somewhat conspicuous among you," by insinuating that " political ambition lies at the root of the whole matter." In 1834 he devoted nearly half the speech to a similar denunciation of the " grovelling and debasing spirit " of jealousy which had become apparent in the movement. Obviously thinking of the coming election, he reminded them that

> neither in Europe or America, have the producing classes . . . put forward and sustained an individual of their own body, that was capable of taking even a respectable stand in the councils of the nation. . . . The very instant that one of their number rises to a little distinction, some individuals become envious, and instead of aiding and encouraging him, set about detracting from his merits.

He attributed this jealousy to their deficiency in " correct habits of thinking ", recommending a process of self-improvement rather than formal instruction as the remedy. He concluded by emphasizing that " the general dissemination of intelligence, and especially of political intelligence," would lead " workingmen " to " choose men for [their] legislators whose sympathies and interests harmonize with . . . [their] own." [32]

The election campaign began officially four days after this appeal. Moore appeared frequently both at Tammany Hall and before meetings of the Democratic Workingmen's Committee, and his speeches were praised in the journals of both wings of the party. As a result his name was submitted to the nominating committee, and he was one of the four men chosen by the Democrats to represent New York County in Congress. With the other candidates, he promised to oppose recharter of the Bank of the United States and other " exclusive privileges ", this adoption of the pledge system being saluted by the *Man* and the *Evening Post,* organs of the party's left-wing faction, as evidence of the triumph within the party of the principles of

[32] Moore, *Address . . . December 2, 1833,* p. 14; and " Address Delivered Before the General Trades' Union, September 25, 1834 ", published in the *Man,* November 24 and 25, 1834.

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" equal rights ". After three quiet days of balloting the entire Tammany ticket was elected by a sizable majority, and, although Moore trailed the rest of his party by almost five hundred votes, he enjoyed a comfortable lead over his closest opponent.[33]

A year passed before Moore was sworn in as a member of the House of Representatives, and in the interim his reputation as spokesman of the " mechanics and workingmen " became somewhat tarnished. The instrument of his fall from grace was the report on state prisons which was published early in 1835. Although the three commissioners admitted that " in some articles, and to some extent," the complaints of the mechanics should be relieved, they concluded that the amount of competition from convict labor had been exaggerated.[34] The reaction was immediate and extremely vitriolic. When they saw Moore's signature on the report, the editors of the *Man* and the *Evening Post* denounced as " a barefaced piece of treachery " the action of a man who had " won the suffrages of the mechanics by the incessant and superior loudness of his vociferations against the employment of convict labor." [35] Moore was also under fire in the Trades' Union, his resignation being called for and a committee being chosen to draft a resolution on the prison-labor question. The storm finally subsided when the committee was discharged without being able to agree on a report. His term as president came to an end a few months later, when a resolution was passed in praise of the " able and impartial manner " in which he had presided. Moore, after warning the delegates to " beware of their enemies in disguise, who endeavor to sow the seeds of discord among them," expressed his gratitude for the " many kindnesses " he had received. This was virtually his last

[33] *Evening Post*, October 9, 31, November 11, 1834; *Man*, October 2, 10, 16, 30, November 1, 1834; *Times*, October 9, 1834. The first two papers represented the more radical wing of the party, while the *Times* was the spokesman of the conservative element.

[34] " Report of the Commissioners . . .", *New York Assembly Documents*, pp. 13-14, 26. Several evils in the system were pointed out, however, particularly in regard to the method of letting contracts; *ibid.*, p. 18.

[35] *Evening Post*, February 10, April 28, 1835; *Man*, February 9, 22, March 2, 7, 1835.

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contact with the labor movement, as he prepared to leave for Washington and his Congressional career.[36]

III

When he arrived in the national capital, Moore was thirty-seven years old. Those expecting to see a burly, horny-handed laborer, roughly dressed and uncouth in his speech, were disappointed; he was a slender, handsome man almost six feet tall with delicate, almost feminine, features, and long curly hair which he brushed back from his forehead. Always well dressed and usually carying a heavy ivory-headed cane, he was courteous and reserved, not given to discussing his views in social gatherings. Because of the illness which had afflicted him intermittently throughout his life, he had a pale, unhealthy complexion, and was occasionally subject to fainting spells, but when he rose to speak in public his enunciation was distinct and his voice strong and clear.[37]

His oratorical powers were demonstrated by his first Congressional speech, delivered in answer to the remarks of Waddy Thompson, a South Carolina Whig, warning Northern industrialists that they were " in quite as much danger of insurrection as we are." Moore, who was ill and had recently been bled, was leaning on his cane when he began speaking, but his voice soon penetrated to the farthest corner of the packed galleries. Such an attack as Thompson's, he declared, should help the people to discriminate between the two great political parties, " the Democracy and the aristocracy ", the one advocating a government founded on " persons " and " equal rights ", the other on

[36] The proceedings of the Union were published in the *Man*, March 2, 1835, and the *National Trades' Union*, May 30, August 29, 1835, the latter quoted in Commons *et al.*, *Documentary History*, V, 243, 262-263. Moore made an appearance at the second convention of the National Trades' Union in October 1835, but he contributed little to the proceedings; *ibid*, VI, 228-229, 237-239.

[37] John Quincy Adams, *Memoirs* (C. F. Adams, ed.; Philadelphia, 1877), IX, 405; Ben: Perley Poore, *Perley's Reminiscences of Sixty Years in the National Metropolis* (Philadelphia, 1886), I, 150; " Glances at Congress ", *United States Magazine and Democratic Review* (Washington, D. C.), I (October 1837), 74; *Evening Post*, February 3, 1834. For a crayon portrait of Moore at this time, see Commons *et al.*, *Documentary History*, vol. VI, frontispiece.

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" property " and " exclusive privileges ". Defending labor combinations against the charge that they promote " agrarianism . . . sedition and revolution ", he characterized them as legal measures of " self-defense and self-preservation ", necessary to prevent " capital . . . from unjustly appropriating to itself the avails of labor." [38] This outburst was an exception to Moore's normal conduct during his four years in the House, for he seldom participated in debates and almost never crossed party lines when the vote was taken.[39] As a member of the Committee on Naval Affairs, he attempted to raise seamen's pay to fifteen dollars a month, and advocated increasing the salary of warrant officers, but neither measure was approved. In 1836 he presented a memorial from the National Trades' Union, calling for a ten-hour day on all public works, but it was similarly dismissed by the House, members of both parties maintaining that Congress had no power to " interfere " between workers and their employers.[40]

When Moore returned to New York in 1836 to stand for reelection, the Tammany organization, which had won such an overwhelming victory two years before, was split by dissension over the Bank question. In 1835 the group which adhered to the principles preached by William Leggett in the *Evening Post* and George Henry Evans in the *Man* had formed the Locofoco, or more properly the Equal Rights, party, which was

[38] Thompson in the House, March 3, 1836; Moore in the House, April 28, 1836: *Congressional Globe*, 24 Congress, 1 Session, Appendix, pp. 229, 444-447. After speaking about an hour, Moore collapsed and for a time it was feared he would not recover. For descriptions of the scene, see *United States Magazine and Democratic Review, loc. cit.*, pp. 75-76; Poore, *op. cit.*, I, 150-151; *Democrat*, May 2, 1836; *Union*, May 19, 26, 1836.

[39] For his voting record, see " Historical Register ", supplement to the *United States Magazine and Democratic Review*, IV (February 1838), 41-69, and (November 1840), 177-210. John Quincy Adams charged that Moore was " the servile tool of the Executive . . . and votes with the standing majority—occasionally changing his vote upon finding he is mistaken how the majority would vote." Adams, *op. cit.*, IX, 405.

[40] Moore in the House, January 11, 1839, *Congressional Globe*, 25 Congress, 3 Session, Appendix, pp. 134-135. Also *Evening Post*, November 3, 1838; *Daily Whig*, June 6, 1839. For the fate of the memorial, see *Congressional Globe*, 24 Congress, 1 Session, pp. 213, 231, 254, 271-272 (February 29, March 7, 14, 21, 1836).

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gradually gaining the balance of power in New York politics. Most of its candidates in 1836 were men with long records of opposition to Tammany, many of whom were also nominated by the Whigs. Moore was the only nominee to receive both Democratic and Locofoco endorsement, and as a result he was re-elected while Tammany went down to defeat.[41]

Shortly after moving into the White House, Van Buren called a special session of Congress to deal with the problems created by the panic of 1837. When he asked for the creation of an independent treasury system as the answer to the national financial difficulties, the Locofocos, who earlier had been decidedly cool toward him, now saluted the President for adopting their principles and soon rejoined the "purified" Tammany Wigwam. But in Congress conservative Democrats united with the Whigs to table the Van Buren plan, and an offensive was begun to recharter the old Bank of the United States or a similar institution. Moore delivered his second major Congressional speech during this session, defending the proposed independent treasury which he declared was favored by "ninety-nine out of every hundred workingmen."[42] The Congressional campaign of 1838 in New York was fought almost wholly on this issue, and Moore became the special target of the Whig press. The rumor that he would be the Tammany candidate for governor was broadcast to alarm conservatives, while the prison-labor controversy was disinterred to arouse the "workingmen" against him. A letter in the *Evening Star,* signed "Five Thousand Workingmen", declared that for many years Moore's eloquence had been "transforming our little means and our bread into windy promises," and demanded: "Away with the trumpet tones and the magical intellect of idle demagogues who

[41] For the Democratic split and the 1836 campaign, see Fitzwilliam Byrdsall, *History of the Loco-Foco or Equal Rights Party* (New York, 1842), pp. 21-50, 67-97; *Herald,* October 30, 1835; *Democrat,* October 5, 29, November 26, 1836; *Times,* November 2, 1836.

[42] Byrdsall, *op. cit.,* pp. 157-187; *New-Yorker,* November 4, 1837. For his speeech, see Moore in the House, October 13, 1837, *Congressional Globe,* 25 Congress, 1 Session, Appendix, pp. 138-146. This address was largely an attack on the constitutionality of a proposed national bank in which he gave an exposition of the same arguments used by Jackson in his veto of the Bank bill five years before.

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call themselves workingmen, but never lifted a hammer or made a shoe string." The election was a blow to the Democracy as the Whigs swept New York, Moore running almost four hundred votes behind his ticket.[43]

A Democrat was still ensconced in the White House, however, and Moore returned to New York when the final session of the Twenty-fifth Congress adjourned, with Van Buren's promise of a position in the Customs House as Surveyor of the Port. In spite of protests by conservatives of both parties, the incumbent, described as a " quiet, steady man of business ", was persuaded to resign, and Moore, the " noisy politician ", took his place until after the Democratic defeat in 1840.[44] Moore remained active in New York politics for ten years after this, but continually failed in his pursuit of elective office. In 1842, after participating in the verbal agitation in support of the Dorrite movement of Rhode Island, his attempt to secure the Tammany nomination for Congress was thwarted by Fernando Wood, who represented the Calhoun partisans in New York, and a compromise candidate was nominated.[45] Early in 1844 Moore began to campaign for the mayoralty, appearing as the principal speaker at a meeting on municipal reform, but again was unsuccessful in his quest of the nomination. In November of that same year, however, he was nominated for Congress, but failed of election, losing by one hundred votes to the American party candidate.[46] Early in 1845 President Polk appointed him

[43] *Daily Whig*, March 21, 1838; *New-Yorker*, December 30, 1837; *Evening Star*, October 16, November 3, 1838; *New Era*, November 2, 1838.

[44] *Daily Whig*, April 4, June 6, 7, 1838; *Evening Star*, May 21, 23, 1839.

[45] For the New York reaction to the Dorr War, see *Evening Post*, May 18, 1842; *New Era*, May 18, 1842; *Morning Courier and New-York Enquirer*, May 18, 21, 1842; Arthur M. Mowry, *The Dorr War* (Providence, 1901), pp. 167-173. For the 1842 campaign: *Evening Post*, October 7, 26, November 5, 9, 1842; *Plebeian*, November 1, 14, 1842; also Fernando Wood to ———, February 20, 1843, *Van Buren Papers* (XLVI, 10771), Library of Congress; C. H. Ambler (ed.), "Correspondence of Robert M. T. Hunter ", American Historical Association, *Annual Report* (1916), II, 40-54.

[46] *Plebeian*, March 23, 29, 1844; *Proceedings of a Meeting in Favor of Municipal Reform, Held at Tammany Hall, March 22d, 1844* (New York, 1844), pp. 5-13. For the Congressional campaign, see *Evening Post*, October 25, November 7, 8, 1844.

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United States Marshal for the Southern District of New York, a position he held until his removal by President Taylor four years later. He then returned to his birthplace in New Jersey where he purchased a weekly newspaper and began to participate in politics in that state.[47] When Pierce became President in 1853, Moore was appointed special agent to the Indian tribes in Kansas, and after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act he became the first register of the land office in Lecompton. Although he took little part in the political controversies of that stormy period, he was occasionally mentioned by moderate Democrats as a possible candidate for territorial delegate to Congress. After two years of intermittent illness, he died January 27, 1860, at his farm near Lecompton.[48]

IV

The same relationship between labor leadership and politics which was exemplified by Moore's life existed in other cases, several leaders of the trade-union movement in New York devoting as much or more time to political activities as to the immediate demands of their followers. As has been indicated,[49] some of these men were extremely active in the Whig party. Robert Townsend, a representative of the Journeyman Carpenters in the General Trades' Union, had a long record of opposition to the domination of Van Buren's Regency in Albany and the Tammany Society in New York. In 1830 he was a leader of the faction in the Workingmen's party which formed

[47] For Moore's appointment, see *Register of Officers and Agents in the Service of the United States, September 30th, 1845* (Washington, 1845), p. 221. He purchased the *Warren Journal* (Belvidere, N. J.) in June 1850, according to the issue of June 6, 1850.

[48] Ely Moore, Jr., "The Story of Lecompton", Kansas State Historical Society, *Collections*, XI (1909-10), 463-464; see also in the same publication, Albert H. Greene, "United States Land Offices in Kansas", and Franklin G. Adams, "The Capitals of Kansas", VIII (1903-4), 1-5, 331-343. For Moore's projected nomination by the moderates, see *Kansas National Democrat* (Lecompton, Kan.), July 30, November 5, 12, 1857; William S. Hoole (ed.), "A Southerner's Viewpoint of the Kansas Situation: Letters of Lt. Col. A. J. Hoole, CSA", *Kansas Historical Quarterly*, II (February-May 1934), 169. Moore's obituary appeared in the *Kansas National Democrat*, February 2, 1860.

[49] See note 31 *supra*.

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an alliance with the Clay Republicans and the Anti-Masons, and two years later he was vice chairman of the latter party's state-wide convention. After joining the Whigs in 1834, he moved on to the Locofocos, who were as vehement in their opposition to Tammany as in their avowal of Jacksonian principles. In 1836 he was elected to the Assembly by the combined support of Whigs and Locofocos. After a brief affiliation with the "purified Wigwam" during Van Buren's Administration, he again joined the Whigs and was appointed to a position in the Customs House by President Tyler.[50] Other "workingmen" had similar careers, the main difference being that some followed Moore into the Democratic party while others joined Townsend in opposition.[51]

Although this was the pattern, the labor movement undoubtedly contained unheralded leaders less concerned with politics than with the immediate improvement of working conditions. Seth Luther, the New England reformer and labor leader, was one of these. Working first as a carpenter and then in the textile mills, he became familiar with the lot of both skilled and unskilled labor, and tried unsuccessfully to awaken

[50] *Free Enquirer*, June 19, 1830; *Working Man's Advocate*, August 21, September 4, 1830; *Standard*, October 25, 1830; *Daily Whig*, July 3, 1832; *Evening Star*, September 20, 1834; Byrdsall, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-71; *Doggett's New York City and Co-Partnership Directory*, 1843-44; *Aurora and Union*, September 5, 1843.

[51] Among the members of the General Trades' Union who joined the Locofocos were John Commerford of the Chairmakers, who succeeded Moore as president of the Union, and John Bowie of the Curriers, who led the opposition to Moore's report on prison labor. The latter supported Tammany after 1837, but Commerford continued in opposition, working for the Calhoun forces after 1842 as well as assisting George Henry Evans in the National Reform Association. Levi Slamm, delegate of the Journeyman Locksmiths, gained a reputation for the worst political opportunism during his affiliation with the Locofocos and his later editorship of the *New Era* and the *Plebeian*, and was allegedly for sale to the highest political bidder. Two men, John Windt and Alexander Ming, Jr., were never associated with the Trades' Union, but both had been journeyman printers at one time, and were active in politics with the Democrats and the Locofocos, Ming holding several positions in the Customs House. Byrdsall, *op. cit.*, pp. 17, 34-55, 134, 178-188; *Man*, October 10, 1834, March 2, 1835; *Working Man's Advocate*, June 29, 1833, September 7, 1844; *Democrat*, April 2, 1836; *New Era*, February 24, March 25, 1840; *Plebeian*, October 19, 1842; Ambler, in American Historical Association, *Annual Report* (1916), *loc. cit.*, pp. 40-42, 52; J. F. Jameson (ed.), "Correspondence of John C. Calhoun", in *ibid.* (1899), II, 862, 1126.

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them to the need for united action. He wrote and spoke throughout the East, emphasizing the evils of the factory and calling for a ten-hour day for all occupations, but had little liking for practical politics and did not affiliate himself publicly with either party. His panacea was the establishment of manual labor schools, not the abolition of the banking system or the election of self-styled spokesmen of the "workingmen".[52]

Moore, on the other hand, viewed political action as the chief road to the salvation of labor, an attitude which was revealed as clearly by his numerous speeches and writings as by his overt activities. While defending the right, and even the necessity, for workers to combine as a protection against associations of employers, he continually impressed upon his hearers that such organizations were only a temporary expedient, worthless without "the acquisition of knowledge and correct habits of thinking." Without "severe mental discipline", he emphasized, journeymen "may complain in vain—in vain organize—in vain form Unions and associations," but knowledge would enable them to "elevate men whose interests . . . feelings and sympathies are identified with . . . [their] own."[53] As he was consistent in his exposition of the twin Democratic doctrines of strict construction and laissez faire,[54] he neither expected nor demanded that such men should advocate ameliorative legislation in behalf of labor. Although he apparently disregarded his own injunction in presenting the ten-hour petition of the National Trades' Union to Congress, his support of this proposal was far from enthusiastic, and he failed to recommend such legislation in any of his discussions of the workingman's prob-

[52] Louis Hartz, "Seth Luther: Working Class Rebel", *New England Quarterly*, XIII (September 1940), 403-406, 411-417; Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-151, 168, and sketch by Percy W. Bidwell in *Dictionary of American Biography* (New York, 1934), XI, 511.

[53] Moore, "Address, September 25, 1834", *Man*, November 24, 25, 1834; Moore, *Oration Delivered Before the Mechanics and Working Men of the City of New York, on the Fourth of July, 1843* (New York, 1843), p. 22.

[54] His *Address on Civil Government: Delivered Before the New York Typographical Society, Feb. 25th, 1847* (New York, 1847), pp. 8-45; *Congressional Globe*, 25 Congress, 1 Session, Appendix, p. 139; *Warren Journal* (Belvidere, N. J.), August 1, 1850.

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lems. His view of the rôle of government was that it should "preserve as perfect an equality of rights as possible" among the members of society, and this objective could be accomplished only by enacting laws "general in their scope and application, and in their operation equal and impartial to all." [55] Despite his demand for the elimination of all special charters and "exclusive privileges", he gave no open support to political parties, like the Locofocos, which were dedicated to that end, preferring instead to battle for his program within the Democratic organization. An avowed exponent of party "discipline" throughout his life, he summarized his practical political philosophy when he wrote that "the key to party success", and hence the eventual defeat of the "aristocracy", is to "forego our own private feelings and predilections and to support the candidate of whom a majority of our party friends shall have made the choice." [56]

While Seth Luther attacked the new capitalism for its social abuses, Moore, like other purveyors of the "equal rights" doctrine, demanded that the fruits of this capitalism be made more accessible to all, a goal which he felt could be realized only through the continued power of the Democratic party. At the same time Moore ignored, while Luther emphasized, the plight of the unskilled; for the labor movement in New York, and generally throughout the nation, was an instrument of the elite of the working class designed to prevent the worsening of its own social position. Many of these artisans, however, were more concerned with rising in the world than with merely holding their own, so they took the offensive to open the avenues of enterprise. Merchant capitalists, because of their easier access to credit, were rapidly coming to dominate the various trades, so ambitious journeymen who hoped to establish their own businesses joined with master craftsmen who wished to expand theirs in denouncing the chartered banks for a discriminatory loan policy which, they insisted, by restricting competition

[55] Moore, *Address on Civil Government*, pp. 17-20, 23; *Congressional Globe*, 24 Congress, 1 Session, Appendix, pp. 445-446.

[56] *Warren Journal* (Belvidere, N. J.), June 13, October 31, 1850; also his speech reported in the *Plebeian*, March 29, 1844.

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failed to utilize the nation's potential wealth.[57] Moore in his attacks upon the "banking aristocracy" was the spokesman, not of the "laboring class" alone, but of the "enterprising", whether journeyman or master, manufacturer or merchant—all those who were struggling against an aristocratic system which would deny to all but a few the opportunity to share in the future of the new nation.[58] America's chief heritage from Jacksonian Democracy was not the growth of a militant labor movement, but the economic exploitation of a continent.[59]

WALTER E. HUGINS

NEW YORK CITY

[57] William Gouge, one of the most popular and influential Jacksonian pamphleteers, condemned the banks for refusing to make loans to "thrifty young mechanics", many of them "embryo Doctor Franklins", while at the same time giving credit to those "to whom no man ought to lend"; businesses thus established often fail, "and the wealth of the community is diminished in proportion." *Short History of Money and Banking in the United States* (Philadelphia, 1833), Part I, pp. 35-37. Locofoco leaders declared that "the banks have been a clog upon the industry of this country," because of their discriminatory loan policy, and advocated free banking under a general law so that "an unprecedented activity on equitable principles would . . . pervade all occupations, and . . . the advances of society would be comparatively uniform and in mass." Theodore Sedgwick, "What Is a Monopoly?", and John W. Vethake, "The Doctrine of Anti-Monopoly", reprinted in Blau (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 218, 231. See also Commons *et al.*, *History of Labour*, I, 276-277; Richard Hofstadter, "William Leggett, Spokesman of Jacksonian Democracy", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, LVIII (December 1943), 586, 592-594; Bray Hammond, "Long and Short Term Credit in Early American Banking", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XLIX (November 1934), 93-97, 101-103; and "Free Banks and Corporations: The New York Free Banking Act of 1838", *Journal of Political Economy*, XLIV (February 1936), 184.

[58] This view of Jacksonian Democracy is developed more broadly by Richard Hofstadter in *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York, 1948), pp. 44-66.

[59] The highest percentage of the business elite in American history with lower-class origins is to be found among those who were born between 1820 and 1850, the men who fought the Civil War and led the United States into the industrial expansion of the Gilded Age. C. Wright Mills, "The American Business Elite: A Collective Portrait", *Journal of Economic History*, V (December 1945), 20-44.

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REVIEWS

Money in a Maelstrom. By J. W. BEYEN. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1949.—x, 221 pp. $3.25.

Here we have a happy combination. The story of the development of international coöperation in the financial field during the last three decades is told by an active participant in it; and he uses "the practitioner's, not the scientist's, language . . . [because] economic theory has to be applied every day by people who can no longer understand the language of the economic scientist" (p. 1).

This "practitioner" entered international banking in 1918 upon graduation from the University of Utrecht, serving first as a treasury official in The Hague, thereafter, in succession, as Deputy Treasury General, Manager of the Amsterdam office of the Java Bank, and Managing Director of the Rotterdam Bank. While the post-war twenties, the depression thirties and the Second World War forties were making drastic changes in the total world situation, Mr. Beyen served as one of the Netherlands' delegates at many of the international convocations which sought to bring order out of chaos. This experience included the Standstill Committee on German Debts, the Geneva Conference on Austria, the World Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933, the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 and the Savannah Inaugural meeting of 1946. Also, he was president of the Bank for International Settlements, 1937-1940, became the Executive Director for South Africa and the Netherlands in the International Monetary Fund and represents both the Netherlands and Norway in the Fund and the International Bank today.

Large sections of American conservative monetary thought must needs ponder all this experience before dismissing Mr. Beyen's strictures against their ideology. From this arduous and enlightening experience the "practitioner" evidently concluded that now is the time to explode old myths about international monetary coöperation, and to evaluate progress in this field. This is designed to help world leaders and their more intelligent constituents to avoid pessimism and to keep on supporting the coöperative efforts, since these are essential to survival of modern civilization.

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The enormity of the problem is lucidly stated. It must be remembered that monetary arrangements are central in international relations; "the position of money in the whole pattern of social and economic policy may not be completely dominant, but it has remained pivotal" (p. 174). Furthermore, the growth in government control over economic processes has made international financial coöperation impossible, except through agreements organized by governments, which makes those agreements increasingly dependent upon decisions by officials; this "cannot fail to increase the role played by human weaknesses in the conduct of economic affairs" (p. 209). Furthermore, international organizations, like all human enterprises, are subject to "pains of growth"; yet they are conceived as full grown and "have to fight their attacks of measles and whooping cough in the merciless limelight of full publicity" (p. 7).

This adds up to the need for infinite patience on the part of leaders and their influential electorate, who must learn that predecessors who have failed have left more than litter behind, and that *international coöperation is a plant that has to grow its own roots.* These are but a few of the factors stressed in this summary of experience.

Such being the enormity of the problem, the author seeks to provide the understanding necessary to inspire patience, by outlining the history of organized efforts at international financial coöperation, frankly telling why he believes they failed or succeeded. He begins with the first form of such coöperation—the efforts by the Financial Committee of the League of Nations to bring order out of the chaotic monetary situation in Central and East Europe after World War I. There follow: the futile attempt to make a modified gold standard fit the needs of the inter-war years; the "Standing Still with German Debtors" (p. 71) when for the first time in the history of banking a government prevented debtors who were able to pay their debts from doing so; the premature London Conference of 1933 with its degeneration into another "resolution-brewing affair" (p. 95), such as never achieve results even under the best circumstances and always waste time.

Next Beyen presents the thirties, the time when monetary action became openly recognized as a matter of government policy, with internal prosperity placed ahead of international monetary equilibrium; fear of unemployment became a mighty force, nationally and internationally. The Bank for International Settlements was not without some achievement in international consultation, although it won scant credit. The wartime and Bretton Woods consultations are shown to

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have testified to the hope which springs eternal out of conflict. A final chapter is devoted to showing that the Bretton Woods institutions are a step forward, despite mistakes in their inception and application —particularly the mistake of failing to capitalize on skills acquired in regional coöperation.

The entire book abounds in penetrating comment upon the interaction of psychological, political, economic and social factors. It is that difficult achievement, a " whole " picture, for which Mr. Beyen strives, and with an unusual degree of success. He does not blink unpleasant facts about the organizations in which he has served, warning that governments cannot remove a danger by shutting their eyes to it, hiding it and fooling themselves about it. He does not use past statistics to try to foretell the future.

Unlike many theoretical economists, this " practioner " never loses sight of the human factor, with which he so often has had to contend. The most pressing problem of the world today, to him, is effective coordination of the judgments of the human beings in charge of various governments. Through these instrumentalities, the tender plant of international monetary coöperation has to struggle to grow roots. Realizing how inconspicuous is its initial success, Mr. Beyen yet decides that there has been enough growth to show that more can grow, and gradually will grow, " with better and better results " (p. 210). This constructive outlook is badly needed on Whitehall, Pennsylvania Avenue and every other important street of government.

JEANNETTE P. NICHOLS

SWARTHMORE, PA.

My Three Years in Moscow. By WALTER BEDELL SMITH. Philadelphia and New York, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1950.—346 pp. $3.75.

An outstanding military organizer and strategist, General Bedell Smith was pressed into the diplomatic service of his country in 1946, as the implications of the cold war unfolded. In his difficult post at Moscow he had the dual task of defending American interests to a coldly hostile government and estimating its power and intentions in the contest for power. In an informing account of his stewardship he has reported on his efforts and his observations. His book is a valuable contribution to a wider awareness of the basic factors and conditions underlying the unstable stalemate between Soviet and American power and purposes.

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General Smith has not attempted to survey all the political events of his ambassadorship but rather singled out several crucial episodes for full reporting. His first interview with Marshal Stalin, in early April 1946, gives the full flavor of that dialectical talking at cross-purposes which leaves non-Communists wondering how to achieve a common statement of fact, the first basis of negotiation. In describing his effort to establish the kind of free, confidential discussion of differences which can lubricate the work of diplomacy, General Smith understates the hopefulness with which he planned this direct, forthright approach (p. 47). Nothing in his intimate wartime dealings with his British colleagues in SHAEF had prepared him for the system of suspicion and constraint which shapes the relations of Soviet diplomacy with foreign representatives.

General Smith gives a full account of his effort in May 1948 to dispel illusions of the Soviet leadership concerning the effect of the approaching elections upon American foreign policy (pp. 157-166). The alacrity with which Molotov attempted to use this confidential approach to divide the Atlantic alliance and to confuse public opinion illustrates again the difficulty which the Kremlin encounters in judging the effects of its own actions upon peoples and areas outside its control.

My Three Years in Moscow presents a detailed report of the Moscow negotiations of 1948 for the lifting of the Soviet blockade of Berlin. This is a valuable case study of Soviet methods of negotiation, and General Smith supplements it with a shrewd analysis of Soviet motives. In this tense and almost unmanageable situation General Smith was stubborn and skillful both in defending essential American rights and in seeking some ground for settlement; and the agreement of May 1949, it should be pointed out, was based on the stand which he had upheld in August and September 1948. It is still not clear, however, why the Western negotiators rejected Molotov's proposal that the technical questions concerning transportation and currency be settled in Moscow, instead of referring them to representatives in Berlin (p. 247). Surely, it would have been possible to bring a planeload of advisers from Berlin and to try to work out the detailed arrangements in Moscow, where alone necessary concessions could be pressed upon the Soviet leaders.

Drawing on the reports of his embassy staff and seasoning them with pithy observations of his own, General Smith has drawn a broad picture of life in post-war Moscow. He gives full credit to the great industrial expansion and describes the lag in agricultural production and in standards of living. He traces in detail the post-war tightening

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of controls over intellectual and artistic life and the ever-deepening hostility to the West. It is doubtful, however, that the Lysenko theory in genetics should be regarded, in the long view, as "one of the fundamental props of Soviet ideology" (p. 285).

Gomolka is not one of the "expatriate" Moscovite Communists (p. 193), and the Polish-German boundary approved at Potsdam should be described as "provisional" rather than "temporary" (p. 223). In one matter which is not directly connected with his ambassadorship—the question of the German surrender terms of May 1945 and the rôle of the European Advisory Commission in London (pp. 19-20)—this account shows a number of inaccuracies, probably due to a faulty recollection of the actual sequence of events in those crowded days.

PHILIP E. MOSELY

THE RUSSIAN INSTITUTE OF
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Stalin: A Political Biography. By ISAAC DEUTSCHER. New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1949.—xiii, 600 pp. $5.00.

This is an enigmatic and elusive biography of an enigmatic and elusive figure. Deutscher's version is certainly not the blatant apologia for Stalin which some of his reviewers have made it out to be. Its predominant tone is independent and critical, and much of the analysis is penetrating and suggestive. Yet under the guise of a lofty objectivity he has managed to create a sympathetic, if somewhat synthetic, portrait of greatness in which harshnesses are blurred, chicanery explained away, and blood baths and purges find their ultimate justification in terms of a higher necessity of revolutionary dynamics and progress.

The alchemy by which these effects are attained merits close scrutiny. In Deutscher's interpretation, Stalin grew up as one of the "committeemen" of the revolutionary underground. He belonged to the "hard" bureaucratic organizers and practical workers called forth and exalted by Lenin's conception of the Bolsheviks as a party of professional revolutionaries. Stalin was no ideologue. His only important theoretical work of the pre-revolutionary years, *The Problems of Nationalities and Social Democracy,* was written, Deutscher suggests, largely under the direction and inspiration of Lenin. Stalin drew his strength from his native soil. He did not conceal his contempt for the doctrinaire babblings and sectarian squabbles of the

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emigré leaders who pitched their tents abroad and were aloof from Russian realities. His deepest loyalties were always involved in the fate of the Revolution at home rather than abroad. As Deutscher sees it, Stalin made his career primarily as one of Lenin's loyal party henchmen and disciples. He rendered himself indispensable by undertaking the drudgery of the day-to-day management of the party organization. Largely on the basis of his accomplishments in this field, he was made General Secretary of the Central Committee in 1922. From this point of vantage he began his uninterrupted ascent to total power, which was accompanied by the elimination of all his rivals and ended with his virtual deification as the supreme embodiment of authority in the Communist world.

What were the qualities which made this *tour de force* possible? Deutscher gives primary weight to Stalin's shrewd practical sense and his unbending spirit. He lacked the doctrinal brilliance and the oratorical talents of his rivals, but he made up for it by his "patient and sustained interest in every detail of organization", by his "enormous capacity for hard and uninspiring toil", and by his unerring instinct for the strategic levers of control that signify power in any large-scale organization. His rivals underrated him, but Stalin had the gift of capitalizing their contempt into political assets and of transforming the limitations of his own endowment into positive advantages. Working unobtrusively but effectively, he succeeded in creating a vast political machine which became the instrument of his dominance and enabled him, group by group, to dispose of all his enemies.

Up to this point, there is little in Deutscher's appraisal with which one can disagree. More debatable is his effort to defend the thesis that Stalin belongs among the constructive despots of history, that, as with Peter the Great, Napoleon and Cromwell before him, what will be remembered about his régime will be "its constructive social performance" rather than the cruelties which were its birth pangs. The method by which he seeks to develop this thesis has its elements of casuistry. A few examples will have to suffice. Deutscher does not blink the hunger, starvation, and forced labor which attended the introduction of collectivization, but did it not train a whole new generation of peasants in the mechanical tools of an industrial age? Was it not "the peasants' preparatory school for mechanical warfare", an important key to the survival of the Soviet Union in World War II? The forced pace of industrialization under the Five Year Plans imposed severe hardships on the Russian people, but did it not contribute a solid element of strength without which the Soviet Union

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would certainly have been defeated by Hitler in World War II? The purges of 1936-1938 were attended by indefensible bloodletting, but did they not dispose of the kernels of resistance from which fifth columns might have sprouted in the war with Germany? The consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe has been accompanied by undemocratic practices and unattractive purges, but are not the new régimes in this area putting into practice social reforms that have been long overdue?

Deutscher's *Stalin* comes closest to sophisticated, if unwitting, apologetics in the last few pages of its final chapter in which he sums up the constructive achievements of the Stalinite epoch. Here he passes over Stalin's rôle as " the collector of old Russian possessions " and " the promoter of Communist revolutions " as well as the problems which Soviet expansionism has posed for the non-Soviet world. He concentrates on domestic accomplishments. These are viewed as threefold: the achievement of industrialization and a planned economy, the spread of educational opportunities, and the transformations in the social structure of Russian society. The transformation in social structure is discussed without any reference to the emergence of new élitist and hierarchical elements which have attended the consolidation of Stalin's power. The impressive growth in the number of schools of all grades is cited without reference to the system of mind control and indoctrination which has been installed in these schools. Some of Deutscher's statements read strangely in the light of recent developments. " Perhaps in no country have the young been imbued with so great a respect and love for the classical literature and art of other nations as in Russia . . ." (*vide*—the current drive on cosmopolitanism). ". . . Stalin has not, like Hitler, forbidden the new generation to read and study classics of their own literature whose ideological outlook does not accord with his " (*vide*—the recent ban on Dostoyevsky).

One can only conclude from samples such as the foregoing that Deutscher has still not shed all the hopes and illusions which sustained him before he broke with Stalin over Communist tactics at the time of the Nazi seizure of power in Germany. When he says of Communist education that " it is the community of the free and equal, and not the dictatorship, that has remained the inspiration ", surely he is seeking to recapture a utopian vision from which he has only partially emancipated himself. There are times when biographies reveal more of the biographer than they do of the subject. That is partly true in this case. Deutscher's residual faith in the constructive

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potentialities of the Bolshevik Revolution has led him to embody that ideal in Stalinism, even though it be in distorted form. It is unfortunate that this should contribute an element of caricature to what otherwise remains an acute and perceptive analysis of one of the somber heroes of our time.

MERLE FAINSOD

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy. By SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1949.—xx, 588, xv pp. $7.50.

Twenty-five years after his marriage, John Quincy Adams wrote to his wife a confession (p. 18) that the first woman he ever loved was a French actress. They were both about fourteen. For seven years he yearned, but afterwards he blessed "his stars and his stupidity" that he had not met the girl, because "I learnt from her that lesson of never forming an acquaintance with an actress to which I have since invariably adhered. . . ."

In learning the art of diplomacy, John Quincy fortunately did not attempt to gain experience by avoiding it. What opportunities he had to study statesmanship! How superbly he used them! His mother Abigail wrote to him during his second trip abroad, when he was thirteen: "When a mind is raised and animated by scenes that engage the heart, then those qualities, which would otherwise lie dormant, wake into life and form the character of the hero and the statesman" (p. 11). Her fond optimism was justified. Professor Bemis has written an excellent account of the education which by cool deliberation of the son as well as his parents produced a statesman who ought to be counted among the greatest of American heroes.

This book does something to remove from Adams the adjectives—self-righteous, cantankerous, and so forth—under which his great achievements have been smothered. More will have to be done if the author's evident purpose of making Adams popular with a wider public than professional students is to succeed. The task will be easier in the second volume which Bemis hints he may give us on the post-Presidential career of John Quincy Adams, the crusader against slavery.

In his first career as diplomatist and maker of foreign policy, the province of the present volume, Adams was perhaps the machine for statesmanship that Bemis portrays. Still a reader may wonder why the author, although he is careful to remark (p. x) that he found

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" little new historical matter " in the original Diary which the Adams Manuscript Trust allowed him to use, makes no such disclaimer regarding the " personal matter " which Charles Francis Adams omitted from the published *Memoirs*. Bemis states (p. ix) that he has written " a diplomatic biography—if such a thing there can be. . . ." Doubtless there can be, but, once Adams is launched on his political career, this book is brilliant diplomatic history and very little biography.

It is solely the statesman whom we are asked to admire, and the author is persuasive. He concludes (pp. 567-70) that Adams had a decisive or at least influential relation to all of the " fourteen fundamentals " of Amercan foreign policy: sovereign independence to preserve the rights of English freemen; freedom of the seas; freedom of commerce and navigation; abstention from the " ordinary " vicissitudes and " ordinary " combinations and collisions of European politics and wars; the no-transfer principle; continental expansion; self-determination of peoples; no further European colonization in the New World; nonintervention; the right of expatriation and naturalization and the wrong of impressment; suppression of the African slave trade; Pan-Americanism; international arbitration; and anti-imperialism. The body of the book is a series of meticulous studies to examine Adams' relation to these fundamentals.

So well does Bemis argue his case (pp. 3, 571) that Adams was our greatest diplomatist and more than any other one man helped to shape American foreign policy and the future of the Republic, that exception can be taken to very few of his points. To support his claim that Adams was a harbinger of the Good Neighbor policy, Bemis points to the instructions drawn up in 1826 by Adams' Secretary of State, Henry Clay, to guide the American delegates to the Panama Congress. There he finds (p. 557) such principles as nonintervention proposed for inclusion in a series of " good neighborhood " treaties. The phrase was Clay's. This is interesting but perhaps not as indicative of Adams' aims as his concurrent policy of securing certain Latin American territories for the United States.

A general contradiction may also be found between Adams' expansionism and Bemis' claim that the policy of anti-imperialism was implicit in all of Adams' policies. He defines imperialism (p. 570) as " dominion or control over alien peoples ", but even this definition leaves room for speculation whether Adams would recognize himself as an anti-imperialist. Probably for Adams the difference between American expansionism and ordinary imperialism lay in the manner that dominion was exercised. But the Indians found even this difference unnoticeable.

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Bemis minimizes the vigorous methods Adams and his collaborators used to secure the expansion of the United States. For example, he neglects to consider whether Great Britain's remarkable concessions in the Convention of 1818 were responses to the formidable array of American threats against British peace and trade. But he does not minimize the share of others besides Adams in the formulation of American policies. In the discussion of the Monroe Doctrine, ample credit is given to the President. Bemis provides many fresh insights here as well as in his discussion of a dozen lesser affairs. One wishes, however, for more knowledge of the process whereby Adams shifted from Federalist to Republican allegiance. Evidently Bemis regards the step as a very short one: he writes (p. 140) that the foreign policy of President Jefferson "did not differ essentially from that of his Federalist predecessors, George Washington and John Adams." All depends on what is thought to be essential. Jefferson's readiness to sacrifice his predilection for France in favor of a British connection, when the national interest required it, may fairly be thought to demonstrate one essential difference between his foreign policy and that of the Federalists, who were far less ready to sacrifice their predilection for England.

These remarks, however, should not obscure the fact that Bemis has written easily the best study of Adams' first career. It relates the massive work of this great man to vital issues of American faith and fortune. Readers will take pleasure in its special glow of enthusiasm as well as in the solid scholarship to which the dean of American diplomatic historians has accustomed us.

BASIL RAUCH

BARNARD COLLEGE

Southern Politics in State and Nation. By V. O. KEY, JR., with the assistance of ALEXANDER HEARD. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1949.—xxvi, 675, xiv pp. $6.00.

"Southern politics is . . . deadly serious business that is sometimes carried on behind a droll façade." Mr. Key ignores the façade in his book except for the clues that it gives to the real business being carried on behind it. Spending little ink on the comic opera aspects of southern politics and no great amount on the personalities and antics of colorful leaders, he concentrates on the nature, causes, operations and tendencies of the political life of the South.

The book opens with eleven chapters, each describing the political scene in a southern state. Here Key amply demonstrates one of his

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theses, namely, that no two southern states are alike and that no one set of stereotypes about political behavior or personalities will fit much of the South. Following this state-by-state survey, succeeding chapters treat the Republican party in the South, the degree of cohesiveness and the issues that evoke cohesiveness among southern senators and congressmen, nominating processes, the primary, campaign finances, disfranchising devices, and the extent of non-voting. Major emphasis is given to the impact of the Negro on politics, the nature and consequences of one-party factionalism, and the causes and effects of demagoguery.

Key's wide ranging is never aimless nor disconnected. He is constantly making correlations (the book contains sixty-eight Tables and seventy-five Figures) in an endeavor to account for various types of political behavior. Though a political scientist himself, he sometimes makes better use of sociological, economic and historical data than of political.

Novel and even startling dicta appear in this book. At least one good word is said for the southern demagogue: his colorful antics and his "intensely loyal personal following can introduce into the disorganized politics of one-party states elements of stability and form that are of the utmost importance." It will be a shock to Ohio Republicans to read that although Eugene Talmadge was like Bilbo or Long in his "unruly conduct and . . . uninhibited tongue," he was like Governor John W. Bricker in his attitude toward business and the New Deal. The political life-cycle of several southern senators is neatly summarized in one sentence. "He manages to get himself elected, perhaps by a rabble-rousing appeal, and then builds his fences so well with the moneyed interests that no opponent can raise a campaign fund large enough to make much of a fight against him." To the commonly known facts about the Republican party in the South—that it is a small minority except in a few hill and mountain counties and that few of its leaders want it to grow—Key raises a discouraging problem for those who would like to see Republicanism sweep down from the hills and challenge the Democratic party throughout the state. How can southern mountain Republicans reared in the tradition of Populism and political radicalism be effectively reconciled to the national Republican party of today?

Key's major conclusion is that "in the final analysis the peculiarities of southern white politics come from the impact of the black race. . . . The one-party system, suffrage restrictions departing from democratic norms, low levels of voting and of political interest, and all the consequences of these political arrangements and practices must be

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traced ultimately to this one factor." Key may have proved this thesis; much evidence is marshaled to support it. But whether one thinks that the conclusion is too absolute and that the book comes to its end at too single a point, there can be no denying that its breadth and depth of investigation, originality of interpretation, clarity and wit of expression, and timely significance make it a book of major importance. No one should talk about southern politics who has not read it.

CHARLES S. SYDNOR

DUKE UNIVERSITY

The President and the Presidency. By LOUIS BROWNLOW. Chicago, Public Administration Service, 1949.—xi, 137 pp. $2.75.

The Presidency in Transition. Edited by ROBERT S. RANKIN. Gainesville, The Journal of Politics, University of Florida, 1949. Distributed by Kallman Publishing Co., Gainesville.—256 pp. $2.00.

A stimulating personal comment on the Presidency, by a man experienced in public affairs, is afforded by Louis Brownlow's *The President and the Presidency,* though its conclusions invite challenge.

The book comprises a series of six lectures, given at the University of Chicago in April 1947, under the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation. Mr. Brownlow, in his first lectures, states, " I have relied largely on my memory " (p. 2). In his preface, written in 1949, he explains that he has not attempted revision of the lectures which would have " compelled me to a task in historical research for which I have no taste " (p. vii).

Mr. Brownlow has been a political correspondent and a public administrator, including five years as a commissioner for the District of Columbia. In 1937, with Charles E. Merriam and Luther Gulick, he was a member of the President's Committee on Administrative Management.

The author's impressions of the Presidency were molded by his early acquaintance with Theodore Roosevelt. He espouses the " strong man " theory of the Presidency and does not fear that it will be abused. In fact, he proposes several new measures (pp. 117, 128, 129, 133) to increase the executive power and prevent " any encroachment " by Congress—a romantic and dangerous platform.

By contrast, the professional scholars who have written *The Presidency in Transition* handle the subject with an objective realism.

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They are aware that the conditions of modern times inevitably have enhanced the office, but they also recognize that the American public is traditionally wary of concentration of power.

The authors of the sections which comprise the book are: R. S. Rankin (Duke), E. S. Corwin (Princeton), C. A. Berdahl (Illinois), E. A. Helms (Ohio State), W. E. Binkley (Ohio Northern), C. H. Pritchett (Chicago), C. L. Rossiter (Cornell), A. L. Sturm (West Virginia), C. Fairman (Stanford), H. J. Laski (London), W. McClure (State Department), C. P. Patterson (Texas), E. S. Brown (Michigan), R. C. Silva (Penn State).

Laski alone among these commentators seems not to comprehend the American *mores*, or our patience with the handicaps of our political structure. In his torturous, polysyllabic prose he presents the place of the President in foreign affairs. He recites much history, past and present, already familiar to American ears, digresses with discussions of our domestic policy, and concludes with the debatable observation (p. 207), "The test of the American system will depend upon its power to produce great presidents."

Rankin, as editor of the volume, is much more prudent and realistic when he says (p. 6) that the past twenty years in the Presidency have been years of "flux and change but also of development." Corwin cautions against the "personalized power" of the office (p. 13) and suggests practical remedies. His chapter is the only one not especially written for this book; but it is an important counterbalance to the Laski thesis.

Space permits giving but a hint of these well-documented papers. McClure outlines the steps that are being taken "to achieve unification between the Executive and the Legislature" in international affairs (p. 206). Like McClure, Binkley is optimistic over the possibility of achieving improved unity between the White House and the Congress, and he proposes a legislative-executive council for that purpose (p. 79).

Berdahl would abolish the electoral college and amend the nominating process so that Presidential selection might be more directly controlled by popular choice (p. 41). Helms believes that men of higher caliber can be attracted to party leadership by more extensive use of public opinion polls and more thorough coverage of political activities by radio and television (p. 64).

In discussing the relationship of the Supreme Court to the Presidency, Pritchett declares himself on the side of those who "prefer that the powers of the President be defined by the political rather than the judicial process" (p. 92). A valuable digest of the hazards of

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Presidential intervention in labor disputes is presented by Rossiter, who holds that intervention has its uses but should be employed only as a last resort.

In discussing the place of the President in emergencies, Sturm emphasizes the need for Congress to clarify the word "emergencies" and to revise its procedures so that it may act more swiftly in times of crisis (p. 143). He points (p. 144) to the urgency of keeping the public fully informed, "except as military and diplomatic necessity requires"—a limitation which often has been misused.

Fairman presents the Commander-in-Chief aspects of the Presidential office in terms of the entire organization for defense, and outlines both the organization of the Presidential power and the mode of its exercise (pp. 145-170).

Brown and Silva, in perhaps the most original and informative paper of the book, discuss the many theories concerning the Presidential succession and recommend that in such a crisis the Congress pass a concurrent resolution requesting the successor to serve as president. This would relieve the prospective incumbent of the embarrassment of taking the initiative (p. 256).

Patterson brilliantly analyzes the rise of the administrative power in the past century and a quarter. He concludes (p. 235) by showing how the responsibilities of leadership, the appointive and removal power over many top officials, various persuasive impacts on the judicial process, "almost complete finality in fact-finding", and most ample means for appeal to the public give the Presidency of modern times a material influence on both Congress and the Courts.

I heartily recommend that this symposium be kept readily at hand by any devotee of American political science. It lacks the drive of an integrated one-author book, but its individual chapters are indispensable commentaries.

J. C. Long

Bethlehem, Pa.

Congress on Trial: The Legislative Process and the Administrative State. By James MacGregor Burns. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1949.—xiv, 224 pp. $3.00.

The title, *Congress on Trial,* suggests more accurately than the subtitle, *The Legislative Process and the Administrative State,* what Professor James MacGregor Burns had in mind when he wrote his provocative study of Congressional politics. He is not interested in the technical and procedural aspects of legislation but is profoundly dis-

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turbed by conditions on Capitol Hill, that seem too dangerous and unstable to endure. As an assembly of the agents of the special interests Congress has become, in the opinion of Professor Burns, something of a menace to the survival of the country. The Presidential-Congressional deadlock results from the fact that individual Congressmen, forced to fight for their lives in restricted constituencies, are vulnerable to the pressures of organized minorities while the President rallies popular majorities composed largely of people who belong to no pressure groups at all. Back of the split personality of American politics lies the failure of the parties to convert Presidential majorities into effective Congressional majorities. In the course of the elaboration of his argument Burns makes an uncompromising statement of the case for a greatly invigorated system of party government. The reader may not agree with the whole of this analysis but he is certain to find it stimulating because Professor Burns is digging at the roots of the matter as vigorously as Woodrow Wilson once probed into the foundations of Congressional behavior. What distinguishes this volume from the rash of new books about Congress is the fact that the author goes behind the Congressional apparatus to look at the political conditions that cause Congress to behave as it does. For this reason he does not think that Congress can reform itself. Nor does he think that the adoption of a system of responsible cabinet government will cure the evil, as long as the parties do not create a new political base for the government as a whole, by organizing the millions of voters who have remained outside of the pressure-group system.

Implicit in the argument of *Congress on Trial* is the idea that the special-interest organizations which now dominate Congress are not invincible, that the raw materials for a new kind of party organization are available for mobilization. What one misses in this admirable and hard-hitting book is an awareness of the dynamic factors already at work producing a new party system. It is a curious circumstance that American political scientists have greatly underestimated the political consequences of the revolution of 1932. While they continue to describe the party system as if it were immutable, the Democratic party has become substantially a new creation bearing little resemblance to the decrepit and contemptible organization that seventeen years ago was used by the nation to produce the greatest reversal of public policy in American history. The conquest of Congress by the parties will not be brought about by the relatively modest proposals made in chapter xi but by developments as substantial as the decline of sectionalism, the conversion of the labor movement to party action, a great

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extension of the scope of politics and fighting political action such as the "purge" of 1938, Mr. Truman's unprecedented campaign in 1948, and the great contest already under way for the control of Congress this year.

E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

The Task of Nations. By HERBERT V. EVATT. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949.—279 pp. $3.00.

This record of the third United Nations General Assembly—held in Paris in the autumn of 1948—does not add much to the official and press accounts of the meeting. Dr. Evatt is at his best in describing the conduct of business under his chairmanship, and especially in his narrative of the phases of the Palestinian question. He writes clearly, and without fuss or self-importance. Although he never obtrudes his own part in the proceedings, he convinces one of his honesty and efficiency as a chairman. He is a "likeable" man; the kind of man with whom one might well disagree, and yet disagreement would make no difference to one's feelings of friendship and trust.

As far as Dr. Evatt's own activities are concerned, the book is satisfying. It is much less satisfactory in its general treatment of the U.N. organization. The reason is perhaps that Dr. Evatt is writing for the ordinary reader—one might say, the ordinary voter—and, for all his robust belief in the judgment of the common man, does not venture to put a very heavy strain on the average voter's intelligence. He is too ready to "write up" this new organization in relation to previous machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. One might suppose at times that he accepts the myth of an "international anarchy" before 1914; at all events he does not seem to have asked himself how disputes affecting the vital interests of Great Powers were settled before 1914 or whether the peacemakers of today may not learn something from the fact that there was no general war for a century after the Congress of Vienna. A historian may well doubt whether, from the point of view of securing peaceful settlements, the new machinery is all that much better than the old, and whether it is wholly a good thing that every minor dispute can be "universalized", with the accompanying glare of publicity and excitement. Even the ordinary voter may find it hard to accept without qualification Dr. Evatt's comment about the open proceedings of the U.N. Assembly. Dr. Evatt says: "One of the many good results of having public meetings is that every one can see exactly what is going on." What

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" goes on " is not always edifying, and the fact that the meetings of the Assembly are public does not necessarily mean that the public sees, or hears, all that is " going on ".

Similarly Dr. Evatt expects his readers to swallow a good deal when he tells them that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a landmark in world history comparable to Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights. It may well be that the Universal Declaration, like Magna Charta (which is not mentioned in Shakespeare's *King John*), will suddenly obtain general importance four centuries after its formulation, but the fact is that Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights dealt with definite lists of encroachments by the executive power—the setting up of weirs in the Thames, or the billeting of soldiers—whereas the Universal Declaration makes large assumptions about the relationship of the individual to society and the state, and contains no machinery for enforcing any one of the " rights " which it lays down. Consider, for example, this assertion: " The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, and is entitled to protection by society and the State." Protection against whom? Against people who do not regard it as the natural and fundamental group unit of society? And what kind of family is to be protected? Must the society be monogamous? Where, in some societies, does a family end and a clan begin? Or again, article 23 of the Declaration lays down that every one has the " right to work ". Dr. Evatt's gloss on this clause is that " each person is not only entitled to expect that employment will exist for every one, but if he is honestly unable to obtain work he is entitled to appropriate protection and assistance." The latter claim has been accepted in England since the reign of Queen Elizabeth, but are we yet in sufficient control of the cyclical movement of supply and demand, or even of the weather, to recognize full employment not merely as something desirable but as a " right " in the same category as the " right " to freedom of conscience? Article 24, which Dr. Evatt again accepts with satisfaction, goes even farther and recognizes a " right " to holidays with pay. Who, then, has the duty—since every right implies a duty—who has the duty to ensure that the work done provides the surplus out of which the holiday is paid?

These and many like criticisms which one could make about Dr. Evatt's assumptions of fact or theory are not just captious. They do not detract from Dr. Evatt's practical ability in getting business through meetings; they are not a general " crab " of the United Nations. The task of nations, to use Dr. Evatt's apt title, is assuredly to work for international coöperation at all levels, since without it we face the gravest risks and may be involved in total calamity. Never-

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theless, we shall only repeat the mistakes of the past if we conceal from the ordinary voter the fact that our new machinery is not really so much better than that of our grandfathers, and if we are content to debate grandiloquent and ambiguous formulae under the impression that we are conferring some great benefit upon our fellowmen. It might be worth while for the Assembly of the United Nations to begin its proceedings by listening to the fairy tale of the Emperor and his clothes.

E. L. WOODWARD

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Last Call for Common Sense. By JAMES P. WARBURG. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949.—viii, 311 pp. $3.00.

Mr. Warburg's book deserves both utmost praise and severe criticism. He is called on the jacket " the articulate conscience of the United States " and fully deserves such recognition. He represents the best in American liberalism: generous ideals, matter of fact and energetic devotion to a cause, independent and consistent thinking, integrity. He also represents a somewhat superficial and escapist outlook. This is probably the tragedy and weakness of liberalism which is almost necessarily carried away by the intensity of its moral call and by its fervent indignation at the no-man's land of the " ought to be ". *Last Call for Common Sense* presupposes that " common sense " is a predominant and universal characteristic of man and that it is sufficient for him to be exposed to a logical expression of " common sense " to see the light and act accordingly. This presupposition, unfortunately, is dangerous.

The book, written in a concise and vigorous style, consists of a series of addresses delivered during the years 1948 and 1949. It covers many topics—some already dated, such as the Berlin crisis—others of more general and lasting interest, as indicated by the following chapter headings: " Some Economic Predicates for Peace ", " How to Achieve One World ", " Our Role in World Affairs", and perhaps unfortunately for us " The Atlantic Alliance ". It forms a consistent whole, however, and this reviewer will give only a brief exposé and criticism of the assumptions of the thesis underlying the treatment of the various topics.

He is in agreement with most of the diagnosis and with many of the remedies suggested by Mr. Warburg. The responsibilities for our diffi-

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culties cannot all be conveniently put on the broad Russian shoulders. Economic and social problems of immense importance to world stability, and thus to our security and value system, cannot be solved by hatred and incantation. The real danger is, however, that in the bipolar world of conflicting ideologies mutual fear forces an armament race that can only increase fear. "The Cold War is becoming hot"—the dice are almost cast for a catastrophe. In the meanwhile we are hypnotized by the need for strategic containment and tend to forget the more essential need of economic development and social welfare.

It is imperative, argues the author, that we become reasonable and understand the implications of mutual fear and growing armaments. The Marshall Plan, originally sound and constructive, is being prostituted by strategic considerations. The Atlantic Treaty only precipitates the trend toward a negative policy of containment at the expense of the positive policy of economic development. We are spending three times as much on military preparedness as on economic and social betterment; the proportion ought to be reversed.

There is real insight in Mr. Warburg's insistence that our security is not exclusively a matter of armaments. More important than physical containment is ideological containment. "The Soviet threat to peace is primarily a threat of communist penetration or subversion. The way to meet it is not with guns placed in the hands of harassed and unhappy peoples. The way to meet it is to remove the causes of man's discontent—to promote economic recovery and social justice—and thus to strike from the hands of the Communists the only dangerous weapon they possess" (p. 159). Unfortunately, this reviewer believes, the double threat of the Soviet army and of world communism cannot be easily eliminated by the simple matter of establishing a priority among dangers. The Atlantic Treaty is both backing up the Marshall Plan and conflicting with its purpose. Enough armaments to protect Western Europe may well be too much, considering the dire need of European reconstruction. Yet not enough may prevent the will to rebuild, should the myth of security not be there.

The real evil is fear, says Mr. Warburg; it is up to us, rather than to the Russians, to conquer fear, for we have a preponderance of military strength and "until we conquer our own fear of Russia, we shall not be able to alleviate Russia's fear of us." Let us presuppose with the author that the removal of fear on our part will end the contagion—an article of faith which could be challenged—but what kind of operation will succeed in removing fear? It is sufficient, says the author, to realize that we are afraid of the wrong thing. We should be afraid

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less of the Soviet Union than of war itself, since even a victorious war would be a disaster. The recognition by both sides that war represents to each a greater danger than the possible aggressive intent of the other should furnish a common interest and a basis for coöperation. Here the reader wonders if man is rational enough to replace an existing fear by another that is manufactured out of a vision of Apocalypse.

The author is convinced that the world cannot long endure if it is divided into two camps; the choice is between unification by world conquest or by world government. (Incidentally the moralist of world government meets here the amoralist of preventive war.) Perhaps, the reader may think, there is another alternative, that consists in continuing to live dangerously until time, accidents, and the pressure of necessity come slowly to teach wisdom.

Mr. Warburg admits that the Soviet system stands at the opposite pole from the liberal democratic one. But he is confident that common ideals will develop, once there is world government controlling military power, the movement of peoples, the exchange of goods and services. This is putting the cart before the horse. The machinery of government cannot be established unless common ideals already exist. Consensus on goal-values must precede the establishment of a structure that is destined to protect and implement these values. The structure cannot create the consensus, but at best help to maintain it through a successful technique of peaceful change.

World federalism or the half-world federalism of the "Pilot Plant" is taken as a self-evident and simple proposition; in Mr. Warburg's text obstacles to its realization do not appear to exist. Yet the very failure in reaching agreement on the international control of atomic energy should teach us a lesson; when it comes to supranational government, fear of a dictatorship by an inimical majority will continue to act as a deterrent to any agreement on a federation with the most "limited" powers. This is obvious enough—yet it is not a minor criticism. Advocacy of the unattainable not only makes for wasted good will but actually works against the goal of peace itself. It prevents united and forceful support of the possible. When the objectives pressed for by the reformers are set too high, they belong to the realm of ethics rather than statesmanship; and this divorce of morals and reality can benefit only the amoralist who then appears to have a monopoly of realistic thinking.

C. A. MICAUD

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

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Strategy for Liberals: The Politics of the Mixed Economy. By IRWIN ROSS. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1949.—x, 211 pp. $3.00.

Even though not all persons who think of themselves as liberals will agree with the argument, this is nevertheless a book worth reading by those who dislike both communism and Fascism. The mixed economy that Mr. Ross has in mind is "a blend of capitalist, socialist, and coöperative elements, with the government acting as prime mover." He favors the nationalization of those industries (except for the opinion-molding businesses) in which a high degree of monopoly of ownership or control already exists. His position is roughly that of the British Labor party.

Depression and monopoly the author views as our most critical economic problems, and he describes briefly but vividly the effects of these conditions upon American life. Depression, he thinks, must be met by government spending and controls along the lines recommended by Alvin H. Hansen, but monopoly can be conquered only by an expansion of coöperatives and more government ownership.

Before moving toward a moderate socialism Mr. Ross believes that American liberals should ponder well the experiences of European social democratic movements. These failed, he says (p. 61), "in great part because they consistently underestimated their opponents . . . . Too many leading Socialists had a naïve faith in the decency and sportsmanship of the opposition. They seldom doubted that the 'ruling class' would abide by the results of the ballot, would acquiesce in the legal withering away of their wealth and privileges." The Left-wingers, he writes, always lost, either because of armed force—as in Austria, Germany and Spain—or because of "economic sabotage and political demagogy" in England and France. An American movement toward the left could, he believes, expect the same opposition, and a military *coup d'état* is not unthinkable in the United States.

"For the advocates of the Mixed Economy to come to power" in the United States Mr. Ross expects three necessary conditions: peace, a depression, and a "strong liberal organization". The last of these troubles him no end, and it may be said that he never really solves the political problems. He is of two minds about the Democratic party as a vehicle for the cause of liberalism. On page 4, for instance, he writes that the 1948 "election altered the relationship of political forces in America. Organized liberalism emerged with a strength, a mandate, and an opportunity unmatched since 1932 . . . . The

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Truman administration has the legislative strength, the *expertize* to discharge many of the specific commitments it undertook at the polls." But later on (p. 128) he becomes discouraged with the party which, he says, "can only be regarded as an erratic vehicle for long-term liberal action." Labor, the Americans for Democratic Action, and all other groups and parties are equally unsatisfactory to him, and he proposes a new organization of perhaps 80,000 to 100,000 members "to act as a kind of advance scout and salesman for the Mixed Economy." This new group—which never gets named—would infiltrate labor, farm, and urban middle-class groups, selling to them the program of the mixed economy. Such a scheme is not impossible under American conditions, but unless some Bryan or Huey Long emerged to dress it up in patriotic rhetoric its chances seem remote. Much more thinking needs to be done on the political strategies necessary to produce a mixed economy.

DAYTON D. MCKEAN

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

Labor in Postwar America. Edited by COLSTON E. WARNE, KATHERINE DUPRE LUMPKIN and Others. Brooklyn, Remsen Press, 1949.—xii, 765 pp. $10.00.

In 1945 the Institute of Labor Studies published a symposium entitled *War Labor Policies*, identified as "Volume 1, Yearbook of American Labor" (New York, Philosophical Library, publisher). The present volume "carries forward the plan" launched at that time. It appears to mark the abandonment, however, of any plan to issue annual volumes. Evidently it is number two in a projected series of volumes designed to deal with successive stages in the development of the American labor movement. The first volume covered World War II. The present one spans, generally, the years 1945-1948.

The circumstance that its thirty-two chapters are contributed by thirty-five labor specialists not unnaturally makes for unevenness in quality and some repetitiousness. On the whole the editors have done a good job of integration. The first half of the book deals topically with post-war labor problems: wage-price decontrol; labor-contract developments; employer and union policies; trends in production, hours and earnings; price trends; labor-relations, wage-and-hour, and social-security legislation; the Employment Act of 1946; guaranteed wages; conciliation and arbitration; the Supreme Court and labor.

The second half of the book consists of a series of chapters dealing with particular industries and population groups: the coal, steel, auto-

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motive, printing, communications, railroads, maritime, meat-packing, clothing and lumber industries; women, Negroes, professional and clerical, and "child labor and youth employment". Included in this last category are three chapters dealing respectively with "Postwar Employment and Wages in Agriculture", "Labor Relations in American-Occupied Germany", and "Industrial Relations in Occupied Japan". Appendices include a chronology of the stabilization program after V-J Day, a digest of the Taft-Hartley Act, a "roster of labor unions in the United States" and a list of union research directors. The book is adequately indexed.

The transitional and turbulent post-war period on which the book centers attention was one of such importance as to justify this book's thorough, if somewhat uneven, appraisal of it. The contributing specialists evidently stand, for the most part, to the left of center. They properly treat the period as one marked by significant legislative swings to the right. These swings are legislative "counter-marches". The writers fairly represent them to be, for the most part, reverses for the labor movement. But it seems to be insinuated that, in the full measure that these shifts have been reverses for the labor movement, they have been reverses for the American people—reverses which in the public interest now must be wiped off the statute books by counter-counter-marches by labor. Such an insinuation unrealistically equates the labor movement to the whole people. Thus, in the opinion of this reader, a counter-march on the Wagner Act in 1947 was overdue, if only for the purpose of amending it to require unions to bargain collectively. The Taft-Hartley counter-march did this. Some of the other things it did were bad; and not only from the point of view of organized labor. They were bad in terms of the national interest.

The writers of the chapters dealing with labor legislation color darkly enough the "anti-labor" laws. What does not appear to have been done by any of them is to give explicit recognition to the circumstance that much of this "anti-labor" legislation reflected public recognition of abuses in the field of labor relations which desperately called for remedial action. The other circumstance, that too often the "cure" was worse than the disease or, at least, not well devised to cope with it, is one of which the contributing specialists are fully and articulately aware.

P. F. Brissenden

Columbia University

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BOOK NOTES

David Cushman Coyle is one of the millions who are concerned about the state of man in society, and one of the smaller number who have thought carefully about it. He has examined this state with skill and perception. Now, in *Day of Judgment: The Economic and Political Challenge to the West* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1949; viii, 212 pp. $3.00), in strong and trenchant language, with scrupulous avoidance of both exaggeration and euphemism, he describes the present state of man in society and discusses its portent. Getting all this done in a small book leads—perhaps inevitably—to a generalized form of presentation and a somewhat pontifical style. Mr. Coyle's revelation seems, indeed, to arise from the peak of a pyramid of knowledge, and to be set forth by a passionate partisan of truth. "Beyond a doubt," writes Mr. Coyle, "the Day of Judgment is the time when mankind, after a long search, comes face to face with science." The heaven which is revealed has no streets of gold, but, instead, offers a more effective freedom than we yet have known. The other outcome is not a brimstone lake, but is war, dictatorship, and oppressive tyranny. These, at least, are clear alternatives; the vacuous uncertainties of purgatory lie behind us in time. This short metaphor is my device for trying to sum up a book which is itself a summary. Mr. Coyle, despite his title, employs no figures of speech; he examines our American political and economic life, its aims, its materials, and its laws of motion. He uses tools drawn from history, anthropology, agronomy, psychology, dietetics, and engineering. He studies modern warfare, the strategy of peace, the need of people for self-realization and the means to its attainment, the technological versus the monopoly grounds for industrial bigness, the waste of resources through non-conservation, the problem posed by Malthus, the responsibilities of free men, the shortcomings of the social sciences. He points out how easily we lose our bearings in a semantic wilderness, how crude greed defeats its own end, what benefits come to a free society if its members see widely and think far ahead. A remarkable feature of this small book is the variety of things it deals with. Another is the unity achieved in the treatment of these various things. Yet another is the skill with which the author cuts through the obscurity and sophistry which befog so many of our current social issues. Mr. Coyle must have intended his book for thoughtful citizens, but

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not especially for such as read the QUARTERLY. It may be of interest, however, to anyone who sets store by clear and honest thinking.—HORACE TAYLOR, Columbia University.

Roland W. Bartlett, author of *Security for the People: Ways of Maintaining Full Employment and High Farm Income* (Chicago, New York, Wilcox & Follett Co., 1949; vii, 303 pp. $3.75), is an agricultural economist, well known for his studies on the economics of the dairy industry. In this work, he considers our total economy. This economy and the historic American way of life he feels to be in serious danger. The danger lies in the fact that monopolies straitjacket our economy, prevent the expansion of markets, and both cause and fail to cope with unemployment. Professor Bartlett is a passionate believer in free competitive enterprise. Few defenders of that system have ever written such a strong denunciation of monopoly capitalism. To him, its behavior not only decries its creed. It is also suicidal. The program Professor Bartlett advocates has ten points. Its cornerstone is 52 pay checks a year for every worker in all major industries. He applies this principle to various industries and devotes one chapter to experience to date with the annual wage. Beyond that, he wants "every power of government" to be used "to restore competition". He wants the major share of the gains from increased productivity to go to buyers rather than to labor and management. He defends cooperatives staunchly and cogently as a form of free enterprise useful in curbing monopolies by their competition and presents a number of case studies of successful coöperatives. If necessary, he would even consider adding to government's rôle as "umpire" the job of establishing wages and prices for steel and other large industries. He would "establish in the colleges and universities of each major industrial state a program of research, teaching and extension for maintaining full employment comparable to the highly successful Extension Service carried on by each College of Agriculture." Half the book is given to an appendix, about one fourth of it to supporting data, the rest to articles by business and other authorities which confirm his contentions. Each chapter in the main text has a bibliography and many carry quotations, sometimes extensive, from business leaders and others which sustain the author's argument. The range of sources is amazingly wide. The degree of documentation but rarely impedes the argument. This is a book with a purpose. Some sections of it appear to have been written at white heat, some in haste, for there is a bit of unnecessary repetition. Whether one agrees in whole or in part with the author, he has certainly stated vigorously one of the central

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issues of our times and assembled evidence for his contentions that must needs be regarded. This is a real service. It is also a service to point to the hypocrisy of the monopolist arguing for the competitive free enterprise he fears. Finally, it is useful in illustrating the obvious but too often disregarded interdependencies of our society, for instance, to show that the decline in the sales of agricultural products and especially of the protective foods in the major urban centers was proportional to the increase in unemployment during the depression.—EDMUND DES. BRUNNER, Teachers College, Columbia University.

Now that the first excitement over the appearance of the China White Paper has died down and the debate over American policy in China has largely shifted to new ground, it is time perhaps to recommend this book to those who remain unintimidated by the thundering journalistic bulls that have been shaking the China shop for all it was worth in the last few years, and who can still get excited about a responsible, first-hand account of recent Chinese history. Not that the State Department has tried to give us a full and well-rounded history—despite its tremendous length, the White Paper remains a political piece, designed to defend a given policy, not to do strict justice to all of the personalities and problems involved. Yet the applications of our foreign policy to so complex a situation are not easy to explain, and in making out their case the Department's publicists have had to bring from their files a wealth of documentary evidence. Much of this will be of interest only to specialists, but that fact need not deter the ordinary reader, for the book is so arranged that he may conveniently pick and choose from the text as well as from the voluminous annexes. The most absorbing sections—the reports of qualified observers on the political scene—may also be considered the most vital. For even those whose primary concern was with military or economic problems conclude that the root of Nationalist China's troubles lay in the lack of inspired political leadership. To say this is not to ignore or belittle the staggering problems with which the régime was faced, or to set out on a hunt for individual scapegoats, but simply to recognize what these observers call our attention to again and again: that the Kuomintang leadership did not dedicate itself to the solution of these problems with the selfless devotion the Communists did, however much the latter may have underestimated these problems themselves. As suggested by the official title *United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949* (Washington, Department of State, 1949; xli, 1054 pp. $3.25) the book deals most fully with the ambassadorship of

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General Hurley, who appears to have had a great faculty for persuading himself that others (including Stalin) saw things just as he did, and ironically is the only former United States representative in China to be quoted as saying (p. 86), "The Communists are not in fact Communists, they are striving for democratic principles"; with the thankless labors at mediation by General Marshall; with the observations of General Wedemeyer, as honest and outspoken as Stillwell had been, though less bitter and somewhat more tactful, yet in the end equally unsuccessful in moving the Kuomintang to reform; and especially with the ambassadorship of J. Leighton Stuart, whose long reports to the Department provide the most authoritative personal commentary we have on political developments from 1947 to 1949. Some of the statistics in the annexes on American aid are not easy to understand: for instance, of the $125 million grant appropriated by Congress in 1948 and disbursed in full by the Treasury as of April 1, 1949, only $87 million is accounted for by the shipment reports of United States government agencies and the Chinese Embassy. No doubt some of the remaining $38 million still awaits delivery, but, lacking any indication here, we cannot tell what may have happened to it.—W. T. DE BARY, Columbia University.

In *The South African Constitution* (Capetown and Johannesburg, Juta & Co., Ltd., 1949; viii, 447 pp. 48/–.) Mr. Henry John May, Barrister-at-Law and Advocate of the Supreme Court of South Africa, describes with great competence the present position of constitutional law in the Union. This book is the second edition of a work published in 1935 by the Oxford University Press under the title *The Law and Custom of the South African Constitution* of which Mr. May, writing as H. J. Schlosberg, was co-author with Professor W. P. M. Kennedy of Toronto. Costs of publication have made it necessary to omit much historical matter in the second edition, but this is compensated for by the more extensive treatment given certain topics of contemporary interest. Obviously, there had to be a complete rewriting of the chapter on "External Affairs". Moreover, the growth of delegated powers is emphasized, and there is additional material on the government of the non-European population and on other "topical controversies" (as the author calls them) such as the power of amendment. Concerning the treatment of all these matters, two observations may be made. In the first place, we are given here somewhat more sharply than in the first edition the South African view of affairs—for example, of the Statute of Westminister as a definite abandonment by the British Parliament of sovereignty over and the right to legislate for the Union. The fullness of South African sovereignty is revealed

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with impressive clarity. Even the "entrenched clauses" of the 1909 Act may now be altered by a simple majority in Parliament. "The 'two-thirds majority' rule is legally as dead as the proverbial dodo." In the second place, it should be noted that Mr. May writes as a lawyer rather than as a political scientist. Indeed, it is probably true to say that he gives us rather more law and less custom than in the first edition. Certainly he does not undertake to give a complete account of the workings of South African institutions. Parties are not discussed nor other political forces and realities. But it would be hard to find a clearer or more up-to-date summary of constitutional law.—THOMAS P. PEARDON, Barnard College.

Students of American political dynamics will welcome Professor Stephen Kemp Bailey's new book, *Congress Makes a Law: The Story Behind the Employment Act of 1946* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1950; xii, 282 pp. $3.75) as a valuable addition to their sources for the study of that immensely complex and always confusing process whereby public policy is made. With scholarly care he follows the act named in the title from its Keynesian origins in the National Farmers' Union through all the maze of intermediate steps up to and including final passage. While there is nothing startlingly new in this type of research, Professor Bailey brings to his investigation an array of psychological and sociological tools of analysis that make of this something refreshingly revealing and challenging. At each stage in the process of evolution of this law, Professor Bailey describes and explains the motivations and strategy used by proponents and opponents of passage. His most careful and perhaps most revealing study is of the work of the many interest groups and organizations which were involved in the process. One aspect of this pressure activity which is detailed here has been virtually ignored heretofore—the methods by which members of Congress and their staffs use pressure groups to advantage in gaining support within Congress for proposed legislation. The account of the establishment and use by Bertram Gross and his staff of the Continuations Group and the Liberal-Labor lobby will be intriguing if not startling to many political scientists. Those who categorically oppose the activities of pressure groups may read here with great profit. Most of the problems of organization and procedure in Congress are made explicit in the course of the narrative. We see the subcommittees and committees at work in the framework of strategy which preceded the actual meetings. The debates and action on the floor of each House of Congress are revealed in the context of rules, rulings, oratory, leadership and personalities. Professor Bailey describes the successes, failures, errors and

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frustrations attending the assignment of bill to committee, the formation of co-sponsor groups, the selection of the conference committee and its treatment of the bill, and the organization of support within the administration. Out of this welter of action and inaction, pressure and cajolery, delay and compromise, there emerged Public Law 304, the Employment Act of 1946. A far different creature it is than S. 380, the version originally introduced. Although Professor Bailey admittedly would have preferred the original version, the conclusion he draws is far from being narrowly partisan. With good reason he sees implicit in this process of change and adaptation one of the most difficult problems of American democracy today: given our present system of representation with its glaring lack of party discipline and legislative leadership, it is impossible for the public to place responsibility for the formation of public policy. We can now hope that Professor Bailey, having presented the issues so ably and suggested hypotheses for correction, will further apply his sound scholarship and insight to the elucidation of the alternatives which are or may be available to us.—GENE W. SETZER, Columbia University.

The central chapter in a new volume of the Harvard Historical Monograph series, *Judgment by Peers*, by Barnaby C. Keeney (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1949; 191 pp. $2.50), is an attempt to determine the real meaning of the crucial phrase "by the lawful judgment of his peers" (*per judicium legale parium suorum*) in the thirty-ninth clause of Magna Carta: "No freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison or deprived of his freehold, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way molested, and we will not set forth against him, nor send against him, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." This chapter is preceded by a study of the practice of judgment by peers on the continent of Europe and in England before the time of Magna Carta, and followed by two which trace the further history of the institution in England during the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The author shows that judgment by peers was a product of feudalism. Peers (*pares*) were primarily covassals of the same lord, and the recurring demand for *judgment by peers* was a demand that a feudal vassal be not condemned without judgment or be tried solely by his lord or the lord's "domestics" or ministers, but should have among his judges some of his covassals. The chapter on Magna Carta is a luminous piece of historical and linguistic exegesis. Its conclusions may be summed up as follows: (1) the need for clause 39, like the insistence on judgment by peers in other lands and at other times, arose out of the tendency of the

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lord (in this case King John) to ignore well-established custom, especially feudal custom; (2) the clause was intended to protect *all* freemen against acts of royal tyranny; (3) it invoked the *law of the land* (interpreted, following Glanvill and Bracton, in the most general sense, to include unwritten custom as well as written law) as the proper means of dealing with any alleged crime; (4) it called for *judgment by peers* in cases between king and subject—that is, in cases where the king was personally involved; (5) the peers in question were the twenty-five magnates charged under clause 52 with the task of upholding the charter. The fifth of these points is perhaps the least convincing. The author quite properly does not trouble to glance at the view, useful in its time but long since abandoned, that clause 39 guaranteed trial by jury to all free men. Chapters four and five show that judgment by peers, as above defined, was actually applied in England, and trace the process by which judgment by peers came to be entrusted chiefly, though not exclusively, to the peers assembled in Parliament. Mr. Keeney bases his work on a thorough knowledge and understanding of the sources and a careful consideration of the views of other scholars, earlier and contemporary, in the field of mediaeval institutions. His little book is a valuable contribution to the study of an institution which played an important part in the development of limited, constitutional monarchy in England.—JOHN REA BACHER, Wagner College.

Professor Faith Thompson has long been interested in the history of Magna Carta. In her doctoral dissertation, published nearly twenty-five years ago, in which she dealt with the first century of that history, she remarked that modern Englishmen, in the uses they made of the Great Charter, were not creating a brand-new myth but "were using a document with a long history behind it." It is with a great part of that history that she is concerned in her recent work, *Magna Carta: Its Role in the Making of the English Constitution, 1300-1629* (Minneapolis, The University of Minnesota Press, London, Oxford University Press, 1948; x, 410 pp. $6.50), as indicated by the terminal dates on its title page. The history of the Charter did not come to an end, of course, in 1629, but one must leave off somewhere, and by then, she believes, "the initial work of revival, reinterpretation, and publicization had been accomplished." The reader can hardly fail to agree with the author that most of the content of what has been called "the myth of Magna Carta" was venerable long before the days of Sir Edward Coke. As regards what became the most famous provision of the Charter, the "Nullus liber homo" chapter, Miss Thompson is clearly not overstating the case when she says, on the

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basis of her findings, that its later reputation was "pretty well established" in the fourteenth century. She shows that the eclipse of the Charter in the late fifteenth and the sixteenth century was never more than partial, and that its use by common lawyers and puritans in the reign of Elizabeth foreshadowed its better-known exploitation by Coke and the leaders of the Long Parliament. The author deserves high praise for her diligence and staying power in research. From the nature of the case her investigations could not be literally exhaustive, for, as she rightly says, it would be an almost hopeless task to collect all the references to Magna Carta in sources extending over her entire period. Her procedure was to exploit a wide variety of sources for what she calls "the most active periods of Charter history" and to examine only "the most likely sources" for the relatively inactive periods. The unpublished materials which she has consulted include manuscript parliamentary diaries for the parliaments of 1624, 1626, and 1628. The proof-reading has been carefully done, an amusing exception being on page 241, where failure to delete a superfluous letter in the title of one of Selden's treatises might suggest that he was an authority on interstate commerce. In a good many instances the exposition could have been pointed up and tightened up to advantage. Sometimes Magna Carta is almost lost sight of, as in the account of the case of Darcy *v.* Allen (pp. 228 *et seq.*), and there is rather too much quotation from secondary histories. If Miss Thompson were accused of some degree of prolixity, of a lack of constant sharp focus on her subject, I think she would plead guilty. But much should be forgiven her, for she confesses "to having enjoyed the tale more than the moral, the proponents of the Charter more than the theories they propounded."—R. L. SCHUYLER, Columbia University.

As a study of the intricacies of English politics in the eighteenth century, R. J. Robson's *The Oxfordshire Election of 1754* (London, Oxford University Press, 1949; 192 pp. 12 *s.* 6 *d.*) follows in the tradition of L. B. Namier. It concerns the interplay of political forces in the three predominant constituencies of Oxfordshire—the county, the city, and the university. This election was the first contest held in the county since 1710, and was ultimately decided in the House of Commons. The fact that neither the city nor the university had a contest for their own seats at this time allowed them to concentrate their efforts upon the county election. Because of this triangular distribution of forces, and because of the fact that this campaign saw the last of Jacobitism as a living issue and the beginning of a trend toward wider suffrage in so far as the question of the copyholders' vote was involved, the election is particularly worthy of study. Indeed, in ad-

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dition to Mr. Robson's book, another much briefer account has also recently appeared. (C. S. Emden, *Oriel Papers*, Oxford, 1948, chap. 16.) As far as Mr. Robson is concerned, he has done an excellent piece of research, based on the newssheets and pamphlets of the time, the city archives, and the private papers of various personages. The nature of these sources is explained in text and footnotes, and further clarified by an appendix containing brief comments on each item listed. Nevertheless some further description of the city and county records, and of the Dashwood papers, and a report on the existence and location of poll books, tax tables, and lists of freeholder voters, as generally found in the eighteenth century, might add to the reader's understanding of the author's problems and procedures. The book abounds in quotations that catch the flavor of the period, and show the range of the author's research. The worst feature of Mr. Robson's book is its style. Awkward and unwieldy sentences make the narrative—already intricate enough—very difficult to follow. Such statements as these are common: "The fears for their own security of the landowners, always so easily aroused, were incubated by such spurious items . . . as . . . ." (p. 88); "Symptomatic were a brawl . . . and such items as . . ." (p. 62); "The moral entitlement of the copyholders to a vote was as impeccable as at law it was faulty" (p. 145); and—worst of all—"Sir Edward Turner gave . . . a Carlylesque, but too febrile to be altogether comprehensible description of the denouement" (p. 151). Confusion is also occasionally produced by vague allusions in earlier chapters to matters to be taken up later (the "Battle of Chepping Norton", p. 62, later p. 97, and the poll books, p. 63, later p. 101). Similarly, persons and circumstances previously described are often not clearly enough identified when referred to later on. (Norton, p. 133 from p. 130, 131; Robinson, p. 138 from p. 137; the "Blueskins", p. 107 from p. 62.) Despite these defects of presentation, the book is a useful one, providing detailed knowledge of an election that was at the same time both typical and unique, and for this reason it can find a worthy place in the Oxford Historical Series of British Studies.—MILLICENT B. REX, Washington, D. C.

When George Washington took office as our first President, he was acutely aware of his unique position as a potential shaper of tradition. The sketchy and abstract language of the Constitution furnished no blueprint for presidential conduct, nor were there precedents to which Washington could turn. The first administration had to make its own precedents, and it is this story that James Hart tells with great competence in *The American Presidency in Action, 1789: A Study in*

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Constitutional History (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948; xv, 256 pp. $4.00). The author devotes one chapter to the President as ceremonial chief of state. He then proceeds to the more important matters of the President's position vis-à-vis the legislative branch and his rôle as head of administration, concluding with a discussion of the establishment of the executive departments. The inclusion of this latter material, incidentally, means that the book's content is broader than the title would indicate; for Mr. Hart does not merely describe the events incidental to the passage of organic acts and administrative legislation, but presents an interpretation in terms of administrative theory. Students whose chief interest lies in administration will find much grist here. Included is a lengthy treatment of the President's removal power, and here as elsewhere the author's method is to indicate the alignments of opinion and then to quote extensively from the debates in the First Congress and from other contemporary sources. What emerges is a piece of scholarship which on every page shows breadth of learning and meticulous care in research and documentation. In praising the book this reviewer desires to express but one reservation, which springs from doubts regarding the ultimate utility of the refinement of historical details and from further doubts as to the relevance which decisions in 1789 may have for government in the vastly changed circumstances of today. One feels that, useful as historical research undoubtedly is, a political scientist of Mr. Hart's marked abilities would be rendering a wider service if he devoted his energies to the critical problems government faces now, rather than focusing on a bygone era. But this, admittedly, is a bias of the reviewer; and if Mr. Hart is to write history, one can only hope that the further volumes he contemplates will be of the same quality as this one.—FRANK BOWEN EVANS, Columbia University.

Recently our attention has been directed to several regional literature "series" about American rivers, trails, lakes and cities. These have been written in an historical vein, setting forth discovery and progress. But for the most part these books have stated facts. None has taken a state apart and put it back together, revealing its retrogression and prescribing for it as though it were a sick animal. That is exactly what Harry W. Schacter has done in *Kentucky on the March* (Foreword by Mark F. Ethridge; New York, Harper & Brothers, 1949; xvi, 201 pp. $3.00). Fifty years ago Kentucky ranked with the best among the forty-eight states. And then, like a colossus developing anemia, something happened to Kentucky. When disease seemed to strike its almost fatal blow in the early 1940's, a group of

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self-appointed "physicians", who loved and believed in their state, decided it was high time to administer livershots in the state's limbs of education, economic problems, and the problems of health and welfare. Mr. Schacter, a Louisville merchant, interested fellow merchants first in the political trend, pointing out the issue involved and urging both sides of the legislature to rise above politics for the good of the state. Then late in 1943 some thirty of the most important groups of the state met and chose the name "Committee for Kentucky". "For" struck a responsive chord. Thus a name, an idea, and an inspiration brought this committee into existence. This book describes the development of a "moral climate" which can bring Kentucky up by its own bootstraps. The foremost experts in the state are helping. The people had to learn the most cruel facts about Kentucky; and the idea was to make it clear that if they wanted progress, they would have to pay for it. They would have to relearn the meaning of real democracy. March 1950 is set as the time for the committee to disband. The citizens can then carry on. The desire now is for these forces set in motion to go on and on into the future helping other states and countries. It is Kentucky's Moral Rearmament.—MAXINE TULL BOATNER, West Hartford, Conn.

SPRING MEETING
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Spring Meeting of the Academy will be held on April 26, 1950 at the Hotel Astor in New York City. The general topic of discussion will be

FREEDOM AND THE EXPANDING STATE

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The Academy will greatly appreciate copies of the March 1949 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

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